by automobile. He owned an automobile, and when he used it in his employment the company allowed him $25 per week for the expense of operation. At about 8 o'clock p. m. on May 28, 1918, near the village of Killkenny, while traveling with his automobile from Waterville to St. Paul, his place of residence, he met with an accident and was killed by the overturning of the machine; the cause of the accident does not appear. He left surviving as partial dependents his mother, a sister and brother, in whose behalf the mother brought this proceeding under the Workman's Compensation Act. The trial court rejected the claim for compensation and as a basis for that conclusion found as facts that:

"On May 27 and 28, 1918, deceased was engaged regularly in the line of his employment, up to the time he completed his work at Waterville in the afternoon of May 28, 1918, whereupon the deceased in the evening of May 28 departed from Waterville to return to St. Paul by way of Montgomery in violation of instructions of his employers and upon an errand wholly personal to himself, and in so doing met with said accident which resulted in his death. That at the time and place of said accident the deceased was not in the course of his said employment or in the line of his duties as an employee of the defendants, and his said accident and death did not arise out of or in the course of his said employment."

The only question presented to this court is whether the findings embraced within the quotation are sustained by the evidence. The question must be answered and disposed of as a question of law, and not of fact or mixed law and fact, for, as urged by counsel for respondent, review in this court in such proceedings is so limited by the express terms of the compensation act. Section 8225, G. S. 1913. A similar limitation is found in the compensation acts of other states and the rule stated is generally applied, though some of the courts hold that the findings of the trial court, or of the industrial commission which administers the law in some jurisdictions, are conclusive upon all questions of fact. 1 Honold, Workman's Compensation, § 242, where a collection of the authorities may be found. See also L.R.A. 1916A, at page 266.

The findings are not regarded as conclusive in this state, for we here review them for the purpose of determining whether they are supported

22-Vol. 142 M.

by sufficient competent evidence. In this we apply the rule that a question of law arises on the evidence in a particular case, where an impartial consideration thereof, together with all reasonable and fair inferences, will lead reasonable minds to but one conclusion. That is a well established rule, and one of general application by the courts. 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 9707; 38 Cyc. 1514, et seq. If reasonable minds may reach different conclusions the question becomes one of fact, and, where that situation is presented in a compensation case, the findings must be sustained. We have not heretofore enlarged upon the particular point in compensation cases where the evidence has been challenged as insufficient to sustain the findings of the trial court, but expressions in former opinions, in whatever language couched, were not intended as laying down a broader scope of inquiry by this court. State v. District Court of Meeker County, 128 Minn. 221, 150 N. W. 623; State v. District Court of St. Louis County, 129 Minn. 423, 152 N. W. 838; State v. District Court of Pennington County, 132 Minn. 251, 156 N. W. 278; State v. District Court of Ramsey County, 132 Minn. 249, 156 N. W. 120; State v. District Court of Blue Earth County, 133 Minn. 439, 158 N. W. 700. The statement found in State v. District Court of St. Louis County, 137 Minn. 435, 163 N. W. 755, L.R.A. 1917F, 1094, to the effect that, to justify setting the findings aside, it must appear that they are manifestly against the preponderance of the evidence, was an inaccurate expression of the rule guiding the court in such cases, for to weigh the evidence and declare the preponderance thereof, is tó determine a question of fact, and not a question of law. 28 Cyc. 1516. With this statement we pass this feature of the case and come to the question whether, within the rule stated, there is any evidence reasonably tending to support the findings in this case.

The territory covered by Niessen in his employment was in southern Minnesota, and comprised certain towns specially designated by the employer. The evidence tends to show that he had no roving commission to go out and seek business for the company, but was required to make such towns only as were assigned to him from week to week. His itinerary or schedule of towns for the week in which he met his death took him from St. Paul to Shakopee, thence to Carver, Belle Plaine, St. Peter, Kasota, Waterville, Waseca, Morristown and Farmington. He

had made most all those towns and had reached Waterville on the day of his death; the remaining towns of his schedule being Waseca, Morristown and Farmington. The evidence further tends to show that at Waterville, late in the afternoon of the twenty-eighth of May, the day of his death, he concluded to return to St. Paul by way of Montgomery, LeSueur Center and New Prague for the Memorial exercises to take place on the thirtieth, going out the next day, Friday, to make the remaining towns of Waseca, Morristown and Farmington. The route selected for the return took him directly away from those towns, and through and into towns he was not required to make, and so far as appears in which the company had no fixed trade, at least deceased was not required to make them in his rounds. It was after starting out for the return trip to St. Paul, leaving the towns named unattended to, that he met his accidental death.

There was no direct controversy in the evidence, though some thereof is challenged by counsel for relator as untrue. But the truthfulness of the witness is not for this court, but solely for the trial judge. The only question, therefore, is whether the findings of the court to the effect that deceased met his death after he had departed from the course of his employment on an errand personal to himself, are not sustained by the evidence as a matter of law. A careful consideration of the record leads to the conclusion that the findings must be sustained. Whether our conclusion would concur with that of the trial court were the question before us as one of fact, to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence, together with the situation of the parties and the character of the employment and permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we do not stop to consider, though it may be remarked that in the light of some of our decisions the question is not entirely free from doubt. State v. District Court of St. Louis County, 129 Minn. 176, 151 N. W. 912. But considered from the viewpoint of the legal sufficiency of the evidence a different question is presented upon which we can reach no conclusion other than that stated. State v. District Court of Hennepin County, 138 Minn. 326, 164 N. W. 1012, L.R.A. 1918F, 881.

Judgment affirmed.

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION OF JOHN A. STEES
TO REGISTER TITLE, ETC.

JOHN A. STEES COMPANY v. WILLIS F. REINHARDT
AND OTHERS.

CITY OF ST. PAUL, APPELLANT.1

Width of sidewalk

May 9, 1919.

No. 21,180.

easement inside of platted lot line user. The owner of a platted city block, surrounded by streets duly platted and dedicated to public use, set the business buildings erected thereon back five feet from the lot line, in order to afford a space for the dis play of goods. The streets were curbed eight feet from the lot line, and the public authorities ordered eight foot sidewalks laid. The owner laid these walks and extended them five feet further to the front walls of the business buildings. The city claims an easement for public travel in the five feet inside the lot lines. It is held:

(1) The evidence sustains the findings, to the effect that there was no intent to dedicate an easement beyond the lot line, and that the acts and conduct of the owner were not such as to require the inference of an intent to dedicate.

(2) The findings are also sustained to the effect that there was no acceptance of an easement for public travel beyond that granted by the plat.

(3) Public easement to the strip in question cannot be claimed by statutory user, for that requires both travel over and work upon the land to be acquired for six years.

(4) The evidence does not make a case of an easement by prescription, for the owner always asserted the right to use and did use the strip in dispute.

(5) The evidence does not show that the applicant is estopped from denying the existence of the easement claimed.

Application to the district court for Ramsey county by John A. Stees to register title to certain city lots. The city of St. Paul in its amended

1Reported in 172 N. W. 219.

answer denied that the applicant had any right or title to any part of East Seventh street in that city, and alleged that it had an easement for public travel over all that part of the premises described in the application between the exterior walls of the building and the platted line of the street, and that it had been in possession thereof for more than 15 years. The matter was heard by Hanft, J., who made findings and found that the original applicant was the owner of an estate in fee simple of the property; that during the pendency of the proceeding John A. Stees and his wife conveyed the property to John A. Stees Company, which duly became a party to the proceedings and that this company was the owner of the premises. From an order denying its motion for amended findings or for a new trial, the city of St. Paul appealed. Affirmed.

O. H. O'Neill and John A. Burns, for appellant.

Harold Harris, for respondent.

HOLT, J.

Stees and his as

In 1870, John A. Stees and three other persons bought the block bounded by East Seventh, Eighth, Jackson and Sibley streets, St. Paul. The block was platted into lots, and the streets mentioned had long prior thereto been by plat dedicated to public use. At that time no building for business purposes existed on the block. sociates at once erected a brick building on the corner of Jackson and East Seventh streets, and purposely placed the outside walls five feet inside the line separating the lots from the streets. All buildings subsequently erected in the block fronting on the streets last mentioned were similarly set back five feet from the street line. At the time of filing of the application in this proceeding to register the title of the property, being the westerly 136 feet of the block, John A. Stees had acquired the interest of his associates therein, but before the trial the ownership had passed into the John A. Stees Company, a corporation. The city was made a party, and set up an easement for public travel in and to the five-foot strip between the outer walls of the buildings fronting on Jackson street and on East Seventh street and the platted line dividing the lots from said streets, and that it had acquired this easement