strument without reading it or attempting to ascertain its true contents. The law will favor, as between the holder and maker in such a case, the more innocent and diligent. The maker had it in his power to protect himself from the fraud, but failed to do so. When the consequences of this act are about to be visited upon him, he seeks to make another bear it, on the ground that he was defrauded through his own gross negligence.

*

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"The rule contended for by appellee would tend to destroy all confidence in commercial paper. It is better that defendant, and others who so carelessly affix their names to paper, the contents of which are unknown to them, should suffer from the fraud which their recklessness invites, than that the character of commercial paper should be impaired, and the business of the country thus interfered with and unsettled."

See the many cases cited by the above-named author in the notes to the above-quoted text.

Under the undisputed evidence in the case, the court should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant John C. Webeke; and, in our opinion, the undisputed testimony of the defendant Boes shows him to have been guilty of such gross negligence that the court might well have directed a verdict against him, and such others of the defendants as did not claim that they were misled by the actual active fraudulent conduct of the persons procuring their signatures; and, as to all of those latter defendants, the court should have charged the jury fully upon the rule of negligence to which we have referred, and their attention should have been called to the maxim that, when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, the loss must be borne by the person who enables such third person to occasion it.

The defendant Albert Bement testified that he had never signed the note at all. This testimony was denied by the witness Martin. But, even had the jury

found that the note was a forgery as to defendant Bement, that would not have prevented the recovery against the other defendants under the authority of First Nat. Bank of Durand v. Shaw, 157 Mich. 192 (121 N. W. 809, 133 Am. St. Rep. 342), where this court held that the forgery of a part of the signature on a promissory note does not invalidate the instrument, as to the genuine signatures, in the hands of the holder in due course.

4. The criticism of counsel for appellant here is upon the use of the term "fair preponderance." This court has recently had occasion to collect the decisions in this State upon this subject. See Silverstone v. Assurance Corporation, 176 Mich. 525-533 (142 N. W. 776), where the language of this court in an early case is quoted to this effect:

"There is no rule of law which adopts any sliding scale of belief in civil controversies."

The language used in the instant case is not as objectionable as in the cases cited; but, as the case must go back for a new trial, we should say that we think it more prudent for the trial court, in charging a jury in a civil case, to not require a greater weight of proof than the ordinary preponderance of evidence. We should not feel like reversing the case on this ground. Other questions discussed are not likely to arise upon another trial.

For the errors pointed out, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a new trial granted.

MCALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

GREGORY v. OAKLAND MOTOR CAR CO.

1. DAMAGES-HUSBAND AND WIFE BILES-WIFE'S SERVICES.

PERSONAL INJURIES-AUTOMO

Damages for loss of the services of plaintiff's wife, arising from personal injuries suffered by her in a runaway accident, which was caused by defendant's servant in charge of a motor car, are recoverable in an action by the husband, notwithstanding the provisions of Act No. 196, Pub. Acts 1911 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11552), giving the wife the right to her earnings and services. The statute means that all earnings acquired or services performed as a result of her personal effort in any separate business carried on by her in her own behalf, or any services performed by her for others than her husband belong to her. Her labor, companionship, society, and assistance in the discharge of her family and household obligations still belong to the husband.

Nor did the trial court err in submitting to the jury the question of the value of the wife's services, although no direct or express evidence was offered on the subject; and it was not improper to permit the jury to fix the damages to be recovered according to their good judgment and

common sense.

3. SAME EXCESSIVE AMOUNT-MARRIAGE.

Seven hundred dollars for loss of the services of plaintiff's wife who was disabled from washing, ironing, milking and similar labor, upon testimony tending to show permanence of such injuries, was not an excessive verdict such as to require the court to grant a new trial.

Error to Oakland; Smith, J. Submitted April 20, 1914. (Docket No. 81.) Decided June 1, 1914.

Case by Fred J. Gregory against the Oakland Motor Car Company for loss of the services of his wife because of personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Keena, Lightner, Oxtoby & Oxtoby, for appellant. Pelton & McGee, for appellee.

STONE, J. This is an action of trespass on the case to recover damages against the defendant for injuries to plaintiff's horse and buggy, also for expenses incurred by him for medical attendance upon, and for loss of the services, comfort, fellowship, and society of, his wife, by reason of the negligence of an employee of the defendant. Defendant is a corporation, and on May 4, 1912, was engaged in the manufacture of automobiles at Pontiac. On the day aforesaid plaintiff's wife was driving plaintiff's horse and buggy on the public highway in a northerly direction toward their home, when she was met by an automobile driven by one of defendant's testers.

Upon the trial plaintiff's claim, substantiated by the evidence, was that defendant's automobile was driven by its said employee at a dangerous and unlawful rate of speed and in a reckless manner, thereby scaring plaintiff's horse so that it sprang out of the road, tipped the buggy over, and threw out plaintiff's wife. The horse then ran away, injuring both the horse and buggy. Plaintiff's wife sustained bruises about her back, head and shoulders, and her right wrist was broken, and she was unable to do any work for three to five months, and at the trial, a year after the injury, there was testimony that she was unable to wash, bake, or iron, or to milk or work in the garden, as she had done before the injury; and there was medical testimony tending to show that there was permanent injury of the nerves of the hand, rendering it numb and impairing its use.

Plaintiff's wife had previously brought an action against the defendant, and had recovered a substantial amount for personal injuries.

Upon the trial of the instant case, defendant claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only for

the damages to his horse and buggy and his expenses for medical attendance on his wife, since, by Act No. 196, Public Acts of 1911 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11552), the earnings of a wife and her earning power now belong to her, and not to the husband. Defendant therefore objected to any evidence being offered as to loss of the wife's services. This objection was overruled, and defendant duly excepted, and the evidence was received. Upon this subject defendant's counsel requested the court to charge the jury as follows:

(1) "I charge you that in this case the plaintiff as the husband of Sarah Gregory, is entitled to recover, if you find for the plaintiff, only (a) the damages to his horse and buggy; and (b) the expenses actually paid out or incurred by him for medical attendance, which is given at the sum of $47."

Which request was refused. There was evidence tending to show the nature, extent, and consequent effect of the wife's injuries, but there was no evidence as to the value of such services, and upon the subject of damages the court charged the jury as follows:

"In determining what amount, if any, you may award plaintiff by reason of the loss of the services and society of his wife, you may take into consideration whatever aid, assistance, comfort, and society the wife would be expected to render to, or bestow upon, her husband under the circumstances as shown by the evidence in the case, and in the condition in which the husband and wife were placed."

("In addition, you may award damages for the loss, if any, for the services of the plaintiff's wife, and the amount to be awarded therefor is committed to the sound judgment and good sense of the jury in view of the nature and extent of the disability, as you may find the same from the evidence. You will notice that neither Mr. Gregory, nor any of the witnesses was asked to express an opinion as to how much the services this husband claims as lost were worth per week, month or year. That is what is meant by say