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About a century afterwards, Louis XV. of France assisted the North American colonies to throw off the dominion of England; but this monarch did not think fit to ground his interference on the right to protect subjects against the oppression of their sovereign. The French manifesto states that the King of France neither was, nor pretended to be, a judge of the disputes between the King of England and his colonies; and that he took up arms "to avenge his injuries, and to put an end to the tyrannical empire which England has usurped, and pretends to maintain, upon the ocean."

This intervention in the affairs of other nations took a singular turn. On the breaking out of the French Revolution, established governments became exceedingly alarmed at the course of events, ceased their bickerings, and began to draw together in assault upon France. The French people very properly decreed, that where the general will of a nation, clearly and unequivocally expressed, called the French nation to its assistance and fraternity, France would not sign a treaty or lay down her arms until the independence of the people, into whose territories she had once penetrated, should be confirmed, and popular government, freedom and equality established there. The allied powers in return, pledged themselves not to make a separate peace, but to persevere until France should be reduced. After the Bourbons were carried back to Paris on the points of the allied bayonets, these allied powers formed a new treaty, by which they engaged "mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known." This is precisely the counterpart of the French revolutionary decrees; and taking the acts of the governments since the peace of 1815 as a guide, it does not appear that interference for the mere purpose of preventing the oppression of subjects by their prince, is now held lawful by any nation. No country interfered to prevent the oppression of Spain by Ferdinand, on his return from France in 1314. And yet the allies, who had given to him the means of being mischievous, had the power, for they were then the dictators of Europe, and, if the law of nations sanctioned it, seemed liable to the duty of restraining him. England, at least, saw apparently with indifference the re-establishment of the Inquisition, and the exile, imprisonment, or death, of those who for years had fought by her side against France. The powers who gave the kingdom of Poland to Russia, Piedmont to the house of Savoy, and Naples and Sicily to the Italian Bourbons, have not interfered to check the misgovernment of those countries. According to modern international law, it appears to be doubtful whether a nation has any rights against its sovereign; and it is certain that, if it have any, they are rights which no third party is justified in supporting.

On the other hand, it appears to be the opinion of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, that the rights of a sovereign against his subjects are whatever he may think fit to claim. The Austrian and Prussian manifesto of August, 1792, denies that a king can be deprived, or voluntarily divest himself, of any portion of his supreme, never-ceasing, and indivisible authority; and the same sentiment, though seldom so nakedly expressed, is stated or implied in all the state papers of these three monarchies, even down to the recent speech of the Prussian king to his newly assembled legislature. They further assert that, by international law, all third parties are justified in interfering to enable a sovereign to retain or recover his authority. Whether they should or should not actually inter

fere, they have considered a matter of discretion to be governed by the circumstances of each case; but we are not aware that any one of them has ever abandoned, or doubted, or even limited the right.

The conduct of England in the long wars of the revolution afforded little evidence of any amelioration of the cruelties of war, although that of other nations was more gratifying. The atrocious murder of the aged Caraccioli at Naples by Nelson, was worthy only of the darkest ages. The brutal proclamations of the Duke of Brunswick could be equalled only by the untaught ferocity of pagan warriors; but a more systematic and cruel exercise of power, was the refusal of England to exchange prisoners with France in the war which followed the peace of Amiens. The allied armies were composed of all nations, a few English, surrounded by Spanish and Portuguese. The prisoners taken by the French in every battle were necessarily of these three nations; whereas, the prisoners taken by the English were necessarily French. In number, France had the most prisoners; but out of 60,000, one sixth part only were English, while England held 50,000 French. A proposition was made to exchange. France agreed, man for man, rank for rank; but England claimed that all the English should first be given up against a like number of French. Bonaparte saw the meditated fraud, which was to stop the exchange after all the English were released; he therefore proposed to exchange the whole against the whole; this they agreed to. He then began the exchange with 1,000 English and 2,000 Spanish and Portuguese for 3,000 French. This was refused, exposing at once the premeditated treachery. By this, thousands of innocent persons were abandoned to years of misery and disease; a monument of British barbarity in the nineteenth century. The scenes of the peninsular war are equal in atrocity to any of the events of what are called the dark ages. The troops of England were in the peninsula as the allies of Spain, seeking with their armies to drive out the French; yet when a Spanish city, as in the case of Badajos, was held by the French and taken by the English troops, it was abandoned to the plunder of the British troops. No age or nation can present a parallel to the horrors which Spanish citizens sustained from their "allies," the English troops. A retreating English army through a friendly country, has been described, by its own officers, as but the devastating progress of an undisciplined barbarous banditti. There is nothing in the conduct of England to indicate that the international law or morality in the nineteenth century is in any degree advanced beyond that evinced by the columns of the Vandal, Genseric, in the fifth. The Spanish peninsula may bear witness, that the lapse of fourteen centuries between the visits of Genseric and that of Wellington, had not served to ameliorate the conduct of foreign troops, whether in the form of enemies or allies.

The operation of the law of nations, in respect to the right of maritime search, has, in the last few years, assumed a more definite form, involving the utter defeat of British diplomacy in her attempts to incorporate it in the law of nations, and placing her in a most ridiculous position. We cannot but ascribe to the exertions, energy and high character of Mr. Wheaton, much of the credit of influencing the favorable turn affairs have taken.

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The right of maritime search in time of war has, from remote ages, been claimed by Great Britain, chiefly because she had the power, as the greatest commercial nation, to enforce it. The principle of free ships, free goods" had, however, been asserted by most of the continental nations of Europe; and England by a treaty with Portugal, made by

Cromwell in 1654, recognised this principle in favor of the Portuguese flag; and this treaty continued to exempt Portuguese ships for a century and a half, from the belligerent right of visit and search for enemy's property, as asserted by Great Britain. In 1810, Great Britain agreed to tolerate the slave trade in the Portuguese African possessions, in consideration of the suppression of this exemption of Portuguese vessels from the belligerent right of visit and search. At the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the rule" free ships, free goods," was adopted between Great Britain, France and Holland, and was continued down to the French Revolution. During which war, all rights of neutrals were trampled upon by Great Britain, who ruthlessly seized upon Copenhagen, a neutral port, in 1807. From that time she continued to exercise the unlimited right of visit and search, doing away, in 1810, by the Portuguese treaty, with the only stipulation against its universal operation. From that time forth, she sought to make her absolute will and power the rule of action, and to interpolate in the law of nations the right of maritime search. This right had taken a new phase, in consequence of the action of the United States in 1807, by which the slave trade was abolished. That trade being by Congress prohibited to Americans, and by the English supremacy on the ocean up to 1814, to all other nations, it was exclusively enjoyed by the merchants of Liverpool and London, to an extent greater than ever before known.

When the powers, at the peace of 1815, agreed, finally, to suppress the trade, it was contended by Great Britain that the concession of the right of search in time of peace, was necessary for her to stop the trade. The United States had too severe a lesson of the abuse to which that right could be carried by an arrogant and unscrupulous power like Great Britain, and they firmly and decidedly rejected it. From that moment, however, the efforts of Great Britain have been unceasing, to make the "right of search," in time of peace, a portion of international law; and the exceptions to it to be based on treaties, instead of requiring treaty stipulations to concede it. That is to say, they assume that, from the nature of things, they have a right to visit and search all vessels on the open seas, to ascertain their nationality; and a nation can be exempt from that violence only by treaty. At first the British government assumed that slave-trading was piracy, and might be punished by any nation. The British Courts of Admiralty, however, decided that it was an offence punishable by the laws of the country to which the vessel belonged. Hence, the nationality of a vessel became important; and England succeeded in obtaining from several countries treaties, conceding the right of search to ascertain that nationality. In 1817, a treaty was formed with the Brazils, conceding the mutual right of search; and unceasing attempts were made to form such stipulations with European nations. The ductile French government of July conceded it by convention in 1831, limited, however, to a zone of 60 miles radius round Cuba, and on the African coast from 15° north to 10° south. With Texas, Brazil, France, and many American states, England had obtained these concessions. She had so far progressed with her theory as to be menacing; and in 1842 she had cajoled the four powers of Europe, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France, to join her in a treaty of mutual search; with which treaty, as Lord Palmerston said in the House of Lords, they were to come over in a "body to the United States," and he trusted, "they would not be able to resist acceding to it." At this moment of apparent success the tide turned upon them. The English ministry was changed, and Mr. Wheaton's book, "Inquiry into the

Right of Search," appearing in Paris, with some pamphlets on the same subject, kindled such a flame in public opinion, that the French government dare not sign the treaty, showing an instance where international law was directly governed by popular opinion. The English government then subdivided the right. They claimed the right to "visit," to ascertain nationality, and not to "search," unless it be an English vessel. The whole attempt has, however, failed, like her diplomacy in Texas. By the treaty of Washington, the matter has been settled according to the views taken by Mr. Wheaton; and in 1845 England made a treaty with France, which comes to a most impotent conclusion. By this treaty the two nations are to keep equal forces on the African coast, and each squadron to take care of the vessels that hoist its nation's flag. Article 8, runs as follows:

"Whereas, experience has shown that the traffic in slaves, in those parts of the world where it is habitually carried on, is often accompanied by acts of piracy, dangerous to the tranquillity of the seas, and to the safety of all flags; and considering, at the same time, that if the flag carried by a vessel be prima facie evidence of the national character of such vessel, this presumption cannot be considered as sufficient to forbid in all cases the proceeding to the verification thereof,-since otherwise all flags might be exposed to abuse, by their serving to cover piracy, the slave-trade, or any other illegal traffic; it is agreed, in order to prevent any difficulty in the execution of the present convention, that instructions, founded on the law of nations, and on the constant usages of maritime powers, shall be addressed to the commanding officers of the British and French squadrons and stations on the coast of Africa. The two governments have, accordingly, communicated to each other their respective instructions, which are annexed to this convention."

Article 7 states: "In the three following months the right of search, as established by the convention of 1831-'33, shall cease to be exercised." Under this treaty both powers issued instructions to naval commanders; and the English instructions ran as follows, dated May, 1845:

"You are not to capture, VISIT, or in any way interfere with vessels of France; and you will give strict instructions to the commanding officers of cruisers under your orders, to abstain therefrom.”

Here the instructions, "founded on the law of nations," are positive, not even to "visit," and yet the right, for which England has most strenuously contended, has been that of "visiting" a vessel, to ascertain if she wears the flag to which she is entitled. The instructions go on to say, that when there are strong reasons to suspect fraud in the flag displayed, they may go ahead of the suspected vessel, and "drop a boat on board without detaining her." "If she really prove to be of the nation designated by her colors, and one which he is not authorised to search, (by treaty,) he is to lose no time in quitting her."

By this treaty and instructions a vessel under a French flag may not be visited; what, then, becomes of all the fine spun theories?

"That the right of search, for the purpose of detention, or in fact for any purpose, except that of ascertaining the nationality of a vessel, is the creature of treaty, and exists, therefore, only in as far as it has been expressly conceded. But the right of search for the purpose of inquiry, was created, not by treaty, but by necessity."

To add to the chagrin of Great Britain, Brazil gave notice that the treaty signed in 1817, conceding the right of search, expired March,

1845, and the right of search terminated, not to be henceforth exercised. What then is the position of England? She has abandoned the right of visit and search. If, at her own peril, a cruiser visits a vessel under Brazilian colors, and finds that she is really a Brazilian vessel, the hold may be full of slaves, and the officer inhibited from "search." If she "visits" by mistake, because against orders, a French slaver, full of slaves, she cannot arrest her. She must "lose no time in quitting her." To such ridiculous results has English diplomacy arrived. To what purpose shall she ascertain nationality, when satisfied she is not English?

It would appear, therefore, as stated by Mr. Wheaton, that the right of maritime search, since the peace of Westphalia, has been confined to time of war; and has not, as English writers contend, been extended to times of peace, ou pretence of the slave-trade.

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