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claimed that the hiring was but from month to month. The court, in charging the jury, said:
"Much has been said intimating that plaintiff's claim was for a yearly hiring, beginning June 1, 1910. In your absence a careful examination of the testimony has been had, and it results in the conclusion that there is nothing in the testimony which would support the theory that a contract of employment for a year was had for the year beginning June 1, 1910. The plaintiff's claim, then, gentlemen of the jury, is submitted to you, upon the theory that there was a contract by the year beginning January 1, 1910, and the theory that there was a contract for a year, beginning June 1, 1910, not being supported by the testimony, is not before you for consideration. To entitle the plaintiff to recover, then, you must be satisfied by the testimony that there was a yearly hiring of the plaintiff, beginning January 1, 1910, and the plaintiff, furthermore, must establish to your satisfaction his performance of that contract.”
Under this charge the jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for two months' salary. Defendant does not appeal.
The principal contention of the plaintiff is that the court, under the testimony, committed error in instructing the jury that they could not find that a contract had been made between the parties running from June 1, 1910, to June 1, 1911.
We have carefully read all of the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiff upon this point, and are satisfied that there is no testimony which would have warranted the court in permitting the jury to find a contract for a year commencing June 1, 1910.
As plaintiff recovered the full amount possible under this instruction of the court, which we hold to have been proper, it is unnecessary and unprofitable to discuss the other assignments of error.
The judgment is affirmed.
MCALVAY, C. J., and KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.
FERGUSON V. COUNTY OF MUSKEGON.
[2d Ed.] $ 2173 et seq.), which provides for the so-called
Error to Muskegon; Sullivan, J. Submitted January 16, 1914. (Docket No. 110.) Decided July 24, 1914.
Case by Harvey Ferguson, by next friend, against the county of Muskegon for personal injuries. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Sutherland, Johnson & Sessions, for appellant.
MCALVAY, C. J. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to recover damages for personal injuries received by reason of a defective sidewalk in the township of Ravenna along a certain highway which runs through the unincorporated village of Ravenna; this highway being what is known as a county road. Defendant demurred to the plaintiff's declaration upon the ground that Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909, which provides for the county road system, imposed no liability upon defendant. The demurrer was sustained, and final judgment was entered thereon against plaintiff and in favor of defendant. The case is brought to this court by plaintiff asking for a reversal of such judgment.
The facts admitted by defendant's demurrer are substantially as follows: The county of Muskegon has adopted a county road system under Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] $ 2173), and it declared a portion of the public highway in the township of Ravenna, which runs through the unincorporated village of Ravenna to be a county road and named it Ravenna Road. After passing through the village of Ravenna, this road turns south, going down a short hill, and then crosses a bridge over Crockery creek in said township. On the west side and along this portion of the road is laid a sidewalk which at a point north of a bridge terminates abruptly, leaving a drop of about 18 inches. A timber about 12 inches square and 4 feet long was placed at this point, which made a step from the sidewalk to the ground below. This sidewalk at this point is 6 feet wide and the timber step, being but 4 feet long, lacked 2 feet of extending the full width of the sidewalk. This sidewalk had been open to public travel for a long time prior to the accident which occurred at this place. There was no handrail or guard, light, or other means of warning placed at this point whereby a foot passenger along the sidewalk might be made aware that the step was shorter than the width of the walk. The usual traveled way for foot passengers was to walk down this sidewalk to the step and then step down and thence along the road across the bridge.
Plaintiff was injured on this road at this place on:
or about December 8, 1912, at 6 o'clock in the evening. He was at that time going to his destination across the bridge over Crockery creek and, walking along the sidewalk, attempted to go down the step. He was unaware that the step was shorter than the sidewalk and, stepping down at that place, fell violently to the ground below, breaking his leg, and causing the injury complained of.
The question raised upon the assignments of error is whether, under the provisions of Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909, it is made the duty of counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and fit for public travel, sidewalks along roads declared to be county roads. Plaintiff insists upon the affirmative of this proposition. The question is for the first time before this court for determination.
The construction of the statute in question is involved. This is entitled “An act to revise, consolidate and add to the laws relating to the establishment, opening, improvement, maintenance and use of the public highways and private roads, etc.," by which the laws relating to streets and highways in this State were codified, re-enacted, and added to. The details providing for adopting a county road system are not in question in this suit and need not be stated. The demurrer admits that such a system had been adopted in Muskegon county.
The law provides for the election of a board of county road commissioners who are given the general control of county roads. Section 19 of chapter 4 of the act in question defines the power and authority given to such boards, as follows:
“SEC. 19. Said board of county road commissioners shall have authority to grade, drain, construct, gravel or macadamize any road under their control, or to place thereon any other form of improvement which in their judgment may be best, and may extend and enlarge such improvements; they shall have authority to construct bridges and culverts on the line of such road, and to repair and maintain the said roads, bridges and culverts; they shall have all the authority in respect to such roads, bridges and culverts which is vested in highway officers in townships,” etc.
Chapter 21 of this act is devoted to sidewalks. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter provide as follows:
"SECTION 1. In all unincorporated villages, commissioners of highways are hereby authorized to lay out and expend such portion of the township highway funds in their hands or under their control as they shall deem, subject to the limitations of section 7 of this chapter, (necessary) for that purpose for the construction, care and maintenance of suitable sidewalks and crosswalks in such villages.
“SEC. 2. Public sidewalks may be established, opened, improved, and maintained within the boundaries, and along the highways, within this State under the provisions of this act; and the townships and unincorporated villages of this State shall possess the authority herein prescribed, for the building, repairing, and preserving the same.”
Referring to section 19, chap. 4, supra, we find boards of county road commissioners in the counties where a county road system has been adopted "shall have authority to construct bridges and culverts on the line of such road, and to repair and maintain the said roads, bridges and culverts.” The significance of this clause of this section in omitting any reference to sidewalks and crosswalks is recognized by counsel for plaintiff, and in view of a former decision of this court (City of Detroit v. Putnam, post) it is admitted that the words "bridges, crosswalks and culverts" as construed in that case are special restrictive terms, and it would be reasonable to expect the court to follow its former decision where words of like significance were construed and hold that this portion of