on default of the principal debtor. But it does not follow that all
conditions stated must appear in the contract to render notice of
acceptance unnecessary.
-Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. Helmer, 266.
3. The letter of credit set out in the opinion held to constitute an uncon-
ditional promise to pay by the guarantor, and that notice of the ac-
ceptance thereof by the creditor was not necessary.
-Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. Helmer, 263.
4. Plaintiff demanded the guaranty as a condition of further credit to
McDonald, and defendants at McDonald's request signed and caused
a delivery thereof to plaintiff, for the purpose of securing the addi-
tional credit. In this there was a sufficient consideration to sup-
port the contract whether the one dollar acknowledged by the writ-
ing was paid or not.
-Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. Helmer, 267.
1. Chapter 469, Laws 1917 (amending sections 5140-5146, G. S. 1913 [G.
S. Supp. 1917, §§ 5140-5146]), authorizing the state fire marshal to
condemn and order torn down a building which by reason of age,
dilapidated condition, or other defect is especially liable to fire, and
is so situated as to endanger life and limb or other buildings or
property in the vicinity, is a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. A structure coming within the purview of the statute
may be regarded as a nuisance and abated as such.
-York v. Hargadine, 219.
2. The evidence sustains the finding that the building condemned is
especially liable to fire and dangerous to life and surrounding struc-
tures.
3. A frame structure approximately 62 years old, composed entirely of
combustible material, with decayed and weak sills, warped and
bulging walls, curled and loose shingles, with a roof which sags in
the middle, in a densely populated region, and especially liable to
fire and dangerous to other buildings and to human life and limb,
is in fact a nuisance, even if that term is not used either in the
findings or the statute mentioned.
-York v. Hargadine, 219, 221, 222.
4. A finding that, due to its age and composition, the building is espe-
cially liable to fire and dangerous to property in the vicinity and to
human life and limb, is equivalent to a finding that it is a nuisance,
and one to be removed under the authority of the statute authoriz-
ing the state fire marshal to condemn buildings.
Possession of Tenant Notice of Wife's Title.
1. Where the title to a homestead is of record in the name of the hus-
band, but has in fact been conveyed to the wife by unrecorded
deeds, and the wife, her husband joining, leases it to a tenant who
is in possession at the termination of the homestead right, such pos-
session is notice of her title.
-Oxborough v. St. Martin, 34.
Priority of Unrecorded Deed.
2. An unrecorded deed of a homestead is valid as against a judgment
creditor who had notice thereof before the land became subject to
his judgment.
-Oxborough v. St. Martin, 34.
Notice to Judgment Creditor of Unrecorded Deed. See Judgment, 3.
Payment of Mortgage by Husband for Benefit of His Wife and Children.
See Husband and Wife, 5.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Judgment, 3.
Wife's Testimony as to Her Deceased Husband's Statement of Cause of
His Sudden Illness Excluded. See Witness, 2.
1. Where a mortgage runs to husband and wife, it is presumed that their
respective interests in the debt it secures are equal, but such pre-
sumption is not conclusive and the true interest of each may be
shown.
-Dorsey v. Dorsey, 279, 281.
Antenuptial Contract.
2. An oral agreement, entered into and reduced to writing before mar-
riage and signed after marriage, held to have effect as an antenup-
tial contract, upon which an action may be maintained.
-Haraldson v. Knutson, 109, 110.
3. A complaint alleged that, in contemplation of marriage, plaintiff and
another on August 7 proposed an antenuptial agreement by which
certain real estate then owned by her intended husband and such
personal property as he might possess at the time of his death, in
case plaintiff survived him and was then living with him as his wife,
were to be settled on her; that the agreement was reduced to writ-
ing at the time, but by some inadvertence was not signed; that the
parties were married on August 20, and the agreement signed, wit-
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Continued.
nessed and acknowledged on August 28 and filed for record in the
office of the register of deeds in September. After the husband's
death plaintiff brought this action against the administrator of the
husband, who had possession of the personal property, and the son
of the husband by a former marriage, to recover the property set-
tled on her. Defendants demurred to the complaint. Held:
(1) A marriage settlement is not required to be in writing or signed,
in the absence of a statute to that effect.
(2) Under the statute of frauds (G. S. 1913, § 6998), such an agree-
ment, if not in writing or signed, is not void. The statute merely
forbids the maintenance of an action thereon. The statute does not
interfere with such contract being carried into effect, if the parties
choose so to do. It operates on the agreement only while it is ex-
ecutory.
(3) The order sustaining the demurrer was reversed.
-Haraldson v. Knutson, 109, 110.
Consent of Wife to Disposition of Homestead and Other Property in Her
Husband's Will. See Will.
4. Under G. S. 1913, § 7140, the court has power to decree a specific por.
tion of the property of the husband to the wife for her support.
-Dorsey v. Dorsey, 279.
5. The court directed the husband to pay off a mortgage on his home.
stead, which was occupied by his wife and children, and to pay $50
per month for their support. If he failed to do so, he was ordered
to pay her $60 per month and to pay the interest on the mortgage
and the taxes on the homestead. Held, that the former alternative
was optional, while the latter was obligatory in case performance
of the first was refused.
6. The foregoing provision for the support of a wife and two minor chil-
dren was not excessive; the husband's earning capacity being $150
per month.
-Dorsey v. Dorsey, 279.
Permission to Visit His Children.
7. The defendant should have been granted leave to visit his children
at reasonable times. A new trial is unnecessary to enable him to
obtain this privilege. He may obtain it by application to the district
court after the case has been remanded.
1. The Chippewa treaty of 1855 was a public law and presumptively
within the knowledge of all persons affected by its provisions.
-Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Village of Bagley, 18, 19.
2. The treaty and the various stipulations thereof are paramount and
superior to state laws within that territory, and thereby the sale of
intoxicating liquors therein has at all times since the date thereof
been expressly prohibited.
-Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Village of Bagley, 16.
3. The provisions of the statutes of this state relative to licensing the
sale of intoxicating liquors by the different municipalities thereof,
have no force or effect in the territory covered by and included in
the treaty between the Federal government and the Chippewa In-
dians in 1855.
-Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Village of Bagley, 16.
Prohibition of Intoxicating Liquor. See Intoxicating Liquor, 14.
4. The prohibitory clause of the Chippewa Indian treaty of February 22,
1855, is valid. The question is a Federal question, settled by the
United States Supreme Court.
-Johnstown Land Co. v. Brainerd Brewing Co. 291.
5. The treaty forbids the introduction of intoxicating liquor into this
territory. Any contract in furtherance of a purpose to violate it is
void.
-Johnstown Land Co. v. Brainerd Brewing Co. 291.
Promissory Note in Part Payment for Saloon Business within the Ter-
ritory Ceded by the Chippewa Indians of 1855, Void. See Bills and
Notes, 2.
Unlawful Purpose of Parties.
6. An agent of a brewing company, who sometimes acted also as plain-
tiff's agent and assumed to do so in this transaction, was an
active participant in the purchase of a saloon and the sale of certain
kinds of beer in this prohibited territory. Plaintiff accepted the con
tract that he made and took it with all its infirmities.
transaction was void.
-Johnstown Land Co. v. Brainerd Brewing Co. 292.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. See Conspiracy, 2, 3.
Indictment for grand larceny in the theft of an automobile. The point
that there was another indictment pending against defendant for
the same crime, therefore no evidence should have been received
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-Continued.
until the other indictment was shown to have been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, was without merit.
INJUNCTION. See Trade-Mark and Trade-Name, 6.
To Restrain Election of Officers after Incorporation of a Village. See
Municipal Corporation, 2.
To Restrain Electric Light Company from Refusing to Furnish Service
at Contract Rates. See Electricity, 3.
To Restrain the Use of Descriptive Words or Words of Color by a Rival
Trader. See Trade-Mark and Trade-Name, 1.
No Discretion of Court, When.
1. After trial, when the facts found or the facts conclusively established,
clearly call for injunctive relief, the court has no discretion to with-
hold it.
-Currie v. Silvernale, 259.
2. Action to restrain defendant owners of a mill dam from trespassing
on plaintiff's land in erecting or maintaining their dam. The de-
fense was defendants entered to construct an embankment to block
the overflow of water which, unless stopped, would have created a
new channel for the river and destroyed the usefulness of the dam.
Held:
(1) Even if defendants' first entry upon plaintiff's land might be
held justifiable, because of an unexpected emergency threatening
destruction of private property, subsequent repeated entries, when
the threatened destruction could not be said to arise from unexpect-
ed emergencies, must be held wrongful.
(2) The findings and the undisputed evidence relative to certain
challenged findings and requested findings require a judgment for
nominal damages and a permanent injunction against further tres-
pass upon plaintiff's land by defendants.
-Currie v. Silvernale, 254.
Order Vacating a Temporary Injunction Appealable. See Appeal and
Error, 3.
Review on Appeal from Order Granting or Denying a Temporary Injunc-
tion When the Evidence as to the Facts is Conflicting. See Appeal
and Error, 16.
Laws 1917, c. 409, Does Not Give the State a Distributive Share in the
Estate of a Decedent Who Was Maintained at Its Expense in a State
Hospital for the Insane. See Executor and Administrator, 2.
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