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section 19 gives the county road commissioners authority over the traveled part of the roads, bridges, and culverts, and did not give them authority to build sidewalks along and on the side of the county road. City of Detroit v. Putnam, 45 Mich. 263-265 (7 N. W. 815).
This is the construction which this court gives to the authority delegated by the legislature to county road commissioners under this portion of section 19 quoted, and we confirm City of Detroit v. Putnam, supra. The authority to construct, care for, and maintain suitable sidewalks and crosswalks is given by section 1 of chapter 21 specifically to commissioners of highways in all unincorporated villages. Under section 2 of the same chapter, “public sidewalks may be established, opened, improved, and maintained within the boundaries, and along the highways, within this State under the provisions of this act," and authority is given to the townships and unincorporated villages of this State "for the building, repairing, and preserving the same."
We find, then, from these sections of this act which have been quoted, that the county road commissioners have exclusive charge of roadways, bridges, and culverts on roads over which they have assumed control, and only townships and unincorporated villages have within their respective limits power and authority to build and repair sidewalks along the same roads. These powers and duties are specifically defined and distinguishable, and, although exercised over the same highway, they are not conflicting, and the giving of such separate and distinct powers and authority to two public bodies arises naturally from their relations to the public, as has been recognized by this court. Quinlan v. Village of Manistique, 85 Mich. 22 (48 N. W. 172).
The county road system is maintained by the county
for the purpose of providing for its entire population and the public generally adequate highways for the purposes of public travel, and such system adapted to the present necessities created by modern conditions. Each small municipality within its narrow limits provides along such county roads suitable sidewalks for the use of its inhabitants and others who, as foot passengers, desire to pass along and over such sidewalks.
The other sections of this act which are invoked by plaintiff as imposing liability for injuries sustained on this sidewalk upon the county must be considered in connection with our construction of the sections already considered. It is contended that the liability for injuries resulting from failure to maintain a sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition fit for public travel which is laid on a road under the control of county road commissioners is fixed upon the county by the following portions of section 21, chap. 4, of this act:
"It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges, and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to the public travel. The provisions of law respecting the liability of townships, cities, villages and corporations for damages for injuries resulting from a failure in the performance of the same duty respecting roads under their control, shall apply to counties adopting such county road system."
This liability of townships, cities, villages, and corporations referred to in the portion of section 21 last quoted is created by section 1 of chapter 22 of this act, which reads as follows:
“Any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this State, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross
walks, and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city, or corporation, whose corporate authority extends over such public highway,
whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such township, villages, city, or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled just damages, to be recovered in an action
on the case before any court of competent jurisdiction."
The duty mentioned in the section just quoted is imposed by section 3 of the same chapter, as follows:
"It is hereby made the duty of townships, villages, cities, or corporations to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all public highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control, and which are open to public travel.
It is urged that the legislative intent to fix upon counties who have adopted the county road system liability for injuries which have occurred upon sidewalks built along such roads is made clear by that portion of section 19 of chapter 4, heretofore quoted, which reads:
“They [county road commissioners] shall have all the authority in respect to such roads, bridges and culverts which is vested in highway officers in townships."
We cannot agree with this contention and argument. It overlooks entirely the distinction which we have already made between the powers and duties which we have construed the legislature to have granted and imposed by this act upon counties and upon townships, cities, villages, and corporations, which distinction we think has been kept in view by the legislature throughout the entire act. It will be noted that, where a liability for damages is imposed either upon counties or lesser municipalities, if imposed
upon counties which have adopted the county road system, such liability is restricted to injuries caused by their neglect to keep all county roads, bridges, and culverts which are within their jurisdiction and under their control in the condition for travel required by this statute; if imposed upon the lesser corporations, it is by reason of their neglect to keep such public highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, and culverts as may be within their respective jurisdictions in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.
This construction is in harmony with the conclusions of the circuit court.
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.
BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.
HOLLAND FURNACE CO. v. HARTIG.
MECHANICS' LIENS_HOMESTEAD-HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Where complainant installed a furnace in the homestead
of the defendants under a contract with the wife alone,
Appeal from Bay; Collins, J. Submitted January 9, 1914. (Docket No. 44.) Decided July 24, 1914.
Bill by the Holland Furnace Company against Emil Hartig and another for the enforcement of a mechanics' lien. From a decree for defendants, complainant appeals. Affirmed.
James Donnelly and Visscher & Robinson, for complainant.
E. E. Anneke and W. A. Collins, for defendants.
MCALVAY, C. J. In this case complainant filed its bill of complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien upon certain premises occupied by defendants in Bay City, Mich., for the price and value of furnishing and installing therein a certain furnace, together with all the piping and fitting and material connected therewith, and the labor performed thereon. The title to these premises was in defendant Emil Hartig. The other defendant is his wife, and these premises were occupied by them as their homestead. Complainant, a Michigan corporation, was engaged in the business of manufacturing and installing furnaces. Providing this furnace, together with its equipment and the labor and material for installing the same, was undertaken by complainant under a written proposal, dated December 21, 1910, in which it was proposed and agreed by complainant to furnish “Mr. E. Hartig, of Bay City, Mich.," in consideration of the payment of $235 on the completion of the work, and put into his residence in Bay City, Mich., one of its furnaces complete, of a certain size, and under certain conditions and guaranties, that the furnace would warm all rooms which had been completely piped, with proper fuel furnished by the owner. This was accepted in the following terms: "I hereby accept the above proposal and terms.
[Signed] "MRS. E. O. HARTIG.” The last of the labor was performed and the ma