to exercise banking powers, other than the issuing of bills to circulate as money, to corporations. State v. Scougal, 756.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BANKING, RESTRICTING RIGHT OF.-A state stat- ute prohibiting the exercise of banking powers by natural persons, and authorizing their exercise by corporations, is in conflict with the provi sion of the constitution declaring that all men have inherent rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and property, and of acquiring and protecting property, and the pursuit of happiness. State v. Scougal, 756.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHTS.—A statute giv. ing prior liens upon the property of common carriers, mining and man- ufacturing companies, for supplies furnished them, is not unconstitu tional, as impairing the charter rights of such corporations to issue bonds and secure them by mortgage or otherwise. Such corporations take their charters subject to the general law of the state, and subject to such changes as may be thereafter made in such law. Virginia De- velopment Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
9. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUte—Railroad COMPANIES-COMMUNICATED FIRE.-Section 1511 of the General Statutes of South Carolina of 1882, authorizing a recovery against a railroad company of damages caused by the destruction of property by fire, is constitutional. Mobile Ins Co. v. Columbia etc. Ins. Co., 725.
10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPECIAL LEGISLATION.-A statute confined in its operation to the giving of prior liens to the furnishers of supplies to railway, canal, or other transportation companies, or mining or manu- facturing companies, is not unconstitutional, as being special or class legislation, as all persons subject to it are treated alike under the same conditions. Virginia Development Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893. 11. STATUTES Creating Liens-Supplies, WHAT ARE.—Pig iron furnished ■ manufacturing company engaged in manufacturing iron, steel, and other metals, is a "supply" within the meaning of a statute giving a prior lien to "persons furnishing fuel and all other supplies necessary to the operation of any manufacturing company." Virginia Development Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
12 CONSTRUCTION OF CREATING LIEN.-A statute giving to liens for sup- plies furnished corporations priority over mortgages and trust deeds executed by a corporation, after a certain date, affects all mortgages ex- ecuted after such date and after such statute has gone into effect. Vir- ginia Development Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
8. CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 5-9; INTERSTATE COMMERCE; JUDGMENTS, 19, LIBEL, 3; LIENS; TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
STREET RAILWAYS.
See MUNICIPAL Corporations, 6.
See LANDLORD and Tenant, 1, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONE, 4, 6-0; Bam-
Bee CORPORATIONS, 7-19; TAXES, 2, &
1. SUBROGATION OF INSURER.-An insurer, after paying a loss incurred by the assured, is subrogated to all the rights of the assured against the person or corporation whose tortious act has caused the loss. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
2 PROPER MODE OF ENFORCING RIGHT OF INSURER TO.-After several insurance companies have paid to the assured the several amounts re- quired by their respective policies, and thereby become subrogated to the rights of the assured against the person or corporation whose in- divisible tortious act has caused the loss, the proper mode of enforcing such right of subrogation is by an action in the name of the assured for the benefit of such insurance companies. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Colum- bia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
SUBROGATION OF SEVERAL INSURERS-INSURERS MAY JOIN IN ACTION AGAINST RAILROAD COMPANY FOR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY BY FIRE. Insurers becoming, by payment, subrogated as equitable assignees to the rights of the assured, may join in an action to recover from a railroad company the damages resulting from a fire caused by sparks from defendant's locomotive, and for which the company is made liable by statute. The right to maintain such action is not confined to the owner. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia etc. R. R. Co., 725. 4 SUBROGATION OF SEVERAL INSURERS-JUDGMENT IN SEPARATE ACTION NO BAR TO JOINT ACTION, WHEN.-After several insurance companies have paid to the assured the several amounts required by their re- spective policies, and thereby become subrogated to the rights of the assured against the person or corporation whose indivisible tortious act has caused the loss, one of them cannot maintain a separate action against the tort feasor for its proportion of the loss. If such action is instituted, judgment obtained, and payment made, the proceeding should be regarded as practically a voluntary payment, and is not a bar to a joint action by the other companies and the assured to re- cover the damages resulting to them from defendant's tort. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
See JUDICIAL SALES, 4; SURETYSHIP, 1, 2
1. SUBROGATION-RIGHT TO, HOW LOST.-A surety who pays a fudgment against his principal and has it entered "satisfied," without having it assigned to a trustee for his benefit, thereby loses his remedy of subro- gation to the rights of the creditor, as against his principal, and cosurety. Peebles v. Gay, 429.
2 SUBROGATION.-A surety who pays the debt of his principal is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor, as against his principal and a cosurety, and he is also entitled to have a judgment against the principal which he has paid assigned to a trustee for his benefit, in order to compel his cosurety to contribute his pro rata liability. Peebles v. Gay, 429.
3. RIGHT TO SECURE CONTRIBUTION FROM COSURETY. - A surety who has paid one-half of a judgment against himself, his principal and his cosurety, and has had satisfaction entered as to the part paid, may procure the assignment of the other one-half of such judgment to a AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLIV.-66
trustee for his benefit, in order to compel his cosurety to contribute his pro rata liability. Peebles v. Gay, 429.
See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 10, 11, 18.
TAX-COLLECTORS.
See TAXES, 10.
TAX LIENS.
See TAXES, 8, 9.
TAX SALES.
See TAXES, 4-7.
↳ "COLD-STORAGE BUSINESS," WHAT IS-TAX.-Under a statute imposing "upon all packing-houses doing a cold-storage business in this state, whether carried on by the owners thereof or by their agents," a tax of "five hundred dollars in each county where said business is carried on," a packing-house which uses cold storage for preserving its own commodities alone, and does not receive and store for the public, or any part thereof, is not "doing a cold-storage business," and is not, therefore, subject to the imposed tax. Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 119. TAXATION OF SHARES OF CORPORATE STOCK is not a tax on the capital stock of the corporation, as they represent different property interests, are distinct subjects of taxation, and the taxation of both is not double taxation. Commonwealth v. Charlottesville etc. Loan Co., 950.
& TAXATION OF SHARES OF STOCK AND OF Capital of CorpORATIONS.—A statute taxing the "capital including money, credits, or other thing invested," and "the value of all capital of incorporated joint stock companies not otherwise taxed," authorizes the taxation, both of the capital stock not otherwise taxed and the shares of stock in such companies, held by resident and nonresident shareholders. Commonwealth v. Charlottesville etc. Loan Co., 950.
4. TAX SALES.-A DESCRIPTION in a tax proceeding that is inherently defective cannot be aided by extrinsic evidence. Power v. Bowdle, 511. 5. TAX SALE SUPPORTED BY A DESCRIPTION IN AN ASSESSMENT-KOLL ESSENTIALLY DEFECTIVE cannot be held valid on the ground that it was the duty of the owner to furnish a correct description, and that he has, therefore, estopped himself from questioning the sufficiency of the de scription used. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
& ASSESSMENTS.-A DESCRIPTION AS FOLLOWS: "Part of section 25, in township 141, of range 59, containing eighty acres, owned by James B. Power," is not sufficient to support a tax sale and deed. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
7. ASSESSMENT-ROLLS, DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY, EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN. If a subdivision of land is described in an assessment-roll as E' NW, title based on a sale thereunder cannot be supported by averment and proof that these abbreviations and combinations of letters and figures were in general use in the state, and were generally understood by the people thereof, and that such figure, when placed as above, was under
stood to signify one-half, and such figure to mean one fourth, Power ▼. Bowdle, 511.
8. TAX LIENS ARE SUPERIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF EITHER Mortgagor or MORTGAGEE as against a person without notice, and it is the duty of the mortgagee or his assignee on failure of the mortgagor to discharge such liens to discharge them himself as they fall due. Exum v. Baker, 449.
9. Suit to Determine ConflicгING CLAIMS OF TITLE.-A LIEN claimed by the defendant may be adjudicated in an action to determine conflicting claims of title if he sets out the facts of his case and asks judgment thereon, and a part of the claim pleaded by him is that he has a lien on the land by virtue of sales thereof made for delinquent taxes. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
10. TAX-COLLECTOR, LIABILITY OF, FOR COERCING PAYMENT OF ILLEGAL TAX, If a tax-collector causes an execution for taxes to be issued against one not engaged in the business on which the tax in question has been im- posed, and, through a levy by the sheriff, coerces the payment of such tax, together with the cost of collection, such collector is personally liable to the party so coerced for the whole amount paid to the sheriff, whether it ever reached the collector's hands or not. Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 119.
See ASSISTANCE, 3; INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2, 3; Judgments, 3.
1. PRINTED REGULATIONS LIMITING LIABILITY - BINDING EFFECT OF. — Both the sender of a telegraphic message and the person to whom it is addressed are bound by reasonable regulations printed upon a blank furnished by the telegraph company upon which the message is written and signed by the sender. Stamey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95. 2 RIGHT TO STIPULATE AGAINST NEGLIGENCE OF MESSENGERS.-A telegraph company may stipulate against liability for the negligence of its mes- sengers in failing to deliver for transmission messages intrusted to them by the patrons of the company. Stamey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95. 8. REASONABLE REGULATION LIMITING LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE OF MES- SENGER.-A regulation printed upon the blanks provided by a tele- graph company, which provides that "no responsibility regarding messages attaches to this company until the same are presented and accepted at one of its transmitting offices; and, if a message is sent to such office by one of the company's messengers, he acts for that pur pose as the agent of the sender," is reasonable, and the company is not liable to the person addressed in such a message if the messenger to whom it is intrusted fails to deliver it to the transmitting office, and the company fails to transmit and deliver it. Stamey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95.
4. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES ARE LIABLE FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES received through their negligent mistakes or errors in sending or transcribing messages irrespective of the question of punctuality in their delivery. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rountree, 93.
5. INACCURACY IN TRANSCRIBING MESSAGE NO BASIS FOR RECOVERY OF PENALTY. A statute providing that telegraph companies shall trans- mit and deliver messages with "due diligence," and prescribing a pen. alty for failure to comply with the terms of the statute, relates to the
time within which messages must be transmitted and delivered, and not to accuracy and correctness in sending and transcribing them, and the company is not liable by virtue of the terms of the statute, for the penalty prescribed, merely because it makes a verbal, though material, mistake and error in transcribing a message received and transmitted. Western Uuion Tel. Co. v. Rountree, 93.
6. LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE-DAMAGES.-A telegraph company failing to send a message properly delivered to it is liable for the damages sustained by the sender by reason of such failure. Hence, if one having a definite offer of employment at so much per month, and in a particular business, accepts by telegraph, but the offer expires by lapse of time, and the opportunity is lost by a failure of the company to send the message, it is liable for the actual damages sustained by the sender. The plaintiff would be entitled to recover at least one month's wages, if he remained unemployed for that length of time and could not obtain employment elsewhere, as such offer would, prima facie, cover the term of at least one month. Baldwin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 194.
7. OMITTED CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT BE INTRODUCED BY AMENDMENT THOUGH IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN JOINED WITH THE ONE SUED ON.-The statutory penalty for failure to transmit messages promptly is a separate and distinct cause of action from the damages recoverable under the gen- eral law for like default. While the statute allows both causes to be joined in the same action, there is no authority, where one is omitted, for introducing it by way of amendment to the declaration pending the action. No amendment adding a new and distinct cause of action is allowable unless expressly provided for by law. Baldwin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 194.
8. LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER MESSAGE-ERRONEOUS ADDRESS. If the sender of a telegraphic message gives the company the wrong street address of the sendee, and the company receives and carries the message promptly to the place designated by the sender, but is unable to deliver it because the sendee is not there, it is not bound, in order to escape the statutory penalty for failure to deliver with due diligence, to take the message to another address which it does not know, and has no reason to believe is the right one, although the name given at such address is the same surname as that given in the mes- sage. In order to hold the company liable it must appear that is knew the proper address of the sendee, or could have readily ascer tained it in the exercise of ordinary diligence. Western Union Tel Co. v. Patrick, 90.
9. PREPAID MESSAGE AS EVIDENCE CALLING FOR PROMPT DELIVERY.—In an action against a telegraph company to recover for failure to deliver a message with due diligence, the fact that the message as delivered was marked "paid" is evidence tending to show that it was a pre- paid message, and should have been delivered with due diligence as required by the statute upon which the action is founded. Conyers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 100.
10. MESSAGE DELIVERED AS EVIDENCE OF MESSAGE SENT.-In an action against a telegraph company to recover for failure to deliver a message with due diligence, the message as delivered is admissible to prove the contents of the message as sent, without producing or accounting for
« 이전계속 » |