The Secretary said that he did not recall that the minutes of the proceedings of the Council of Four showed any suggestion that such an agreement had been made, which, from the standpoint of Great Britain, had decided the matter.

The Ambassador said that of course the agreement only had the effect of binding Great Britain; and that it was still open for the United States to come to an agreement with Japan. The Secretary then said that as he understood the Ambassador, it meant that if the United States agreed with Japan, Japan was to have the islands; and if it did not agree, Japan was still to have the islands; that he could not understand what was to be the purpose of the agreement if the matter had already been decided.

The Ambassador then said that the United States had agreed that Japan should have the islands. The Secretary remarked that it would seem that there were two positions which should be considered separately. If the United States had agreed that Japan should have the islands, it was quite unnecessary to consider the engagement of 1916 between Great Britain and Japan; the position of this Government was that the United States had not so agreed, and it was only on the assumption that there was no such agreement on the part of the United States that the Secretary understood that it was the disposition of the British Government to invoke, as against the position of the United States, this engagement of 1916. The Secretary concluded that the latter position could not be supported by the contention that the United States had agreed.

The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider the position of his Government; that it had entered into this agreement with Japan in good faith and that it felt bound to carry it out. He asked what else it could do. The Secretary asked what was the position of the British Government with reference to the Treaty of Versailles? Did not the Treaty of Versailles necessarily have the effect of voiding any prior and inconsistent arrangement? Was it possible that anything that was done under the Treaty, no matter what equality of participation the Treaty itself provided for, was to be done upon the basis of agreements which had been previously made? The Secretary pointed out that if it had been the purpose to carry out this earlier agreement with Japan, the Treaty of Versailles should have stated that by virtue of the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, the islands in the north Pacific were allocated to Japan. Instead of this, however, the Treaty provided that Germany renounce her right and title in favor, not of Japan, but of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Secretary was unable to see how proceedings taken under this Treaty would be taken in the view that Japan already was entitled to the Island of Yap.

The Ambassador said that the position was simply that Japan was entitled to Great Britain's votes, but that it remained for the United States to express its agreement, and thereupon the Secretary again stated that that brought the question back to the inquiry whether the United States had agreed; that if the United States had agreed, that ended the matter; but that if it had not agreed, the position of this Government was that the Island could not be disposed of without its assent. The Secretary felt that it should be remembered, without the slightest disposition to exaggerate, the part that America played in obtaining the victory. It was only fair to say that the British Government would not be discussing the disposition of the Islands in the north Pacific if America had not entered the war and had not aided in obtaining the victory. In fact, if America had not participated in the war and enabled the Allies to win the victory, there would be nothing now to discuss. The Secretary said it seemed very extraordinary to him that when, after the victory had been won, the opportunity had thus been created for the disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany, and when the United States merely asked for an equal opportunity where her interests were involved, she should be informed that Great Britain was powerless to give her any support in her contention because of a prior agreement with Japan.

The Secretary said that he thought the British Government should seriously consider the effect of such a position upon public opinion in America; that the Secretary believed the reaction would be immediate. The Secretary added that he was proceeding in the view that cooperation between this Government and Great Britain was most important in the interests of the world, and that he looked for the most friendly disposition in endeavoring to settle the problems that we had to face; but little progress could be made in this direction if the American people got the idea that Great Britain made some engagement with Japan,-before we entered the war, and inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles,—the basis for resisting the very modest request of the United States, as the only benefit she desired for herself was an equal participation in those opportunities important to the United States which had accrued to the Allied and Associated Powers through the common victory.

The Ambassador said that his Government was fully alive to the possible effect upon public opinion in America and that they were able to make the very shrewd guess of what our reply would be, but that they thought they had no alternative, and that no matter what the consequences they must abide by their agreement with Japan—at least, he added, unless Japan could be persuaded to admit the contention of the United States.

8621.01/126

The Italian Embassy to the Department of State 30

[Translation 81]

Italy is fully convinced that the United States are not asking for any privilege in the Island of Yap which is not equally granted to every other nation, including Japan. Italy is also convinced that the United States intend to protect their interests in the Island of Yap with full consideration for the interests of other nations.

82

Italy therefore has not hesitated to harmonize its language with the declaration contained in the last part of the note of the United States of the 5th instant, concerning the equality of rights of the mandatories in the exercise of all the mandates. Italy wishes and trusts that the just rights of everybody concerned be recognized always and everywhere, in the Island of Yap as well as in every other place and circumstance, with perfect equality and justice.

Italy seconded the Anglo-French proposal which confided the study of the Yap question to the Juridical Committee and the Conference of the Ambassadors in Paris, and she now expects that the Conference will pronounce itself impartially in such way as to eliminate every possibility of disagreement and to conciliate all conflicting interests.

Italy is particularly glad whenever the moral policies of the two Governments and the material interests of the two nations agree in such a way as to put Italy and the United States in a position to cooperate towards the attainment of the common end, which consists in the realization of an era of serene peace and prosperity for the civilized world.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RELATING TO CERTAIN PACIFIC ISLANDS FORMERLY IN GERMAN POSSESSION

8621.01/1411⁄2

Memorandum of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador (Shidehara), June 3, 1921

[Extract]

33

(3) The Ambassador brought up the question of Yap. He said that his Government had instructed him to ascertain more definitely what was the American position. He referred to the fact that the

"Handed to the Secretary of State by the Italian Ambassador, Apr. 29, 1921. "File translation revised.

*For previous correspondence concerning Yap, see pp. 263 ff.

mandate covered other islands north of the Equator, and inquired whether the United States claimed an interest in these islands.

The Secretary stated that the principle was of general application to all the overseas possessions of Germany, and that there was no reason why the United States should be denied an equal participation. The Secretary, however, said that while he would maintain this general principle, if it were contested, still the United States had no desire to advance the principle for the purpose of obtaining territory or of increasing its possessions, but merely for the purpose of protecting its interests so that wherever it is important, there should be no denial of equality of opportunity through any exclusive use by any of the other Powers of the possessions which formerly belonged to Germany. The Secretary said he did not see upon what grounds it could be maintained, after we had entered the war and participated in obtaining the victory, that those associated with us should attempt to deprive us of equal privileges in what were German possessions wherever we had interests to safeguard. The Secretary said that so far as the other islands north of the Equator were concerned, he was not advised that we had any interest with respect to which we desired to make representations, but that Yap was in a strategic position and that we should have the same rights and privileges there that were enjoyed by the other Powers.

The Ambassador reviewed the proceedings of the Supreme Council and stated that after a good deal of discussion the islands, including Yap, had been awarded to Japan without any reservations whatever; that Great Britain had the better of the bargain, as they got the islands south of the Equator, and the islands north of the Equator were mostly small and of little consequence; that there had been no protest against the decision for over a year and then the United States had made its protest; that the fact that the islands had been allocated to Japan was known to the people of Japan and that it would produce a very painful impression if it appeared that, as a result of a protest made long after, Japan was asked to give up what was regarded as already hers; that to do this would be humiliating to Japan and that the people of Japan would not permit it.

The Secretary stated that he did not care to make any suggestion as to the policy which Japan should adopt to its own interests, but that he could not refrain from saying that if, when the question had been brought up, Japan had recognized the fact that the United States had not asked for an acre of land as a result of the war, and, finding that there was an interest in Yap by reason of its advantages for the purpose of communication, Japan [had] frankly stated its desire that the United States should have equal participa

tion in that island, it would have created a most friendly feeling throughout the United States;

The Ambassador seemed to give assent to this view, but stated that the people of Japan had been led to believe that the island was theirs and they could not take a contrary view. The Secretary said that he agreed that the opinion of the people of the two countries should always be considered in adjusting their relations, but that it should not be forgotten that the people of the United States were a unit— however divided they might be in other questions-in insisting that they should have equal opportunity in the German possessions which came to the victorious Powers; that wherever one might go through the country he would find not the slightest division of sentiment upon this point, and that the Ambassador's Government must consider not only the opinion of the people of Japan but the opinion of the people of this country, in suggesting a settlement.

The Ambassador said the first question was with regard to the exGerman cables; that he supposed that an agreement could be made with respect to their division; that, for example, the line from Yap to Guam could go to the United States and that other lines could be divided in a fair manner. The Secretary said that the question did not relate merely to existing cables but to all future rights and not alone to cables but to radio stations and all methods of communication. The Ambassador said that so far as radio was concerned, Guam, which was only two hundred miles away, would serve the United States just as well as Yap. The Ambassador inquired whether the United States would be satisfied if it had rights for existing and all future cables that it might want to lay. He said that the claim had been made that the islands should be internationalized for cable purposes; that this might be arranged but that if the United States pressed for anything more, it would be extremely difficult.

The Secretary said that if there was anything that the islands could be used for aside from cables, he saw no reason why the United States should not have its equal opportunity for such a use. He asked the Ambassador whether Japan desired to fortify the island. The Ambassador said that Japan did not. . . .

The Secretary said the type "C" mandate made the mandated territory part of the territory of the mandatory and that the United States could not consent to having Japan, as a sovereign power in possession of the territory, granting or withholding such licenses as it might see fit as a sovereign to grant or withhold; that the United States desired that whatever Power or Powers had administration of the island, their authority should be subject to the equality of right, and administration should be maintained under suitable terms which would assure the maintenance of the privileges, not as those

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