absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been caused by his wrongful act. So, the infringement of any regulation for preventing collision, which is made under the Merchant Shipping Act, raises a presumption of blame as against the infringer, unless he can show either that circumstances "made a departure from the regulation necessary," or that the infringement charged could not by possibility have contributed to the collision. Again, if a salvor's vessel has been injured or lost while engaged in the salvage service, the Admiralty Division presumes, primâ facie, that such injury or loss was caused by the necessities of the service, and not by the salvor's default.* § 207. By the principles, too, of our maritime law, every § 163 reasonable presumption must be made in favour of the rights of property in the owners, whenever any question of derelict is mooted between them and the salvors. Thus, the 33rd article of the laws of Oleron enacts, that "if from any ship or other vessel have been cast overboard several goods or merchandises which are in chests well locked and made fast; or books so well secured and so well conditioned that they may not be damnified by salt water; in such cases it is to be presumed that they who did cast such goods overboard do still retain an intention, hope, and desire of recovering the same: for which reason, such as shall happen to find such things, are obliged to make restitution thereof to him who shall make a due inquiry after them." On the principle of this enactment,-which has been the law for the last seven hundred and fifty years, and which is still in full force,5-it has repeatedly been held, that where salvors make a claim, as in a case of dereliction, it will not suffice for them merely to prove that they found the vessel at sea apparently abandoned, but they must go further and prove that the master and crew, when they left the vessel, did so without any hope, expectation, or intention of being able 1 The Queen, 2 Law Rep., Adm. & Ecc. 354; 36 & 37 V., c. 85, § 16. 2 36 & 37 V., c. 85, § 17. 3 The Fanny Carvill, 44 L. J., Adm. 34, per P. C. ; Law Rep., 4 Adm. & Ecc. 417, S. C. nom. The Magnet. The Thomas Blyth, 1 Lush. Adm. R. 16. 5 In re Cosmopolitan, 6 Ecc. & Mar. Cas., Supp. xxviii, per Dr. Stock. to return, or in the technical language of the law, sine spe recuperandi.1 § 208. It here deserves notice that a ship-owner,-except so far § 164 as his liability is limited by the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 and 1862,2-is primâ facie presumed to be responsible for any damage occasioned by negligence in the navigation of his vessel. In order, therefore, to bring himself within the exemption from liability conferred upon him by the first named Act where pilotage is compulsory, it is not sufficient merely to show that he had a pilot on board at the time of the accident, and that the presence of such pilot was compulsory, but the burthen of proof lies upon him to establish the further fact, that the damage was occasioned exclusively by the pilot's fault. In using this language it is not meant 3 4 5 In re Cosmopolitan, 6 Ec. & Mar. Cas., Supp. xvii, and cases there cited. The judgment of the court in this case is very elaborate, and well deserves an attentive perusal. The Admiralty Division will never decree more than a moiety of the value of the article saved for mere salvage, independent of dereliction, Gore v. Bethel, 12 Moo. P. C. R. 189; The Inca, 1 Swab. Adm. R. 370. 2 17 & 18 V., c. 104, §§ 503-516, and 388; 25 & 26 V., c. 63, § 54; see The Rajah, 3 Law Rep., Adm. & Ecc. 539. 3 § 388 enacts, that "No owner or master of any ship shall be answerable to any person whatever for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified pilot acting in charge of such ship, within any district where the employment of such pilot is compulsory by law." See Conserv. of Riv. Thames v. Hall, 37 L. J., C. P. 163; 3 Law Rep., C. P. 415, S. C.; Prowse v. The European & Amer. St. Shipping Co., 13 Moo. P. C. R. 484; 1 Lush. Adm. R. 103, S. C. nom. The Peerless. This statutable law is applicable to a case, where the collision has occurred within the limits of a foreign port; The Halley, 2 Law Rep., P. C. 193; overruling S. C., as decided per Sir R. Phillimore; 2 Law Rep., Adm. & Ecc. 3; 37 L. J., Adm. 1, S. C. As to the meaning of the word "compulsory," see Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. Brit. & Col. St. Nav. Co., 3 Law Rep., Ex. 330; 37 L. J., Ex. 194, S. C.; 38 L. J., Ex. 97, S. C. in Ex. Ch. ; and 4 Law Rep., Ex. 238. 4 The Earl of Auckland, 30 L. J., Pr. Mat. & Adm. 121; 1 Lush. Adm. R. 164, S. C.; S. C. nom. Malcomson v. Baldock, 15 Moo. P. C. R. 304; The Hanna, 36 L. J., Adm. 1; The Annapolis, 1 Lush. Adm. R. 295; The Lion, Owners v. The York-Town, Owners, 38 L. J., Adm. 51; 2 Law Rep., P. C. 525, S. C. 5 Hammond v. Rogers, 7 Moo. P. C. R. 160; Pollock v. M'Alpin, id. 427; Bates v. Don Pablo Sora, 10 Moo. P. C. R. 467; The Carrier Dove, 1 B. & Lush. Adm. R. 113; The Iona, 1 Law Rep., P. C. 426; 4 Moo. P. C., N. S that the ship-owner will be obliged to exonerate himself by indefinite negation, but it will suffice for him in the first instance to show that the pilot's fault occasioned the damage, leaving his opponent, if he can, to establish as against the ship-owner a case of contributory negligence.1 The legal owner of a ship is also primâ facie liable to pay for all such repairs and stores ordered by the master, as are necessary for the equipment and navigation of the ship in the voyage or trade in which she is employed; for the master, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, is presumed to be the agent of the owner to give all needful orders, and he consequently has authority to pledge the owner's credit for goods supplied or work done in pursuance of such orders. § 209. In cases respecting the national character of a man, who § 165 either has no fixed place of residence, or who has two homes, and the scale is almost evenly balanced between them, the legal presumption is in favour of what is called the forum originis, or domicil of origin; by which is meant, not the place where he may chance to have been born, but the home of his parents. When a man's 336, S. C.; The Minna, 2 Law Rep., Adm. & Ecc. 97; The Valesquez, 1 Law Rep., P. C. 494; 4 Moo. P. C., N. S. 426; 36 L. J., Adm. 19, S. C.; The Victoria, 1 Ir., Eq. 336; The General De Caen, 1 Swab. Adm. R. 9; The Mobile, id. 69 & 127; The Admiral Boxer, id. 193; The Schwalbe, 1 Lush. Adm. R. 239; 14 Moo. P. C. R. 241, S. C. nom. North German Lloyd St. Ship Co. v. Elder; The Netherlands St. Boat Co. v. Styles, 9 Moo. P. C. R. 286; The Protector, 1 Rob. Adm. 45; The Diana, id. 181; 4 Moo. P. C. R. 11, S. C.; Rodriques v. Melhuish, 10 Ex. R. 110; Wood v. Smith, Re The City of Cambridge, 43 L. J., Adm. 11; 5 Law Rep., P. C. 451, S. C.; Clyde Navig. Co. v. Barclay, L. R., 1 App. Cas. 790; The Meteor, I. R. 9 Eq. 567. 1 Clyde Navig. Co. v. Barclay, L. R., 1 App. Cas. 790. * Mitcheson v. Oliver, 5 E. & B. 419; Hibbs v. Ross, 1 Law Rep., Q. B. 534 ; 35 L. J., Q. B. 193; 7 B. & S. 655, S. C.; Gunn v. Roberts, 9 Law Rep., C. P. 331; 43 L. J., C. P. 233, S. C. 3 Frost v. Oliver, 2 E. & B. 301; Beldon v. Campbell, 6 Ex. R. 886; The Great Eastern, 2 Law Rep., Adm. & Ecc. 88; Edwards v. Havell, 14 Com. B. 107. See Wallace v. Fielden, 7 Moo. P. C. R. 398; Tronson v. Dent, 8 Moo. P. C. R. 419; Myers v. Willis, 17 Com. B. 77; 18 Com. B. 886, S. C.; Brodie v. Howard, 17 Com. B. 109; Hackwood v. Lyall, id. 124; Mackenzie v. Pooley, 11 Ex. R. 638; Whitwell v. Perrin, 4 Com. B., N. S. 412. Munro v. Munro, 7 Cl. & Fin. 842; Bell v. Kennedy, 1 Law Rep., H. L. Sc. 307; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750; Forbes v. Forbes, 1 Kay, 364 ; Crookenden v. Fuller, 29 L. J., Pr. & Mat. 1; 1 Swab. & Trist. 441, S. C. ; domicil of origin is not known, or when his intention to abandon it can be proved, the law presumes, primâ facie, that the place of his actual residence is the place of his acquired domicil:1 but this presumption may be easily rebutted by showing that he has merely come to live in the country where he is staying, either for a limited period, or for a special purpose, or that in point of fact he has no animus manendi, no settled intention of making that country his place of permanent abode. When a married man has two houses situate in different countries, in both of which he is in the habit of residing, his home or domicil will generally be presumed to be that house in which his wife and general establishment of servants always remain when he is at the other. In consequence of the legal presumption in favour of the domicil of origin, slighter evidence is required to warrant the conclusion that a man has intended to abandon an acquired domicil, and to resume his domicil of origin, than is necessary to justify the conclusion that he has determined to abandon his domicil of origin, and to acquire a new one.5 § 210. The presumption, too, against the acquisition of a new § 165 domicil will be stronger in the case of a person, who is alleged to have gained such domicil in a foreign land, than it would be, were the domicil in a country where the party would not be a foreigner." Whicker v. Hume, 28 L. J., Ch. 396; in Dom. Proc. 7 H. of L. Cas. 124, S. C. ; 1 Bempdè v. Johnstone, 3 Ves. 198, per Ld. Thurlow; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 230; n. per id.; 6 Br. P. C. 566, S. C.; The Diana, 5 Rob. Adm. 60; The Ocean, id. 90; The President, id. 277; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349, n. 2 Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 230. n.; 6 Br. P. C. 566, S. C.; Bell v. Kennedy, 1 Law Rep., H. L. Sc. 307; Lord v. Colvin, 38 L. J., Ch. 361, 366; Jopp v. Wood, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 616; King v. Foxwell, L. R., 3 Ch. D. 518; 45 L. J., Ch. 693, S. C.; Gillis v. Gillis, I. R. 8 Eq. 597; The Harmony, 2 Rob. Adm. 322; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349, n. 3 Forbes v. Forbes, 1 Kay, 364, per Wood, V.-C. 4 See Udny v. Udny, 1 Law Rep., H. L. Sc. 441 ; and King v. Foxwell, L. R., 3 Ch. D. 518; 45 L. J., Ch. 693, S. C. 5 Lord v. Colvin, 28 L. J., Ch. 373, per Kindersley, V.-C.; Douglas v. Douglas, 12 Law Rep., Eq. 642, per Wickens, V.-C.; 41 L. J., Ch. 74, S. C. " Id.; Whicker v. Hume, id. 399, 400, per Ld. Cranworth; 7 H. of L. Cas. For instance, the court would more readily decide that a Scotchman had acquired an English, or an Anglo-Indian, domicil than a French one; for a man's acquisition of a domicil in a foreign country is obviously a most serious matter, since it not only renders the validity of his testamentary acts, and the disposition of his personal property, liable to be governed by foreign laws, but it is calculated to involve him in a conflict of national duties, and to subject him to the embarrassments of a divided allegiance. The law presumes that the domicil of a wife is the domicil of her husband; and this presumption is, as a general rule, conclusive. An exception, however, might possibly be recognised in the case of a judicial separation pronounced by competent authority, or where the husband had abjured the realm, deserted his wife, and established himself permanently in a foreign country, or had committed felony, and been transported.* 3 § 211. With respect to copyhold property, the law presumes, in § 166 the absence of proof of any specific custom in the manor, first, that estates tail cannot be created, and next, that if they can, they are liable to be barred either by a common surrender, or by a surrender to the use of a will.5 § 212. Where the limitation of a peerage cannot be discovered, § 167 the law presumes that it descends, not to the heirs general, but to the heirs male of the body of the original grantee. § 213.7 A spirit of comity is presumed to exist among nations; § 168 and, consequently, it has become a maxim of international law, that 124, S. C.; Hodgson v. De Beauchesne, 12 Moo. P. C. R. 285, 317; Crookenden v. Fuller, 29 L. J., Pr. & Mat. 1, 8; 1 Swab. & Trist. 441, S. C. 1 Id. 2 Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. of L. Cas. 390; 3 Macq. Sc. Cas. H. of L. 563, S. C. 3 7 H. of L. Cas. 416, per Ld. Cranworth; 420, per Ld. Kingsdown. Id. 418, 419, per Ld. Cranworth. Goold v. White, 1 Kay, 683; Radford v. Wilson, 3 Atk. 815; Moore v. Moore, 2 Ves. Sen. 596, 603. Glencairn Peer., 1 Macq., Sc. Cas. H. of L. 444; recognised and confirmed in Montrose Peer., id. 401; Herries' Peer., 3 id. 585, 588, 600, 603; 2 Law Rep., H. L. Sc. 258, S. C.; Breadalbane Peer., 2 Law Rep., H. L. Sc. 269. Gr. Ev. § 43, in part. |