persons. houses and As regards ecclesiastical property, wherever there is a Ecclesiastical liability to repair or for dilapidations, there is an insurable interest. As the policy of the law throws upon the incumbent of a benefice the duty of keeping in repair the buildings belonging to it, making him and his estate. liable for dilapidations, although caused by accidental fire (a), there is, perhaps, no class to whom fire insurance is a more necessary protection than the clergy. This responsibility attaches, as regards the parsonage-house Parsonage and other buildings belonging to a benefice, to every person buildings. holding possession of it, whether rector, vicar, or under whatever name he may be entitled (b). It also extends to the repair of the chancel of the church, which falls upon the Chancel. parson where there is no custom imposing it upon the parish, or the owner of any particular estate. In the case of a rectory where the freehold of the chancel (as well as of the body of the church and the churchyard) is vested in the rector he is bound to repair, and a lay impropriator is so equally. When there are both rector and vicar, they must contribute in proportion to their benefices (c). The repair of the church, exclusive of the chancel, belongs to the parishioners (c), and in London there is a general custom for the parishioners to repair the chancel, as well as the body of the church (d). And this responsibility applies, not only where there has been a partial damage, but where the building has been burnt down and totally destroyed, being "pro "reparatione aut necessaria re-edificatione" (e). The duty of inquiring into dilapidations, and reporting to the bishop, belongs to the rural deans (f). They would have no power to enjoin, although they will do well to recommend the practice of insuring ecclesiastical buildings. Merchandise insurable interest when arising from possession. The liability of the bailee to the bailor. As regards goods and merchandise, the cases appear to have gone so far as to provoke the inference that any lawful possession creates an insurable interest. Instead, however, of hazarding this general proposition as true without qualification, it will be desirable to examine the cases in which a bailee, or person holding the possession of goods which are the property of another, may be held entitled to insure in his own name. The leading case of Coggs v. Bernard, is the foundation of the law of bailment; and in the report of that case, and the cases cited in the notes to it in the first vol. of Smith's Leading Cases (a), will be found the principles to guide us in deciding most questions which can arise as to the responsibility of the bailee to the bailor. The measure of the responsibility depends in the first instance on the nature of the contract. A gratuitous depositor is answerable for gross negligence; a person to whom chattels have been lent gratuitously for slight negligence; a person to whom chattels have been sent on hire is bound to take the same care as a diligent householder would take of his own goods; a pawnee, or person with whom a chattel is deposited to secure a debt, is bound to use ordinary diligence, and the same may be said either of a person who takes charge of the property for hire as a warehouseman or wharfinger, or of a tradesman or workman who receives the goods to work upon, as where a tailor receives cloth to be made into garments, or a goldsmith jewels to be set. In two cases only the law makes an exception against the bailee by holding him responsible, notwithstanding the absence of any proof of want of care, namely, in those of a common carrier and an innkeeper, who are held in an especial manner responsible for the actual performance of duties which they have undertaken towards the public. Bailee generally (a) Page 82. houseman, or wharfinger. for damage by fire unless it be proved that the fire took place by his default, neglect, or wilful misbehaviour (a). Neither is a factor, warehouseman, or wharfinger liable in Factor, waresuch a case, but he may insure the property, in which, it is to be observed, he possesses a legal interest, such as would entitle him to maintain an action of trover against a wrongdoer, and if he does so, he is not limited in his right to recover from the office to the amount of any lien which he may have upon the goods. Thus in the case of Waters v. The Monarch Fire Office (b), wharfingers effected an insurance on goods, "their own in trust or on commission," under a general floating policy which included a warehouse of their own which was burnt down. They were not responsible to their customers, neither did it appear that the latter were aware that any insurance had been effected. The insurers contended that insurable interest of the plaintiffs was limited by the amount of their charges for landing, wharfage, and cartage, and paid a sum into Court. It was, however, considered that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full amount which they claimed, and beyond their particular interest were trustees for the parties beneficially interested. The decision was upon a special case, and Lord Campbell, and the other Judges sitting with him, concurred in the opinion that the property destroyed was covered by the words "goods in trust," and that there was nothing, either in the common or statute law, to make such a contract illegal (c). land. A common carrier is a person who undertakes to carry Carriers by goods from place to place for hire. He is the public servant, and is bound to carry, and is responsible for every injury occasioned to the goods by any means whatsoever, except only the act of God or the king's enemies, and consequently (a) Shackell v. West, 29 L. J. M. C. 45. (b) 5 Ell. & B. 870; 2 Jur. N. S. 375. (c) The dicta that the real owner must eventually benefit, or that the is so for accidental fire (a). His liability is limited by the Land Carriers' Act, 11 Geo. IV., and 1 Wm. IV., c. 68 (b), which enacts (sec. 1) that no common carrier by land for hire shall be liable for loss or injury to any gold or silver coin, gold or silver in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, precious stones, jewellery, watches, clocks, trinkets, bills, bank notes, orders, notes, securities for payment of money, stamps, maps, writings, title-deeds, paintings, engravings, pictures, gold or silver plate or plated articles, glass, china, silks (manufactured or unmanufactured, wrought-up or not wrought-up with other materials), furs, or lace, contained in any parcel, when the value exceeds the sum of £10, unless at the time of delivery the value and nature of the article shall have been declared, and the increased charges paid, or an engagement to pay the same, accepted by the person receiving the parcel. By sec. 7 the carrier may demand an increased rate of charge for such parcels, which is to be notified by a notice affixed in his office. Carriers who omit to affix the notice are, by sec. 3, precluded from the benefits of the Act, as far as the right to the extra charge is concerned, but are even in that case entitled to a declaration of the value and nature of the goods (c). By sec. 4 they are prohibited from attempting to limit their liability by public notice as to articles not within the Act, but special contracts are permitted; and by sec. 8 their liability is left untouched by losses occasioned by the felonious acts of their own servants. As regards goods for which the carrier is responsible, no doubt could have been entertained of his possessing an insurable interest, but it has been decided that his liability is not the limit of that interest. In The London and North-Western Railway Company v. Glyn (d), the policy was "on goods," the plaintiffs' "own (a) Bourne v. Gatliffe, 11 Cl. & F. 45. (b) See also 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. (c) Hart v. Baxendale, 6 Exch. 769; Pinciani v. London and South-Western Railway Company, 18 C. B. 226. (d) 5 Jur. N. S. 1004. and in trust as carriers," in a certain warehouse; part of the goods destroyed consisted of silk, which had not been "declared," nor any extra rate paid. The defendant contended that the plaintiffs insured their own risk as carriers, and did not effect the insurances as trustees, and that their claim was limited to the value of their own lien. The Court held that the case was governed by that of Waters v. The Monarch Fire Office (a), and that the assured were entitled to recover the full value of the goods-that there would be an equity, on the receipt of more money than would cover their own lien, after the satisfaction of which they would be trustees for their customers. "I understand," said Judge Crompton, "the Carriers' Act to say 'that the "sender of the goods shall be his own insurer in particular LL L cases, unless he chooses to pay an additional sum and "❝ make the carriers insurers.' But a man may say, 'I do not choose to declare the risk, I will be my own insurer'; "or, knowing that there is a floating policy that will cover "his property, may say, 'I will look to the insurance office "and not the carrier.' I see nothing at all necessarily "fraudulent in that." When the goods have arrived at the end of the transit, the carrier, it is said (b), is bound to keep them a reasonable time, at his own risk, for the owner; and it would seem that, during the period that he does so, under the obligation springing out of his receipt of them as carrier, he is subject to the same liability as during their transit; but after the termination of this period he is liable only as an ordinary bailee. As regards carriers by water, in addition to the common Carriers by stipulation in charter parties and bills of lading against loss water. by fire, they are protected by the 26th Geo. III., c. 86, s. 2, which enacts that no shipowner shall be responsible for any loss which shall happen to any goods or merchandise by any fire on board his ship. This statute has been held to (a) Supra. (b) Coggs v. Bernard, Smith's Lea. Cas. Vol. I. p. 103, citing 1 Hyde v. Trent Navigation Com- |