fact. Thus, if he speak falsely, he is almost inevitably detected; but if he be the witness of truth, he avoids that imputation of dishonesty, which sometimes attaches to older witnesses, who, though substantially telling the truth, are apt to throw discredit on their testimony, by a too anxious desire to reconcile every apparent inconsistency. § 56. The testimony of foreigners and of others, who, living out § 48 of the jurisdiction, are brought from a distance to the place of trial, often requires to be scrutinised with more than common caution; for, as such persons speak before a tribunal, which ordinarily knows no more of them than they care for it, whose threat they have no reason to fear, and whose good opinion they utterly disregard, they are obviously far less likely than witnesses living on the spot to be influenced by the dread of having their falsehoods exposed.1 The detection of perjury, in their case, involves but little loss of character, and no real danger of punishment. A dishonest foreigner, too, who has attained a tolerable knowledge of the language, has always this advantage over a native, that he may modestly conceal his proficiency as a linguist, and avail himself of the assistance of an interpreter, which gives him an opportunity of preparing with due caution his answer to any inconvenient question, while the interpreter, all unheeded, is performing the superfluous part of furnishing him with a needless translation.2 § 57. With respect to policemen, constables, and others employed § 49 in the suppression and detection of crime, their testimony against a prisoner should usually be watched with care; not because they intentionally pervert the truth, but because their professional zeal, fed as it is by an habitual intercourse with the vicious, and by the frequent contemplation of human nature in its most revolting form, almost necessarily leads them to ascribe actions to the worst motives, and to give a colouring of guilt to facts and conversations, which are, 1 Per Mr. Brougham on the Queen's trial. 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 126. See id P. 241. * Id. 168. See R. v. Burke, 8 Cox, 44, 47, cited post, § 1444. perhaps, in themselves consistent with perfect rectitude.1 "That all men are guilty, till they are proved to be innocent," is naturally the creed of the police; but it is a creed which finds no sanction in a court of justice. As a set-off to this tendency on the part of the police to regard conduct in the worst point of view, it must in fairness be stated, that, in every other respect, the general mode in which they give their testimony is unimpeachable; and that, except when blinded by prejudice, they may well challenge a comparison with any other body of men in their rank of life, as upright, intelligent, and trustworthy witnesses. § 58. Perhaps the testimony which least deserves credit with a jury is that of skilled witnesses. These gentlemen are usually required to speak, not to facts, but to opinions; and when this is the case, it is often quite surprising to see with what facility, and to what an extent, their views can be made to correspond with the wishes or the interests of the parties who call them. They do not, indeed, wilfully misrepresent what they think: but their judgments become so warped by regarding the subject in one point of view, that, even when conscientiously disposed, they are incapable of expressing a candid opinion. Being zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with Faith as defined by the Apostle, and it too often is but "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." To adopt the language of Lord Campbell, "skilled witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to support the cause in which they are embarked, that hardly any weight should be given to their evidence.3' § 50 § 59. A third ground of the credibility of evidence is afforded § 51 by the exercise of reason upon the effect of coincidences in the testimony of independent witnesses. These coincidences, when sufficiently numerous, and presented in the shape of undesigned correspondency, or incidental allusion, necessarily produce a prodigious effect in enforcing belief; because, if the witnesses had concerted a plot, the coincidences would almost inevitably have been commuted 1See post, § 68. 3 Tracy Peer. 10 Cl. & Fin. 191. See post, § 68. 2 11 Hebrews, 1. by cross-examination into contradictions, and if collusion is excluded, and no deception has been practised on the witnesses, the harmony in their evidence cannot be explained upon any other hypothesis than that the statements severally made are true. Each witness taken singly may be notorious for lying; but the chances against their all agreeing by accident in the same lie may be so great, as to render the agreement morally impossible. On this subject it has been profoundly remarked, that " in a number of concurrent testimonies, where there has been no previous concert, there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the witnesses; a probability which would remain, even though the witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all. This probability arises purely from the concurrence itself. That such a concurrence should spring from chance, is as one to infinite; that is, in other words, morally impossible. If, therefore, concert be excluded, there remains no cause but the reality of the fact."s § 60. So, also, Lord Mansfield justly observed on one occasion, § 51 "It is objected that the books [Keble's and Freeman's Reports] are of no authority; but if both the reporters were the worst that ever reported, if substantially they report a case in the same way, it is demonstration of the truth of what they report, or they could not agree. The word "substantially" here used is highly important, with a view to the question of collusion, since it is scarcely possible that several independent witnesses should tell precisely the same tale, without any variation. Dr. Paley, who has treated this subject with great ability in his Evidences of Christianity, states, On this subject Mr. Brougham thus expressed himself on the Queen's trial:-"Why were there never two witnesses to the same fact? Because it is dangerous; because, when you are making a plot, you should have one witness to a fact, and another to a confirmation; have some things true, which unimpeachable evidence can prove; other things fabricated, without which the true would be of no avail,--but avoid calling two witnesses to the same thing at the same time, because the cross-examination is extremely likely to make them contradict each other." 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 215. 2 Aberer. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, § 3, p. 91. 3 Campbell's Philos. of Rhetoric, ch. v., b. Rhetoric, Part 1, ch. 2, § 4, pp. 58, 59. 1, Part 3, p. 125; Whately's R. v. Genge, 1 Cowp. 16. that "the usual character of human testimony is substantial truth under circumstantial variety. This is what the daily experience of courts of justice teaches. When accounts of a transaction come from the mouths of different witnesses, it is seldom that it is not possible to pick out apparent or real inconsistencies between them. These inconsistencies are studiously displayed by an adverse pleader, but oftentimes with little impression upon the minds of the judges. On the contrary, a close and minute agreement induces the suspicion of confederacy and fraud." These last observations apply with almost overwhelming force, when the facts deposed to consist of conversations, or of a series of trifling and unimportant events, and the testimony is given after the lapse of a considerable interval of time.2 § 61.3 Fourthly, in receiving the knowledge of facts from the testi- § 52 mony of others, men are much influenced by their accordance with facts previously known or believed; and this constitutes what is termed their probability. Statements, thus probable, are received upon evidence much less cogent than is required for the belief of those which do not accord with previous knowledge; but while such statements are more readily received, and justly relied upon, care should be taken lest all others be unduly distrusted. While unbounded credulity is the attribute of weak minds, which seldom think or reason at all,-quo magis nesciunt, eo magis admirantur,—indiscriminate scepticism belongs only to those who, affecting to make their own knowledge and observation the exclusive standard of probability, forget that they are liable to be misled even by their own senses. Such persons, therefore, if they intend to sustain a truly consistent character, should act like Molière's Docteur, in "Le Mariage Forcé," who, in answer to Sganarelle's statement that he had come to see him, replied, "Seigneur Sganarelle, changez, s'il vous plait, 4 1 Part 3, ch. 1, p. 158. 2 See further on this interesting subject, Greenl. on Test. of Evang. §§ 34-36. 3 Gr. Ev. § 8, in great part. Abercr. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, § 3, p. 74. Channing on Ev. of Revealed Relig., 3d vol. of Works, p. 116, observes-"All my senses have sometimes given false reports." 1 cette façon de parler. Notre philosophe ordonne de ne point énoncer de proposition décisive, de parler de tout avec incertitude, de suspendre toujours son jugement; et par cette raison vous ne pouvez pas dire, je suis venu, mais, il me semble que je suis venu." Sceptical philosophers, however, inconsistently enough with their own principles, yet true to the nature of man, continue to receive a large portion of their knowledge upon testimony, derived, not from their own experience, but from that of other men; and this, even when it is at variance with much of their own personal observation. Thus they receive with confidence the testimony of the historian in regard to the occurrences of ancient times; that of the naturalist and the traveller, in regard to the natural history and civil condition of other countries; and that of the astronomer, respecting the heavenly bodies; facts which, upon the narrow basis of their own "firm and unalterable experience," on which Mr. Hume so much relies, they would be bound to reject, as wholly unworthy of belief." § 62. Still, it is not the miscalled philosopher alone, who is too § 53 ready to lend an academic faith to a narrative of facts which do not strictly accord with preconceived opinions, mistaken for knowledge. In all ranks and conditions of life, persons of this stamp abound, and the errors, to which their habits of distrust expose them, are at times sufficiently ridiculous. Thus, the king of Siam rejected the testimony of the Dutch ambassador, that, in his country, water was sometimes congealed into a solid mass; for it was utterly repugnant to his own experience. In like manner, the marvellous but truc stories narrated by the Abyssinian traveller Bruce, were long considered by his countrymen as mere fictions; and so late as the year 1825, the evidence given by the great railway engineer, George Stephenson, before a parliamentary committee, was much impaired by his having ventured an opinion, that steam-carriages might possibly travel on railroads twelve miles an hour. A contemplation of the instances here given, and of others which will readily occur to 1 Scène 8. 2 Abercr. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, § 3, pp. 79, 80. 3 Id. p. 75. Life of George Stephenson, by Samuel Smiles, 1857, ch. 19. |