Vietnam. In this connection, as in others, the word "messy" occurs as a description of the execution of a policy after the concept has been soundly designed. China appears content for the present, however, to see a continuation of two Vietnams, left to work out relations between themselves in line with the Paris Peace Agreement.

The People's Republic has satisfactory relations with the current unified government of Laos. There are several factors which tend to sustain this state of affairs. The Chinese have championed Laotian neutrality and independence since the first Geneva Conference in 1954. They have also provided aid to the Laotians, notably in the form of a road network which is gradually being extended southward from the Chinese border. It is reported that promises have also been made to provide such much needed commodities as rice, gasoline and cement.

With regard to Cambodia, China's position is clear. The government headed by Prince Sihanouk is fully supported as the only authentic and legitimate authority in that country. It regards that government, not as one in exile but as present on Cambodian soil in the form of the unified Cambodian resistance. Here again, U.S. support for the Lon Nol Government and the effort to promote a coalition through that medium is regarded as a "messy" policy unrelated to the realities of the Cambodian situation. From the Chinese viewpoint, a unified, neutral Cambodia is an essential to neutral and independent states in a stabilized Indo-China and the intervention of the United States in Cambodia is seen as a factor which only tends to prolong the conflict.

THAILAND

The basic Chinese principle of opposition to stationing foreign troops in other lands is also applied to Thailand. That principle does not translate, however, into an active insistence at this time that the U.S. withdraw from Thailand. As the Chinese see it, that is a problem for the United States and Thailand.

Actually the Chinese have moved to improve relations with the latter country. General principles of future trade were agreed on when the Thai deputy Foreign Minister visited Peking in 1973. A contract was signed for the delivery to Thailand of 50,000 tons of diesel oil. From the Thai side, however, a number of considerations such as concern over the large Chinese minority in Thailand, estimated to be as many as 4 million, and the inability of the Thai Government to obtain National Assembly repeal of the decree forbidding trade with China have slowed the normalization of relations. Nevertheless, the process is under way.

SOUTH ASIA

There were no expressions of anxiety on the part of the Chinese leaders over the Indian detonation, recently, of a nuclear device. Indian policy toward the buffer states between China and India, such as Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim, however, does give rise to Chinese concern since these states have ethnic, cultural and historic links with China as well as with India. It is conceivable that an activist Indian Himalayan border policy, together with close Indian cooperation with the Soviet Union, could be seen as posing a threat to Chinese security

and territorial integrity in that region. The advance of Soviet military power in the Indian Ocean is a factor in this situation. While the Chinese do not urge any particular U.S. reaction, it is clear that it was believed that what one superpower does should not escape the notice of the other.

KOREA

On Korea, the Chinese position is unequivocal. It is that the United States forces should be removed from South Korea without further delay, especially since Chinese forces were removed from the north many years ago. While the Chinese leaders did not indicate how they visualized the future of Korea following such a withdrawal of U.S. forces, there was no indication that they expected that it would be followed by North Korean military action. On the contrary, if anything, aggression was seen as coming from the other direction.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chinese see the United Nations as in a transition with which they are not dissatisfied. In the pursuit of their objectives, the U.N. has come to be regarded as a useful forum for discussion and exchanges of views and for mobilizing world opinion, particularly third world opinion. The Chinese point out that the old "voting machine" in the United Nations has broken down, which means that the United States or other developed countries can no longer automatically control the positions that will be taken by the United Nations.

Notwithstanding their general satisfaction with this change, the Chinese are realistic in noting the very limited effectiveness of the United Nations and the resolutions which are adopted in that organization. The People's Republic finds its own views and sympathies coinciding in large measure with the positions and aspirations of the new and developing nations of the third world. The Chinese are wary of being labeled "leader" of the third world or of any other bloc for that matter. Nevertheless, they do have strong links to third world nations and maintain these links with skill and with marked success. China also firmly rejects the appellation of "superpower," a term regarded with scorn. Notwithstanding this attitude, China has been formally recognized as a great power by its permanent seat on the Security Council. In that role China has emerged both in the United Nations and in its specialized agencies as a major leader and spokesman for the developing nations.

Keenly aware of the limits of its own resources in relation to its own growing needs and firmly wedded to the principle of self-reliance, China is not striving to become a major source of material assistance to the developing nations. By strict self-control, China has fitted its needs to its resources and in doing so has acquired self-confidence and pride in its independence. The development of the country may have been slower and more painful, but it has been sound. The Chinese are not averse therefore, to replying "don't count on us" to expectations of large scale contributions to international development schemes and in lieu thereof tend to counsel a philosophy of self-reliance. In this context, China sympathizes with and supports the desire of the less developed countries to obtain the greatest possible return for the

sale of their raw materials. They have not entirely successfully reconciled, however, their support for high prices for the oil producing states and the needs of the poorer developing countries for petroleum, especially for the production of food.

China's views on disarmament are clear. Failing what they regard as a meaningful move to bring about general disarmament, the Chinese are unlikely to associate themselves with interim measures. They see a continuing arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and claim that each nuclear arms limitation agreement between the two superpowers has been followed by a rapid increase in nuclear armaments, notably on the part of the Soviet Union.

For their own part, the Chinese disclaim any intention of entering the nuclear arms race. They are continuing their own nuclear arms program in order to strengthen their ability to resist nuclear blackmail. They insist, however, that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons nor will they divert resources needed for China's economic and social development to engage in a numbers game in weaponry.

IV. Concluding Observations

The changes in China are overwhelming in the perspective of visits to the old China which began in the 1920's and occurred again in 1944 and in 1946. Even the progress since my previous visit in 1972 is obvious.

China's system is operating with great dynamism; it has created a new nation on the theme of self-reliance which looks to the future with confidence. Development is planned on the basis of wide diffusion throughout the country with as much self-sufficiency as possible in each region. Factories, houses, schools and other buildings in great number are under construction in urban areas. Construction in the countryside is equally active. Farm acreage is growing rapidly on the basis of immense irrigation and flood control works. As the tracts grow larger, moreover, tractors and other farm machinery are appearing increasingly in the fields. The nation is alive with constructive activity.

Measured against the past, tremendous progress has been made. The basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and good health care are being met by stressing frugality and restraint and by accenting the common good. China is still a poor country by standards familiar to this nation, a reality which is recognized by the Chinese leaders. Invariably, any reference to material progress anywhere in China is suffixed by some statement such as "much more remains to be done.” In short, pride in accomplishment is tempered by a determination to achieve greater advances.

Chairman Mao's theories are now imbedded in the fabric of China's daily life. They have produced a system which is here to stay. There may be tinkering with details and political infighting over who administers the system, but the basic framework of Maoism will not be changed. Our policy should be adjusted to that reality.

There are no signs that China is bent on the oppression or domination of other nations. All present indications are that the People's Republic is intent on internal progress and that its military efforts

are minimal in terms of its own defense. Expressions of superiority are absent from its policies which appear rooted in the principle that all nations should be free of outside domination and influence. To the extent that labels accurately generalize, China is not a "superpower" but a "second world" nation which enjoys great respect in the "third world." There is much that countries in both categories can learn from China.

For too long the United States policy toward China was based on myths. Some of those myths have been cleared away by the NixonMao-Chou meetings of 1972 and various exchanges thereafter. Since the Shanghai Communique, liaison offices have opened in both countries with limited functions. Trade and other exchanges have taken place at a modest rate. These developments have been useful but now appear to have reached a plateau. The issue of Taiwan is a block to further significant progress toward normalization.

On this issue, it should be noted that U.S. forces have not been reduced appreciably let alone removed from Taiwan. Formal diplomatic relationships with Taiwan have not been terminated; indeed, a defense treaty with the Chinese authorities on Taiwan still links us in a formal sense with their view that the People's Republic is an enemy. U.S. policies on this critical question, in short, are still saddled with anachronisms. We lag behind a hundred nations in dealing with a fundamental reality of the situation in Asia. We remain tied to a past which is fast receding into history and which has little relevance to the contemporary needs of the United States.