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“The New York statute provides that 'actions for all wrongs done to property, rights or interests of another shall survive. It is held that this language is so broad and comprehensive as to cover all injuries to rights of property, and is not confined to injuries,

as such—that it includes actions for damages for conspiracies to defraud and damages for deceit. Bond v. Smith, 4 Hun, 48; Haight v. Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464; Lyon v. Park, 111 N. Y. 350 [18 N. E. 863]; Brackett v. Griswold, 103 N. Y. 425 [9 N. E. 438]. These cases turn entirely on the meaning of the significant words 'property, rights and interests.'

In our statute under construction the words "or rights of another” are of much broader significance than any of the language used in section 10117, 3 Comp. Laws, quoted supra, and are as comprehensive as the words quoted from the New York statute; and section 2 of the act provides that:

"The causes of action specified in section one of this act shall, upon the death of the person injured, survive." • Both upon reason and authority the conclusion cannot be avoided that the instant case is within the provisions of section 1 of this act, and that the cause of action by virtue of section 2 survived.

This same question was before the supreme court of the State of Wisconsin in Lane v. Frawley, supra, and upon the statute which contained words identical with those in the New York statute and those in the act of this State under consideration.

The contention was that the words were entitled to the same construction as given to them by the courts of the State of New York, and therefore the action in the case under consideration should be held to have survived. The section in the Wisconsin statute containing these words contained no words of survival as did the New York statute, and also our Act No. 195 under consideration. The court held the section was not intended to provide for the survival of any action, but merely to regulate the proceedings in such actions as otherwise survived.

An examination of that opinion makes it clear that, had the section contained specific words of survival, the court would have held that the cause of action survived. Our legislature has declared that such causes of action shall survive in words so clear that the intent cannot be mistaken.

The remaining grounds for demurrer do not require extended consideration. An examination of the amended declaration satisfies us that the pleader has stated a good cause of action both at the common law and under the Michigan anti-trust laws. The document is necessarily of great length, and must be considered as a whole. To make it more specific would, in our opinion, require that the evidence be pleaded. Similar declarations in actions in case for damages for wrongful acts in interrupting and destroying plaintiff's business and injuring the reputation of his business which contained no more specific allegations than are set forth in the declaration under consideration have been held by this court to state a cause of action. Olliver v. Perkins, 92 Mich. 304-315 (52 N. W. 609); Church V. Anti-Kalsomine Co., 118 Mich. 219 (76 N. W. 383).

The Federal courts have sustained similar declarations in cases brought under the Sherman anti-trust law (Act July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 U. S. Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200]). Wheeler-Stengel Co. v. Window Glass Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864, 81 C. C. A. 658 (10 L. R. A. [N. S.]) 972; Monarch Tobacco Works v. Tobacco Co. (C. C.), 165 Fed. 774-779; People's Tobacco Co. v. Tobacco Co., 170 Fed. 396, 95 C. C. A. 566; Hale v. Supply Co. (C. C.), 181 Fed. 267.

The remaining ground for demurrer relied upon is that plaintiffs' testator was estopped from bringing this action by reason of having sold his business prior to his death. The declaration shows that, after Simon Frohlich's business was ruined, the unlawful acts of defendants as charged and his factory ceased operations, he was forced to and did sell all the tangible personal property used by him in connection with his business to one of the defendants at a price $20,000 less than its value. This sale carried with it no rights of action or other intangible property or interests. If he had a cause of action against defendants, this sale in no way disposed of it. This ground for demurrer is therefore not meritorious. Our conclusion is that the demurrers should have been overruled.

The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed and set aside, with permission to the demurring defendants, after notice of this decision, to plead to the declaration within the usual time allowed by rule.

KUHN, BIRD, and MOORE, JJ., concurred with MCALVAY, C. J.

ATTORNEY GENERAL V. JOY.

Quo WARRANTOREHEARING-DELAY_MOTIONS.

A rehearing must be denied after a period of nearly 30

years have elapsed from the date of final determination of a quo warranto case, involving the right of the Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Company to exercise its corporate franchise, when the motion was based prin. cipally on public records accessible in former proceedings, and the matters of evidence claimed to be newly discovered were not conclusive of the relator's contentions in the case.

Quo warranto proceedings by Jacob J. Van Riper, Attorney General, against James F. Joy and others to determine the right of the respondents to exercise the corporate privileges and franchises of the Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Company. On motion for rehearing. Submitted January 29, 1914. (Calendar No. 7,666.) Denied July 24, 1914.

Roger 1. Wykes, for the motion.
L. C. Stanley, contra.

PER CURIAM. Primarily this is a petition for rehearing in the above-entitled cause, filed by Roger I. Wykes, attorney general, on December 30, 1912. It consists of a printed volume containing 192 pages. Petitioner also asks that, if for any reason a rehearing cannot be granted, permission be given to file an original bill of review to present the questions outlined in the petition.

This case, now sought to be opened, is a quo warranto proceeding and was decided nearly 30 years ago, in 1884, being reported in 55 Mich. 94 (20 N. W. 806), where it occupies 12 pages of the printed record. The opinion is written by Justice COOLEY, and he states that he treated the issues as purely legal questions. It involved the validity and interpretation of certain railroad legislation (including an act passed January 29, 1859 (Act No. 37, Laws 1859], to legalize certain loans made by the Detroit & Milwaukee Railway Company), under which the Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Company now claims its corporate existence. This court then held, contrary to the contention of the attorney general, that certain legislation enabling the company to take a new name and extend its line did not create a new corporation, and defendants were not guilty of certain acts of usurpation charged against them in that connection.

An examination of the original record shows that the case was thoroughly litigated and able briefs were filed by counsel on both sides. Attorney General Van Riper, assisted by Edward Bacon, represented the State, and G. V. N. Lothrop, E. W. Meddaugh, and George Jerome represented the respondents. It is undisputed that all attorneys then connected with the case and the justices who participated in the opinion are now deceased, as well as most, if not all, respondents.

Several attempts made in various ways and courts to enforce collection of certain specific taxes levied under subsequent legislation against the Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway have failed as being in disregard of the special charter under which it operated, the validity of said charter having been settled by the Van Riper Case, and therefore res judicata. People, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Railway Co., 157 Mich. 144 (121 N. W. 814); Powers v. Railway, 201 U. S. 543 (26 Sup. Ct. 556).

Two cases are now pending in which it is sought to enforce collection of the specific tax from the Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway; one in the Federal court (Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Fuller [D. C.], 205 Fed. 86), in which proceedings against the railway under Act No. 95, Pub. Acts 1911, were enjoined (which we are informed has been appealed), and one in the Kent county circuit court in chancery, in which a demurrer to the State's petition, which goes into these matters very exhaustively, was overruled and defendant given leave to answer, such ruling of the trial court having been sustained in this court (169 Mich. 72 [135 N. W. 87]). We understand this case has not yet been heard.

Relator here moves against the original source of embarrassment in all subsequent litigation and seeks to eliminate it by a reversal of this, so-called, Joy decision on a rehearing, the ground urged for granting a rehearing being newly discovered evidence, not available or known to relator when the case was heard

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