Grube v. J. B. Colt Co. ant referred to said C. R. Vaughan as its main salesman to adjust a complaint made with regard to matters of the defendant. Testimony was taken by both parties. From the petition, answer and testimony we find the following facts, most of which are not denied in the answer or testimony of the plaintiff. The defendant is a New Jersey corporation, and has no office, place of business, depot or property in Lancaster or Wyoming Counties, nor does any of its officers reside in either of said counties. It sells, f. o. b. Newark, merchandise to people in Lancaster and Wyoming Counties, upon receipt and acceptance of orders in its New York office. It has two solicitors of orders in Pennsylvania, of whom C. R. Vaughan, living at Tunkhannock, Wyoming County, is one. These solicitors are not officers of the company, and have no authority to bind the company to accept orders or make contracts, but are only authorized to obtain orders, subject to the approval of the defendant company at its office in New York. When such orders are accepted the goods are shipped to the persons giving them, f. o. b. Newark. This is not doing business in Pennsylvania, but in New York, where the orders are accepted, and in New Jersey, where the goods are delivered to the purchasers: Frick & Lindsay Co. v. Maryland, Pennsylvania, etc., Co., 44 Sup. 518. C. R. Vaughan is often called upon by the defendant company to make investigation of matters of which it desires information. When the gas generator of the plaintiff did not work properly he wrote to the defendant company, which directed C. R. Vaughan to investigate, and he directed an inspector to examine the machine. Plaintiff's cause of action, as set forth in his statement, is for damages resulting from an explosion, caused by defective machinery purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant. The Act of April 3, 1903, P. L. 139, Section 1, in clause G, provides that if a corporation has no office or place of business in actual operation in a county in which a cause of action arises, and no member of its board of directors, or other officer, is a resident of the county in which the cause of action arises, then service may be made in any of the methods set forth in the act in another county, the sheriff of the latter county having been deputized for that purpose. Clause E provides that it may be served by handing a copy at any of its offices, depots or places of business to its agent, or person for the time being in charge thereof, if upon inquiry thereat the residence of one of said officers within the county is not ascertained, or if from any cause an attempt to serve it at such residence has failed. This Act of Assembly in these particulars is the same as the Act of July 9, 1901, P. L. 616. The Supreme Court, in Park Brothers v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, and Excelsior Saving Fund v. Cochran, 220 Pa. 634, decided that the Act of 1901 did not confer any new jurisdcition on the Courts of this State, but only regulated the service of writs. In Park Brothers v. Oil City Boiler Works, Chief Justice Mitchell, after showing from numerous cases, that the common-law rule that a corporation can only be sued in the county where the corporate property is situated, and where it transacts a substantial part of its business, says: Grube v. J. B. Colt Co. "Since those cases arose, however, there has been passed the Act of July 9, 1901, P. L. 614, and we have to consider its effect. It is entitled, 'An Act relating to the service of certain process in actions at law, and the effect thereof, and providing who shall be made parties to certain writs.' It provides somewhat elaborately for service of summons, etc., first upon individuals and secondly upon corporations, by the sheriff in the county wherein it is issued. *** These are the only portions of the Act bearing upon the present inquiry, the others merely varying the allowable kinds of service upon different circumstances. All of them relate solely to methods of service. No direct reference is made anywhere to the jurisdiction of the courts, nor is any such intent discoverable in the title. The only phrases from which such intent could be even remotely inferred are in the second section, above quoted, that the sheriff may serve the writ in the county wherein it is issued,' and the provision in clause F for service where the corporation has no office or place of business in actual operation in the county where the cause of action arose.' These are altogether insufficient to turn an act whose title and plain general purpose relate solely to methods of service, into one making substantial changes in the jurisdiction of courts and the liability of corporations to be sued. The words, county wherein it is issued' and 'county where the cause of action arose,' mean county wherein it was legally issued, and county where the location of property or business gave jurisdiction to the courts under existing law. If the quarter sessions issued a writ of summons in a civil action, it could hardly be contended that it was sustainable by this act, and yet the argument cannot stop short of that result if the language quoted was a grant of jurisdiction. The learned judge below was correct in holding that the Act of 1901 was a regulation of service only." เ Frick & Lindsay Co. v. Maryland, Pennsylvania, etc., Co., 44 Sup. 518, decided since the passage of the Act of 1903, follows the above cited case, and decides that the Courts of Alleghany County did not have jurisdiction of an action against a foreign corporation whose corporate property, in whole or in part, was in another county where it transacted a substantial part of its business. Judge Rice reviews the numerous acts of assembly which give courts of Pennsylvania jurisdiction to entertain actions against foreign corporations. He clearly shows that none of these acts of assembly gave the courts of Alleghany County jurisdiction to entertain that case against a defendant corporation. The facts there are so similar to those involved here that we think it clearly decides that the courts of Lancaster County did not have jurisdiction of the case at bar. The defendant in this case does not transact a substantial, or any part of its business in Lancaster County, nor does it have any office, place of business or property in Lancaster County, nor does any of its officers reside here, so that the Court of Common Pleas of this county does not have jurisdiction to entertain an action against it, and the writ was improperly issued. It does not have an office or place of business or any property in Wyoming County, so that, even though the writ was properly issued in this county, it could not have been legally served Grube v. J. B. Colt Co. on any representative of the corporation in that county, and the service was, therefore, improper. But even though we did conclude that the writ was properly issued in this county, and it had an office or place of business in Wyoming County, C. R. Vaughan was not such agent or officer of the corporation as is contemplated by the Act of 1903, upon whom such writ may be served, nor does the return state that he was an agent in charge of the office, depot or place of business of the defendant, so that the service of the writ upon him was improper. We must, therefore, set aside the service of the writ and quash it. That this is the proper way to raise the questions involved is decided in Park Brothers v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, and Frick & Lindsay Co. v. Maryland, Pennsylvania, etc., Co., 44 Sup. 518. The rule to set aside the service of the writ is made absolute and the writ is quashed. Meeting of Law Library Association. The regular annual meeting of the Law Library Association was held in the large Court Rooom at 10 o'clock a. m. with Vice-President Landis in the chair. The Treasurer, John A. Nauman, reported a balance of $156.71. W. N. Appel, chairman of the Library Committee, reported that no volumes were missing and made the usual appeal for more space. E. P. Brinton suggested that more room could be secured by making the library rooms two-storied. D. F. Magee said that a third-story jury room could be used for surplus books. John M. Groff said it was useless to try to improve the present library room, as the whole second floor of the Court House should be remodeled, and moved the appointment of a committee to secure this result, which motion was adopted. The chair appointed as this committee, John M. Groff, John E. Malone and B. C. Atlee. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Hon. Chas. I. Landis; Vice-President, John E. Malone; Secretary, Oliver S. Schaeffer; Treasurer, John A. Nauman; Librarian, T. J. Gilgore. On motion, the Librarian's salary was fixed at $50 per year. The chair appointed the following standing committees: Library Committee: Frank S. Groff, B. J. Myers, H. Edgar Sherts, S. V. Hosterman and J. Roland Kinzer. Finance Committee: John A. Coyle, John M. Groff and Geo. Ross Eshleman. 66 Superior Court of Penusylvania Hildebrant's Estate (Hildebrant's Appeal). Wills-Construction-Remainder-Vesting of-Conversion. A testator bequeathed the remainder of his estate after life interests to his widow and son, to the children of the son who might survive him, providing that upon and after the death of" the son without issue the estate should be divided among his relatives under the intestate law. The son, an only child, died without issue, as did subsequently the widow. On distribution, the fund being the proceeds of real estate sold before the son's death under a power in the will, Held, that the court below properly awarded the balance, half to the widow's administrator and half to the son's widow's executor, and not to descendants of deceased brothers and sisters of the testator. Appeal No. 93 of October Term, 1919, by William H. Hildebrant from decree of O. C. of Lancaster Co. in Estate of Martin Hildebrant, dec'd, to April Term, 1903, No. 87, dismissing exceptions to adjudication and confirming same absolutely. Affirmed. The decedent, who died in 1899, bequeathed the remainder of his estate after life interests to his widow and son, to his son's surviving children if any, and “upon and after" the death of the son without issue to be divided among his relatives under the intestate laws. The son and only child, Harry K., died intestate and without issue in 1908 and the widow, Amanda, in 1913. The real estate was sold under a power of sale in the will before 1908. On distribution, the Court below, SMITH, P. J., denied the claims of children of deceased brother and sisters of the decedent and awarded the fund in equal parts to the administrator of the decedent's widow, and the executor of his deceased son's widow. See 26 LAW REVIEW 74. The appeal was then taken by a nephew of the decedent, who assigned for error this action of the court and the dismissal of exceptions thereto. John A. Nauman, for appellant. The testator, as is clearly shown all through the will, intended that the residue should go to his relatives of his own blood at the time of his son's death without children. This intent should prevail. Butzby's Appeal, 68 Pa. 111. Jordan v. McClure, 85 Pa. 500. The spendthrift trust for the son showed that the testator never intended the corpus to go to his estate. Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585. The testator's words "upon and after' were clearly intended to fix the event and time of the vesting of the remainder. The fund was not converted into and distributable as personalty merely because the real estate was sold before the death of the testaVOL. XXXVII, No. 12 Hildebrandt's Estate (Hildebrant's Appeal). tor's son in the absence of anything to show such intention, the power of sale being not absolute but discretionary. Bispham's Equity, 237 Pa. 125. Frank S. Groff, for appellee. The fund for distribution was necessarily personalty. Ingersoll's Estate, 167 Pa. 549. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion the estate of the testator was converted from the time of his death. Battenfield v. Kline, 228 Pa. 91. Bergdoll's Estate, 258 Pa. 108. Morrow v. Brenizer, 2 Rawle 185. The only person who answers the description of the ultimate remainderman is the testator's son. Stewart's Estate, 147 Pa. 388. Fitzpatrick's Estate, 233 Pa. 35. December 10, 1919. PER CURIAM: A majority of the judges who heard this appeal are of the opinion that its disposition is to be determined by McFillan's Estate, 235 Pa. 175, and for that reason the decree of the Orphans' Court is affirmed. |