period of life, and in every state of intellectual culture, man is instinctively more prone to believe than to disbelieve the testimony of others, and this disposition towards credulity may be regarded

principle, implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us. This is the counterpart to the former: and as that may be called the principle of veracity, we shall, for want of a proper name, call this the principle of credulity. It is unlimited in children until they meet with instances of deceit and falsehood; and it retains a very considerable degree of strength through life. If nature had left the mind of the speaker in equilibrio, without any inclination to the side of truth more than to that of falsehood, children would lie as often as they speak truth, until reason was so far ripened, as to suggest the imprudence of lying, or conscience, as to suggest its immorality. And if nature had left the mind of the hearer in equilibrio, without any inclination to the side of belief more than to that of disbelief, we should take no man's word, until we had positive evidence that he spoke truth. His testimony would, in this case, have no more authority than his dreams, which may be true or false: but no man is disposed to believe them, on this account, that they were dreamed. It is evident, that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns to that side of itself, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale. If it was not so, no proposition, that is uttered in discourse would be believed, until it was examined and tried by reason and most men would be unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of what is told them. Such distrust and incredulity would deprive us of the greatest benefits of society, and place us in a worse condition than that of savages. Children, on this supposition, would be absolutely incredulous, and therefore absolutely incapable of instruction; those who had little knowledge of human life, and of the manners and characters of men, would be in the next degree incredulous; and the most credulous men would be those of greatest experience, and of the deepest penetration; because, in many cases, they would be able to find good reasons for believing testimony, which the weak and the ignorant could not discover. In a word, if credulity were the effect of reasoning and experience, it must grow up and gather strength, in the same proportion as reason and experience do. But if it is the gift of nature, it will be strongest in childhood, and limited and restrained by experience; and the most superficial view of human life shows, that the last is really the case, and not the first. It is the intention of nature, that we should be carried in arms before we are able to walk upon our legs; and it is likewise the intention of nature, that our belief should be guided by the authority and reason of others, before it can be guided by our own reason. The weakness of the infant, and the natural affection of the mother, plainly indicate the former; and the natural credulity of youth and authority of age as plainly indicate the latter. The infant, by proper nursing and care, acquires strength to walk without support. Reason hath likewise her infancy, when she must be carried in arms; then she leans entirely upon authority, by natural instinct, as if she was conscious of her own weakness; and without this support, she becomes vertiginous. When

as a fundamental principle of our moral nature, implanted in us by the Almighty for the wisest and most beneficent purposes. As such it constitutes the general basis upon which all evidence may be said to rest.

§ 51.1 Subordinate to this paramount and original principle, it § 13 may, in the second place, be observed, that evidence rests upon our faith in human testimony, as sanctioned by experience; that is, upon the generally experienced truth of the statements on oath of men of integrity, having capacity and opportunity for observation, and without apparent influence from passion or interest to pervert the truth. This belief is strengthened by our knowledge of the narrator's reputation for veracity and intelligence, by the absence of conflicting testimony, and by the presence of that which is corroborating and cumulative.2

§ 52. It is obvious, that, in the hasty progress of a trial at Nisi § 44 Prius, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to

brought to maturity by proper culture, she begins to feel her own strength, and leans less upon the reason of others; she learns to suspect testimony in some cases, and to disbelieve it in others; and sets bounds to that authority to which she was at first entirely subject. But still, to the end of life, she finds a necessity of borrowing light from testimony, where she has none within herself, and of leaning, in some degree upon the reason of others, where she is conscious of her own imbecility. And, as in many instances Reason, even in her maturity, borrows aid from testimony; so in others she mutually gives aid to it, and strengthens its authority. For, as we find good reason to reject testimony in some cases, so in others we find good reason to rely upon it with perfect security in our most important concerns. The character, the number, and the disinterestedness of witnesses, the impossibility of collusion, and the incredibility of their concurring in their testimony without collusion, may give an irresistible strength to testimony, compared to which its native and intrinsic authority is very inconsiderable."

1 Gr. Ev. § 10, nearly verbatim.

2 Archbishop Whately, in his admirable jeu d'esprit, entitled "Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte," has clearly stated the main tests of human veracity. "I suppose," says he, "it will not be denied that the three following are among the most important points to be ascertained, in deciding on the credibility of witnesses; first, whether they have the means of gaining correct information; secondly, whether they have any interest in concealing truth, or propagating falsehood; and, thirdly, whether they agree in their testimony."-P. 14, 6th ed.

ascertain, with anything like certainty, what characters the witnesses respectively deserve for honesty and intelligence, and how far they are actuated by interested, malignant, or other improper motives. On these heads considerable doubt must almost always exist; although a rigid cross-examination, when skilfully applied,1 will certainly throw much light upon the subject; and a careful attention to the demeanour of the witness will furnish a no less valuable guide. Thus, while simplicity, minuteness, and ease are the natural accompaniments of truth, the language of witnesses coming to impose upon the jury is usually laboured, cautious, and indistinct. So, when we find a witness over-zealous on behalf of his party; exaggerating circumstances; answering without waiting to hear the question; forgetting facts wherein he would be open to contradiction; minutely remembering others, which he knows cannot be disputed; reluctant in giving adverse testimony; replying evasively or flippantly; pretending not to hear the question, for the purpose of gaining time to consider the effect of his answer; affecting indifference; or, often vowing to God, and protesting his honesty; we have indications, more or less conclusive, of insincerity and falsehood.5 On the other hand, in the testimony of witnesses of truth there is a calmness and simplicity; a naturalness of manner; an unaffected readiness and copiousness of detail, as well in one part of the narrative as another; and an evident disregard of either the facility or difficulty of vindication or detection.6

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§ 53. Besides these tests of truth, which are obviously of value § 45 in fixing what amount of credit is due to each individual witness,

1 In the great Tichborne trial of 1871, the cross-examination of Mr. Baigent by Mr. Hawkins should be carefully studied, as being the best modern example of forensic ability in that line.

2 Channing, Ev. of Christ., 3rd vol. of Works, 356. "For, when we risk no contradiction,

3

It prompts the tongue to deal in fiction."

GAY'S Fables, Part I., Fable x. 4"All persons who have been accustomed to see witnesses in a court of justice know, that those who are stating falsehoods are extremely apt to give flippant and impertinent answers." Per Mr. Brougham on the Queen's trial; 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 159.

1 St. Ev. 547.

Greenl. on Test. of Evang. § 40.

certain general rules must be borne in mind, as tending to shadow forth, rather than define, the relative merits of particular classes of witnesses. Thus, it has been justly observed, that "a propensity to lying has been always, more or less, a peculiar feature in the character of an enslaved people,-accustomed to oppression of every kind, and to be called upon to render strict account of every trifle done, not according to the rules of justice, but as the caprice of their masters may suggest ;-it is little to be wondered at, if a lie is often resorted to as a supposed refuge from punishment, and that thus an habitual disregard is engendered." This passage is cited, as accounting in some measure for the lamentable neglect of truth, which is evinced by most of the nations of India, by the subjects of the Czar, and by many of the peasantry in Ireland.

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§ 54. Again, as the chief motive for exaggeration springs from § 46 an innate vain love of the marvellous, and as this love, like all other, is most remarkable in the softer sex, a prudent man will, in general, do well to weigh with some caution the testimony of female witnesses. This care is all the more necessary, in consequence of the extensive and dangerous field of falsehood which is opened up by mere exaggeration; for, as truth is made the groundwork of the picture, and fiction lends but light and shade, it often requires more patience and acuteness than most men possess, or are willing to exercise, to distinguish fact from fancy, and to repaint the narrative in its proper colours. In short, the intermixture of

1 Bp. of Tasmania's Lect. on Christ. Catechism, 519.

2 The Antiquarian loves to trace the Irish blood from a Carthaginian stock. Bp. of Tasmania's Lect. on Christ. Catechism, 522.

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The woman of Samaria affords a striking example of this proneness to exaggerate. When our Saviour told her she had had five husbands, she went into the city, saying, "Come, see a man, which told me all things that ever I did." 4th ch. of St. John, v. 29.

Bp. of Tasmania's Lect. on Christ. Catechism, 522. The difficulty of detecting falsehood which has been engrafted on truth has been noticed by Alfred Tennyson, in his charming poem of the "Grandmother : "

" and the parson . . . said likewise,

That a lie which is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies,

That a lie which is all a lie may be met and fought with outright,
But a lie which is part a truth is a harder matter to fight."

Mr. Brougham commented on the same subject with great ability on the

truth disarms the suspicion of the candid, and sanctions the ready belief of the malevolent. Having pointed out this proneness to exaggerate as a feminine weakness, it is only just to add, that in other respects, the testimony of women is at least deserving of equal credit to that of men. In fact, they are in some respects far superior witnesses; for first, they are, in general, closer observers of events than men; next, their memories, being less loaded with matters of business, are usually more tenacious; and lastly, they often possess unrivalled powers of simple and unaffected narration.

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§ 55. Sir William Blackstone appears to have thought, that § 47 less credit was due to the testimony of a child than to that of an adult; but reason and experience scarcely warrant this opinion. In childhood, the faculties of observation and memory are usually more active than in after life, while the motives of falsehood are then less numerous and less powerful. The inexperience and artlessness which, in a great measure, must accompany tender years, render a child incapable of sustaining consistent perjury, while the same causes operate powerfully in preventing his true testimony from being shaken by the adroitness of counsel. Not comprehending the drift of the questions put to him in crossexamination, his only course is to answer them according to the

Queen's trial. "If an individual," said he, "were to invent a story entirely,— if he were to form it completely of falsehoods, the result would be his inevitable detection; but if he build a structure of falsehood on the foundation of a little truth, he may raise a tale which, with a good deal of drilling, may put an honest man's life, or an illustrious Princess' reputation, in jeopardy." 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 147. And, again: "The most effectual way, because the safest, of laying a plot, is not to swear too hard, is not to swear too much, or to come too directly to the point; but to lay the foundation in existing facts and real circumstances, to knit the false with the true,-to interlace reality with fiction, -to build the fanciful fabric upon that which exists in nature, and to escape detection by taking most especial care, as they have done here, never to have two witnesses to the same facts, and also to make the facts as moderate, and as little offensive, as possible." 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 215.

1

Bp. of Tasmania's Lect. on Christ. Catechism, 522.

2 Take, for instance, the Letters of Madame de Sévigné, or Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, which can only be rivalled, if at all, by those of the effeminate Ld. Orford.

34 Bl. Com. 214.