bears date in 1901. Whether she knew its contents or not does not appear. How much of her estate was derived from his will, or from him, does not appear in this record. It is very clear to us that, if she obtained the services of claimant upon the representation claimed, it would make no difference whether she was then seised of a separate estate or not, for her agreement was to pay after her death by a provision in her will, evidently in expectation that she would then have an estate; and the doctrine of estoppel might well apply, as it was applied in the case last above cited. It has been held in this court that a married woman can make herself personally liable for the services of an attorney in a divorce case. Wolcott v. Patterson, 100 Mich. 227 (58 N. W. 1006, 24 L. R. A. 629, 43 Am. St. Rep. 456); McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678 (98 N. W. 746). It has also been held that a married woman upon her own promise to pay is liable for the services of a nurse. Barber v. Eberle's Estate, 131 Mich. 317 (91 N. W. 123).

In our opinion the validity of the wife's contract does not depend upon the thing bargained for, becoming a wife's separate estate as soon as delivered to her, but whether or not she did agree individually, or personally, to become liable, and the other party looked to her exclusively for payment, whether the thing bargained for was property or services. The real question is: "Did the services benefit her or some member of her family?" We think the court did not err in its treatment of this question.

3. We find no error in the admissibility of the inventories and wills referred to. It is evident that the purpose for which the inventory of decedent was introduced was to show that she had a separate estate in her lifetime. This cannot be said to be immaterial, although in our judgment it was not controlling. Her will was material for the purpose of showing that she had made no provision for claimant therein. The

will of Jacobus De Spelder was material as tending to show that it gave to Mrs. De Spelder property and that she had a separate estate; and it also shows that claimant was not recompensed in and by such will. We are not able to see how the introduction of these instruments in any way prejudiced the appellant.

4. An examination of the testimony of Katie Pals satisfies us that her acquaintance with the family and household of Mrs. De Spelder was sufficient to qualify her as a housewife to testify to the value of the services. True, she did not live in the family as did the witness in Lathrop v. Sinclair, 110 Mich. 329 (68 N. W. 248); but her visits to the house and her intimacy with Mrs. De Spelder were such that it was competent for her to testify upon the subject. The weight of that testimony, of course, was for the jury. We find no error in the ruling of the court upon this subject.

5. We are unable to find any error in the ruling of the court excluding that part of the testimony of the executrix as to conversations had with deceased. This court has spoken a number of times upon the subject of declarations of decedent not in the presence of claimant tending to disprove a claim against the estate as self-serving statements. We might cite Coleman v. McGowan's Estate, 149 Mich. 624 (113 N. W. 17); Bettinghouse v. Bettinghouse, 156 Mich. 169 (120 N. W. 617); Freda v. Tishbein, 174 Mich. 391 (140 N. W. 502). Declarations in favor of interest are inadmissible. Perhaps the best test is to ask whether the deceased would have been permitted to testify upon the subject were she alive. She certainly would not be as to any self-serving statements. Drake Coal Co. v. Croze, 165 Mich. 120 (130 N. W. 355).

6. We have examined the charge of the court with some care, and do not think it is subject to the criti

cism made of it by appellant's counsel in their argument. It seems to have been a fair submission to the jury of the questions involved, and we find no error therein.

An examination of the entire record shows that no prejudicial error appears therein, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

MCALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

PERKINS v. PERKINS.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR-REHEARING-FINAL ORDER.

In equity an appeal lies from an order denying defendant's motion for a rehearing, and a motion to dismiss is denied, on the ground that the order is final.

2. EQUITY-PRACTICE-REHEARING.

The court will be slow to grant a motion for rehearing in a case in which the time for taking an appeal has been allowed to pass before it was filed. Where the mover has lost his appeal by inexcusable laches such motion should not be granted for objections or reasons that relate to errors committed at the hearing or in the final determination of the case.

3. SAME-MOTIONS-IMPEACHMENT.

No abuse of the discretion vested in the trial court was made out in the denial of a motion for rehearing alleging newly discovered evidence that consisted of annotations and memoranda made upon certain trial balance sheets by an important witness for the appellee: the effect of discrediting his testimony not being likely to change the result.

Appeal from Kent; Connine, J., presiding. Submitted January 23, 1914. (Docket No. 84.) Decided June 1, 1914. Rehearing denied June 23, 1914.

Bill by Frederick L. Perkins, as executor of the estate of Harriet M. Perkins, deceased, against Willis J. Perkins and others. From an order denying a motion for rehearing of the defendant named, he appeals. Affirmed.

Martin H. Carmody and Roger I. Wykes, for appellant.

A. C. Hindman, Myron H. Walker, and W. F. Keeney, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. The bill in this cause was filed in December, 1901. A final decree was entered in the circuit court March 29, 1910. The decree was not enrolled until September 16, 1913. Something was done towards reviewing the case in this court; an attempted appeal being dismissed, on motion, March 12, 1913. Perkins v. Perkins, 173 Mich. 690 (140 N. W. 161). Pending the decision of the motion to dismiss the appeal, a motion was made for a rehearing. The reasons asserted were:

(1) That the conclusions of the court, evidenced in the written opinion and decree, were wrong-these involved a reargument of the cause upon its merits; (2) the possibility that no appeal would be permitted; (3) new evidence.

An order was entered September 16, 1913, denying a rehearing. From this order defendant appealed. A motion was made to dismiss this appeal and was heard at the January, 1914, term of this court, without formally deciding which an argument upon the merits of the motion for a rehearing was ordered and has been presented. The order denying the rehearing was final and appealable, and the motion to dis

miss the appeal is denied. Frieseke v. Frieseke, 138 Mich. 458 (101 N. W. 632); Bope v. Ferris, 77 Mich. 299 (43 N. W. 874); Harris v. Deitrich, 29 Mich. 366. To these authorities may be added those which hold that an order refusing leave to file a bill of review is, final and appealable.

The question now presented is whether such abuse of discretion by the trial judge is shown as to require a reversal of his order denying a rehearing. It was said in Simmons v. Conklin, 129 Mich. 190, 192 (88 N. W. 625, 626):

"The court will be slow to grant a petition for leave to file a bill of review in a case where the time for taking an appeal has been allowed to pass before filing it."

In Murphy v. Schoder, 126 Mich. 607 (85 N. W. 1080), it was said that failure to take an appeal is not ground for leave to file a bill of review. See, also, Roberge v. De Lisle, 158 Mich. 16 (122 N. W. 362).

We think it apparent that the motion for rehearing is used as a substitute for an appeal which the mover lost through unexcused and inexcusable laches. In so far as reasons for a rehearing are based upon errors committed upon the trial, they and the arguments used to support them are not different from those which might be presented by the losing party in any suit. They are to the effect that the trial judge should have reached other conclusions.

The alleged newly discovered evidence is certain trial balance sheets, or, rather, certain annotations and memoranda made upon trial balance sheets by Frederick L. Perkins, an important witness for complainant and at one time bookkeeper for appellant. It appears that a searching examination into and analysis of appellant's business affairs during a period of years was made. Appellant's financial condition, and whether he was making or losing money during