lunatic must first be established by the inquisition of a jury, and a guardian or committee of his person and estate must then be appointed according to law, before any proceeding can be taken by any one to procure a sale of his estate for his maintenance, or for a change of investment. The court's authority to decree a sale of the estate of a lunatic for his support, and for a change of investment, being derived solely from the statute can only be rightfully exercised when invoked by the only person who is, under the code, permitted to invoke it. A mere stranger to the lunatic's estate, though akin to him by blood, has no standing in court for such a purpose. Having no interest in the lunatic's estate whilst the lunatic lives, and not being intrusted with the custody and control of his property by any proceeding whatever, he would be simply a volunteer, and his bill of complaint would be wholly ineffectual to give the court jurisdiction at all. It is repugnant to the plainest dictates of natural justice that one having no interest in or claim against the 35 estate of another, should still possess the right to procure a decree stripping the latter of the ownership of his property, and simultaneously adjudging him a lunatic, without the solemn inquisition of a jury, upon a mere ex parte allegation, and substantially ex parte proof of the owner's mental infirmity. For such a proceeding no precedent has been cited or can be found.

The bill of complaint in this case was not filed by a creditor, nor by any one having an interest in or lien on the property decreed to be sold; and as Mrs. Traber has never been found, by an inquisition, to be non compos mentis, and as, under our statutes, no one but the guardian, committee, or trustee of a person who has been actually found by a jury to be a lunatic, can make application to a court of equity for a decree directing the sale of the lunatic's property for his support, or to effect a reinvestment, it is perfectly obvious that the court which passed the decree under which the sale now excepted to was made, was entirely without jurisdiction, and that the decree is, in consequence, a pure nullity, and not merely the result of an irregularity. This being so, the purchaser under that decree can get no title at all, and his exceptions to the ratification of the sale should have, therefore, been sustained. The order overruling those exceptions and finally ratifying the sale will, for the reason that the court

was without jurisdiction to pass the decree under which the sale was made, be reversed with costs.

Order reversed, with costs in this court and in the court below.

JUDICIAL SALES.-RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO SET ASIDE ON ACCOUNT OF IRREGULARITY IN PROCEEDINGS: See the extended note to Watson v. Tromble, 29 Am. St. Rep. 497.

INSANE PERSONS-POWER OF EQUITY TO SELL PROPERTY OF.-A court of equity has inherent power to order a sale of a lunatic's real estate: Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338; 37 Am. Rep. 111.

INSANE PERSONs-Care and CUSTODY OF.-Exclusive care and custody of the estates of idiots, lunatics, and habitual drunkards, as well as of their persons, is vested by statute in the court of chancery: L'Amoreux v. Crosby, 2 Paige, 422; 22 Am. Dec. 655.

ROBINSON V. HURST.

[78 MARYLAND, 59.]

CONFLICT OF LAWS.-IF A POLICY OF INSURANCE IS APPLIED FOR IN THIS STATE by a resident thereof, and the corporation issuing the policy is a resident of another state, and an assignment is subsequently made by a citizen of the first-named state, any controversy afterward arising between the assignee and the heirs or personal representatives of the assignor will be controlled by the laws of the state in which the policy was applied for, and of which the assignee and the representatives of the assignor are residents, rather than by the laws of the state whose corporation issued the policy.

CONSIDERATION.-A MORAL OBLIGATION is sufficient to support a promise to pay. INSURANCE, ASSIGNMENT OF, CONSIDERATION FOR.-One who procures from a member of a partnership a loan of the firm's moneys by misrepresen. tation is, after such member has made good to his firm the loss resulting to the firm, under a moral obligation to repay him, and this obligation will support an assignment of the policy of insurance upon his life made for the purpose of idemnifying such person for the loss he had thus sustained.

INSURANCE, ASSIGNMENT OF WHEN PAYABLE TO LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES.— A policy on the life of the assured payable to his legal representatives may be assigned by him with the assent of the insurers, and the rights of the assignee are ] ara nount to the claims of the heirs or personal representatives of the assu ed.

John M. Carter and F. A. Thompson, for the appellants.

Edwin Harvie Smith, for the appellee.

63 ROBERTS, J. The appeal in this case is taken from a decree of the circuit court of Baltimore city. The facts dis

closed by the record are that Albert B. Faulkner, a member of the firm of Bruff, Maddux & Faulkner, some time in the month of January, 1885, applied to the appellee, who was the senior member of the firm of Hurst, Purnell & Co., for a loan of two thousand dollars. The appellee said he had no money to loan, but that he would loan him the firm's money to the amount requested, if he could be convinced that he was safe in so doing. Faulkner assured him of the solvency of his firm, and succeeded in obtaining the loan. Within thirty days after this transaction the firm of Bruff, Maddux & Faulkner assigned for the benefit of creditors, and in the April following effected a compromise with their creditors, at forty cents on the dollar. The appellee's firm 64 were subsequently paid forty cents in the dollar of their claim, amounting to eight hundred dollars, and allowed as a credit in said claim the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars for account of the storage of certain merchandise which reduced the indebtedness of Bruff, Maddux & Faulkner, to the sum of one thousand and forty-seven dollars, which amount the appellee paid to his firm. From a careful examination of the testimony contained in the record we think there can be no reasonable doubt that Faulkner was fully aware of the fact that the appellee had treated his original negotiation with Faulkner in the loan of two thousand dollars as a personal matter, in which he allowed his confidence in Faulkner's integrity to control his conduct, and that his firm ought not to be the loser in a matter which was a personal favor bestowed, and not a business transaction for the benefit of his firm. Faulkner was undoubtedly cognizant of these facts and of the fact that the appellee had reimbursed his firm the balance due it, and in his subsequent dealings with the appellee he manifestly considered himself as occupying toward the appellee the same relation which integrity and honesty had imposed upon the appellee in his conduct toward his own firm. This, we think, clearly appears from the testimony of Mr. Jones, when in answer to the third. interrogatory he says: "Well, Mr. Faulkner told me on several, many occasions subsequent to his failure, that he felt badly mortified owing Mr. Hurst and Mr. Robinson W. Cator certain moneys which he had borrowed of them, and that they were aggravated with him that he should have borrowed that money when he was on the verge of failing, and that they had so expressed themselves. I said to Mr. Faulk

ner that he ought to do something for these gentlemen, and either he suggested, or myself, I am not sure which, that he would take out or send to them an insurance on his life sufficient to cover the debts; this conversation was 65 in reference to both Hurst and Cator, so that, if he died, they would get their money; and he told me of several parties to whom he owed money that if he lived he expected to pay them, and among those was Hurst and Cator, and I was another one." Further on Mr. Jones, in answer to the twelfth interrogatory in chief, which reads: "Do you know on what grounds Mr. Hurst objected to signing for Hurst, Purnell & Company"? A. "He objected on the grounds that the money which Mr. Faulkner owed him was a private, confidential loan upon which he made nothing, and which he said Mr. Faulkner must return him." But, if any doubts remain, the following letter ought to dissipate the same:

"PHILA., April 21st, 1886. "Mr. John E. Hurst, Baltimore, Md.,

"DEAR SIR: Last June I offered to transfer to you a policy of insurance on my life, as security for the balance of the amount due you by B. M. & F., but you said you preferred not to take it then, because Mr. Bruff had agreed to pay you the balance of the debt; as he has failed to carry out the compromise, I hand you herewith the policy, viz., Policy No. 33838 in the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., of N. Y., for $1,500.00, which I trust you will accept and hold as the best security I can offer you now. Please acknowledge receipt and be kind enough to let me know how much has been paid to you.

"I enclose assignment of the policy in duplicate, one of which I think has to go to the Co. in N. Y., and if these are not properly drawn, will you please have two properly drawn by the agent in Balto., and forwarded to me, and I will execute them at once. Yours respectfully,

"A. B. FAULKNER."

66 In such a state of case there can be no necessity for us to trouble ourselves with any question of law, as it is purely a question of fact. The appellee considered himself a creditor of Faulkner, and Faulkner admitted that he was, and in seeking to discharge the debt he has resorted to a method which in no manner involved the firm of Bruff, Maddux & Faulkner, or detracted from the assets of the firm, but he

wagered his own life in its fulfillment, and he had, both in law and morals, a perfect right, self-imposed though it be, to insure his life, in order that he might thereby be able to give indemnity to friends, who in financial straits had assisted him, and he at the same time had deceived. It was not only justice to his friends, but in the highest degree honorable to himself. If the appellee had voluntarily paid for Faulkner or his firm a sum of money, for which he was under no legal obligation to pay, and, instead of insuring his life for the benefit of the appellee, he had executed mortgage in favor

of Hurst on certain property to indemnify him against loss, could it be fairly argued that the appellee was not entitled to the benefit of the indemnity, or that Faulkner had no right to comply with the dictates of his conscience in giving the indemnity? Acting under no restraint, but freely and voluntarily, he transferred the policy in question as follows:

"For value received, I do hereby assign, transfer, and set over unto John E. Hurst, of Baltimore city, the above-named certificate of membership, and all sums of money, interest, benefit, and advantage whatsoever now due, or hereafter to arise, or to be had or made by virtue thereof, to have and to hold unto the said John E. Hurst.

"In witness thereof I hereunto set my hand and seal, this twenty-first of April, one thousand eight hundred and eightysix. ALFRED B. FAULKNER. [L. 8.] 67 "Executed and delivered in the presence of

"James D. Carter." "The 'Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association' hereby consent to the above assignment, subject to the conditions of the certificate. J. M. STEVENSON, Asst. Secretary.

"New York, May 5th, 1886."

Our attention has been called to the latter part of the seventh condition of the certificate, which is in the following words: "An insurable interest must be shown by all claimants, at time of claim hereunder, and claims by any creditor as beneficiary or assignee shall not exceed the amount of the actual bona fide indebtedness of the member to him, together with any payment made to the association under this certificate by such creditor, with interest at six per cent, and this certificate as to all amounts in excess thereof shall be void." It is claimed by the appellants, but we think erroneously, that the appellee is by this condition required to show that