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minished on the first and second class to -£403 and £474 respectively, and had increased on the third class to .£378.
But the most important feature is the steady progress made by the goods traffic of the country, and the apparent probability that in the course of a few years it will form a more important item in the income of railway companies than the passenger traffic.
The receipts from goods have increased from £4,750,504 in 1849, to £8,112,477 in 1853, being an increase of from £1,090 per mile in 1849 to £1,415 per mile in 1853; and whilst the receipts from passengers in 1849 were larger than the receipts from goods in the proportion of 58.42 to 46.58, in 1853 the contrary was the case, viz: the three per-centage of the passenger traffic was 47.45, and of the goods traffic 52.55.
In Scotland the progress of traffic on railways has been similar. The mean length of railway open during the year has increased from 795.5 miles, open in 1849, to 987 miles open in 1853. The number of passengers conveyed in 1849 amounted to 7,902,228, and in 1853 to 10,999,224, which represents 9.993 per mile in 1849 against 11,246 per mile in 1858. The relative number of passengers of each class conveyed would appear to have slightly varied, the number of first and third class passengers having increased, and the number of second class passengers having diminished, the number in 1849 being 729 first class passengers per mile, 2,035 second class passengers per mile, and 6,997 third class passengers per mile, against 1,107 first class, 1,971 second class, 8,165 third class passengers per mile in 1853. The receipts from passengers having increased from £540,770 to £697,712; or from £680 per mile in 1849 to £713 per mile in 1853; and the proportion of receipts from each class conveyed having been, in 1849, £149 per mile for first class, £196 per mile for second class, and £331 per mile for third class passengers, against £181 per mile from first class, £179 per mile from second class, and £345 per mile from third class passengers in 1853.
It would, therefore, appear that in Scotland the third class traffic preponderates considerably; both as regards numbers and receipts. There is also in the Scotch lines a preponderance in the receipts from goods traffic over the receipts from passenger traffic.
The amount received from goods in 1849 was £650,640, and in 1853 it was £1,068,016, representing £818 per mile in 1849, against £1,075 per mile in 1853. The relative proportions of the two descriptions of traffic were, in 1849, passenger traffic 45.38, and goods traffic 54.62; and in 1853 the receipts from goods traffic amounted to 60.48 per cent, of the whole traffic.
In Ireland the progress has also been marked, but a considerable increase has taken place in the number of miles open for traffic, which increase, (as was the case in this country a few years ago,) has been at a greater rate than the increase of the traffic, hence the receipts per mile do not exhibit a similar progress.
The mean length of railway opened in the year 1849 was 428 miles, and in the year 1853 it was 771 miles.
The total number of passengers conveyed in 1849 amounted to 6,059,947, or 14,142 per mile; and in 1853 it amounted to 7,074,475, or 9,175 per mile. The increase in the number of passangers has taken place chiefly in the first and third classes, the number of second class passengers having diminished. The number of passengers of different classes per mile in 1849:—First class, 1,226; second class, 7,138, and third class, 5,776. The receipts from passengers have increased from £290,604 in 1849, to £537,259 in 1853; the receipts per mile having been £678 in 1849, and £696 in 1853, divided between the different classes in the following proportion in 1849:—First class, £150 per mile; second class, £273, and third class, £255; and in 1853, first class, £168; second class, £264, and third class, £251. The receipts for goods amounted, in 1849, to £127,462, and in 1853, to £294,810, equivalent to £297 per mile in 1853. The relative proportion of receipts from the two classes of traffic was, in 1849, 69.51 from passengers, and 30.49 from goods, and in 1853 it was 64.62 from passengers, and 35.38 from goods.
The general summary of the result is, that since the year 1849, whilst the number of miles over which the traffic is conveyed has increased 34 per cent., the number of passengers has increased 60 percent., the receipts from passengers 36 percent., or from £1,125 per mile in 1849 to £1,143 per mile in 1853; the receipts from goods have increased 71 per cent., or from £990 per mile in 1849 to £1,265 per mile in 1853; and the total receipts have increased nearly 53 per cent., or from £2,115 per mile in 1849, to £2,408 per mile in 1853. And the proportionate increase of the traffic of 1853 over that of 1852 was greater than that of 1850 over 1849.
It is worthy of remark, that as regards the passenger traffic, the proportionate increase in the number of the lower class of passengers conveyed by railway is greater than that of other classes, and the proportion which the receipts from that class bear to the receipts from other classes is greater for 1853 than it was for 1849.
The receipts from goods are also largely increasing, and they bear every year an increasing proportion to passenger traffic.
With respect to accidents, it appears that in 1852, 216 persons were killed and 486 injured on the railways in the United Kingdom out of a gross total of 89,135,729 passengers; of these persons 181 were killed and 413 were injured in England; 24 were killed and 71 injured in Scotland; and 11 were killed and 2 injured in Ireland. In the year 1853, out of a gross total of 102,286,660 passengers conveyed by the railways of the United Kingdom, 805 were killed and 449 injured; of these 243 were killed and 369 injured in England; 37 were killed and 68 injured in Scotland; and 25 were killed and 12 injured in Ireland.
It would appear that, in the year 1852, the proportion of the number of passengers killed and injured from causes beyond their own control to the total number of passengers carried on railways, reduced for the purposes of comparison to the standard of 1,000,000 was, in England, 14 killed and 4.3 injured per million passengers conveyed; in Scotland, none killed, but 5.3 injured per million ; in Ireland, none killed, but 3.2 injured per million; and for the United Kingdom, the proportion of killed was .11, and of injured about 4.2 per one million of passengers conveyed.
But in the year 1853 the proportion of the number of accidents to the number of persons conveyed by railway was greater. For reducing the numbers to the same comparative standard of 1,000,000, the proportion of the number of passengers killed and injured from causes beyond their own control to the total number of passengers carried on railways in that year was, in England, 23 tilled and 2.6 injured per million of passengers conveyed; in Scotland, .09 killed and 4.5 injured per million; and in Ireland, 2.4 killed and 1.6 injured in every million; whilst in the United Kingdom there would appear to have been .35 killed and 2.8 injured in erery million of passengers conveyed by railway.
Memphis Navy Yard and Western Rivers.
While we cheerfully acknowledge that certain measures adopted by the late session of Congress—the establishment of the new territories and the graduation of the price of the public lands — are highly beneficial to the Western States, we are constrained to declare that, in our opinion, the more vital interests of this region have been not only neglected but actively opposed by the legislative and Executive departments of the government. The opposition to western interests was manifested on the part of Congress in refusing to make an appropriation in behalf of the Navy Yard at Memphis, and in failing to grant lands in aid of railroads; and, by the Executive in refusing to sanction the River and Harbor Bill.
We wish not to be understood as charging either department of the government, or any individual, even by implication, with a design, deliberately formed, to injure the Western States, and retard the development of their resources. But we affirm that by obstinately adhering to the policy of doing all to facilitate and encourage foreign trade, and nothing to aid the commerce of the interior, a commercial and financial monopoly has been fostered in the Eastern States materially affecting every branch of industry in the West, and absorbing, in no small degree, the profits of western labor.
The improvement of western rivers, and the establishment of a Navy Yard at Memphis, are to be regarded by the people of the Mississippi valley as objects of primary importance. The improvement of the rivers is necessary to enable us to resist the encroachments of the great commercial and financial monopoly of the east; while the establishment of the Navy Yard will compel the disbursement of at least a small portion of the public money west of the Alleghanies. These facts are understood and fully appreciated by eastern men, and hence their obstinate opposition to those measures.
The Navy Yard at Memphis should not be regarded as a local object: it is an important part of a western system of commerce and finance, and the most remote inhabitant of the Mississippi valley is interested in its establishment. We are gratified to learn that a portion of the citizens of Memphis have taken what we regard as a correct view of the subject. We trust they will finally and utterly refuse to accept of the public property upon the terms offered by Congress, and invoke the Valley States to unite in a vigorous effort to obtain the necessary appropriations to carry on the work.
Much has been said and published to disparage the policy of establishing a Navy Yurd at a point so remote from the Gulf; and objections will doubtless continue to be urged against the location by those opposed to the interests of the Western States; but we are persuaded that every well informed unprejudiced mind must admit that the establishment of a Navy Yard at a suitable point west of Cape Sable is imparatively demanded, in a national point of view, as a means of defence, and that no other place combines as many advantages for such an establishment as Memphis. This location, we believe, was first suggested by Lieut. Maury; whose opinions touching naval affairs are entitled to as much respect as are those of any man of this age. The proposition was discussed before the nation for several years, and was finally adopted as a great national measure. But at that day the mercantile and financial classes of the east had not conceived the idea of absorbing the entire commerce of the west through the agency of railroads. But regarding the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi as their great commercial highway to the Western States, it was natural that they should favor a measure calculated to protect the transit of commerce on that route. Their connection with the west by railroads presents the subject in a new light; and it is now their policy to oppose every measure calculated to facilitate the transportation of commerce on the Mississippi and its tributaries, or give security to its transit across the Gulf. Will the people of the Mississippi valley submit to this policy without an effort to resist it?
As additional evidence in favor of the location of a Navy Yard at Memphis as a means of national defence, and the advantages of that location in comparison with other places, we copy the following extract from a communication by Lieut. J. N. Brown, U. S. N., in answer to certain inquiries addressed to him by the citizens of Memphis.
U. S. Navy Yard, )
Gentlemen: I have received your letter of the 26th inst., requesting from me a "succinct statement of the advantages and importance to the nation at large, but more especially to the South and West, and to our Gulf defences, of a constructive Navy Yard at Mempnis."
While I am convinced that I cannot do justice to the subject, I will try to answer, briefly, to the spirit of your letter.
It seems tome that Memphis offers "advantages to the nation," for a constructive Navy Yard, from the fact that it is situated in the very center of the greatest supply of materials for ship building in the known world. These materials can be drawn together here at less cost, perhaps, than to any other point in the Union.
Memphis has also the advantage over every other proposed building point, of being, under all circumstances, inaccessible to an enemy; hence materials which are not "perishable," or which maybe preserved for years, could here be safely accumulated. Memphis is also nearer the shores of the "Mexican Gulf," than any of our Atlantic Navy Yards; it presents too in its superior climate advantages as a building station over either the extreme North or South. In whatever enters into warlike preparations, calculations Bhould be based upon the contingency of actual war. In time of war with an enemy superior to the United States at sea, the Memphis Navy Yard is the only one which could readily, and safely, draw to itself, by water transportation, every thing requisite for 'uilding and equipping ships or steamers. In point of economy