solation flows, viz.: If the people are as litigious as the lawmakers apparently wish to give them an opportunity to be, the starvation period for the lawyer is at an end.

Our criticism as to the conflict of decisions, however, may not be sound, for the amendment upon that subject reads as follows: "All such charters, or amendments thereto, so submitted as herein provided, when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon in said city, or city and county, shall be and become the law of this state, and of said city, or city and county, notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court, etc." Now, it may be that the first city which votes upon the proposition will make its decision not only the law of that city, but the rule of construction for the state. If it does, how long shall it continue so to be? Forever! or until some other city votes to the contrary on the same proposition. Certainly it is not intended by the legislature that one city can make the law for all the other cities of the state.

The petition, invoking the review of the Supreme Court's decision on any charter question for any municipality, "shall be filed with the legislative body of the municipality desiring the review, and the sufficiency of the petition, on any protest filed, shall be passed upon by the officer with whom the petition is thus filed.”

Then, again, "the findings as to the sufficiency of any petition may be reviewed by any State Court of general jurisdiction in the county in which such petition is filed, upon application of the person, or majority of the persons, representing the signers of such petition." (But not representing the court or a party to the litigation.)

This amendment provides that "legislation may be enacted to facilitate the operation of this article, but in no way limiting or restricting the provisions thereof, or the powers herein reserved.” We feel that this Bar Association could not perform a greater service than to provide a proper committee to recommend legisla

tion to clarify this confusing provision of our constitution, and probably a better thing would be to appoint a committee of this Association to aid the court in determining just what part of this amendment shall fall by reason of its self-destruction through confusion and ambiguity.

We may at times feel that reverence for things, which are past, is fast fading; that the safeguards, anchored with so much care and solicitude seem now the victims of virulent attack; but it must not be forgotten that stability and justice were strong fabrics, wrought by skillful hands, into the frame-work of our government, and that, upon the stability, lucidity, simplicity, reasonableness and efficacy of our laws depend the growth of our civilization, the strength and perpetuity of our government. If the lawyers by their advocacy and admonition do not protect and safeguard these essential elements of the law, they fail in the purpose of their education.

ANNUAL ADDRESS

BY

ROSCOE POUND

OF

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

JUDICIAL JUSTICE

Until recently the theory of separation of powers was fundamental both in our juristic thinking and in our political thinking. It was taken to be an axiom of free government. Until re cently, moreover, the development of our legal system had appeared to conform steadily to this theory. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was settled that the crown had no part in the administration of justice and that causes which concern the life or inheritance or goods or fortune of the subject were not to be decided by the natural reason of the executive, "but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law" as pronounced by the king's justices. In colonial America, administration of justice for a time was chiefly committed to lay executive officers. But a system of courts had grown up prior to the Revolution, and before long the only remnant of this original executive justice was to be found in the petty judicial powers entrusted to mayors or mayors and aldermen in some of our older municipalities. In the nineteenth century we went still further and developed a system of judicial interference with administration. It came to be a matter of course that practically every important measure of police or of administration encountered an injunction. We relied on tax-payer's suits to prevent waste of public funds and misuse of the proceeds of taxation. In case of disturbance of the peace the individual, and in one signal instance the nation, had come to

ANNUAL ADDRESS

BY

ROSCOE POUND

OF

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

JUDICIAL JUSTICE

Until recently the theory of separation of powers was 15damen al both in our juristic thinking and in our political flor ing. I was taken to be an axiom of free government. Inál : cently, moreover, the development of our legal system bal peared to conform steadily to this theory. In the sixteenth an →eventeenth centuries it was settled that the crown had to; in the administration of justice and that causes which conn the life or inheritance or goods or fortune of the subject were you to be decided by the natural reason of the executive, "but by artificial reason and judgment of the law" as pronounced by le king's justices. In colonial America, administration of just. for a time was chiefly committed to lay executive offers. Pat a system of courts had grown up prior to the Revolution, and i fore long the only remnant of this original executive justice w to be found in the petty judicial powers entrusted to mayors en mayors and aldermen in some of our older municipalities. In e nineteenth century we went still further and developed a syste? of judicial interference with administration. It came to be a mat ter of course that practically every important measure of poke or of administration encountered an injunction. We relied on tax-payer's suits to prevent waste of public funds and misuse of the proceeds of taxation. In case of disturbance of the peace th individual, and in one signal instance the nation, had come to