to restrict the opposite party to clearly competent evidence, to the exclusion of all irrelevant testimony which might be prejudicial. The exception to said section 10213, which allows a husband or wife to testify against the other in relation to their separate property or interests, has been often and liberally construed by this court; but the rule stated in Hunt v. Eaton, 55 Mich. 362 (21 N. W. 429), that "no communications passing between husband and wife in the confidence of married life can be given in evidence by either without the other's consent, unless they relate to the title of separate property in litigation between them," has not been departed from. Plaintiff was entitled to testify fully as to communications with defendant relating to issues in this case, as made by the items in her bill of particulars. None of these matters arose before 1909. She was allowed to testify that her husband knew she had money before she married him, that she had loaned him $1,500 before that event, that he told her he had a farm of 200 acres, and she "commenced to learn he was in debt in the spring of 1905, some six or seven months after our marriage," that his farm was mortgaged for some $10,000 or $12,000 at that time, and permitted to relate the details of their business and domestic relations from that time on, including not only the assistance she claimed to have given defendant but other members of his family. She testified to loaning money to "Sam Stevens," defendant's guardian, saying: "He owes me in the neighborhood of $600 now, that I loaned him. * * * At times I would loan Jim; that is his other son. One time he was going to his uncle's funeral and he didn't have any shoes, and I gave him $5 to get shoes. When his daughter went out, that is Alvina, I loaned her $20 to go and various other times I helped with, her." * * * * While this line of examination was progressing against defendant's objection, and her counsel had asked, "Q. Were any of these loans repaid?" and she answered, "Never," the court remarked, "That doesn't tend to show the loan in this instance, does it?" her counsel replied, "No, but it tends to show the fact that she had the money at that time that she could loan and tends to show the fact further that they had need to borrow." A neighbor's wife, who had known defendant for 30 years, was allowed to testify, without giving exact dates, but apparently with reference to about the time the parties were married: “Well, he first spoke to us about getting money because he wanted to go and get her because she had money and he had to have money." And again: "Well, he told us he had got her money. He said he was going to have her sell all her real estate and bring her money down here." Without going further into the details of such testimony, we are well satisfied that much of the evidence of that character was not material to the issue, and in no respect tended to prove any of the different items set out in plaintiff's bill of particulars, and was prejudicially calculated to create the impression plaintiff was a victim of, and being exploited by, defendant and his family, as well as in some instances being in violation of the statute relative to husband and wife testifying against each other. The latitude permitted, along the lines pointed out, on the stated theory that "there is no other way to get at the truth of the matter only to get the whole thing before the jury," should not be extended to irrelevant and immaterial things relating to other times and persons. The evidence should have been more strictly confined to the legitimate and distinct issue presented by the pleadings. We are constrained to hold that the issue before the jury was colored and confused with collaterial issues and incompetent, prejudicial testimony subversive of a fair and impartial trial. The judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted. MCALVAY, C. J., and BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, and MOORE, JJ., concurred. ENSIGN v. DUNN. 1. BILLS AND NOTES-EXECUTION-ADMISSIONS EVIDENCE. The maker of a note signed by her husband, with the qualifying phrase "as surety," admitted the execution of the note where she did not deny it under oath, and testified that she signed the instrument, and she must be held to have executed it in the manner and form alleged and as shown by the instrument, she as principal and her husband as surety. 2. SAME EVIDENCE. The fact that the husband signed the note "as surety" under his wife's signature may be regarded as of significance in determining her relation to and participation in the transaction for which the note was given, namely, the purchase of a lighting plant to be installed upon property that she had an interest in. 3. SAME PARTIES-SALES-CONCLUSIONS-EVIDENCE. Defendant's testimony that the note was given for a lighting plant which was installed in her mother's home and that the witness signed the note, but the husband was the one who purchased such plant, was a conclusion. 4. SAME-HUSBAND AND WIFE. If the note was given for a debt of her husband it would be void as to her, no matter in what capacity she or he signed it. 5. SAME SEPARATE ESTATE OF MARRIED WOMEN. If the plant was purchased either by her or by her husband for her, to be installed as a fixture on realty in which she had an interest and her husband none, the note given for the purchase price was valid. 6. ESTATES-CONTINGENT INTERESTS-REMAINDERS. If it is possible to construe an estate as vested rather than contingent, the law favors such construction. 3 Comp. Laws, 8795 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 10635). 7. SAME-WILLS-VESTED REMAINDER. An estate in a farm created by the will of defendant's father, which devised to the widow, her mother, a life interest, and provided defendant and her sister should have the remainder in equal shares if both survived the life tenant, if not, to the survivor, and if neither survived, to testator's nearest relative, was a vested, not a contingent, interest, subject to be defeated by the death of the devisee of such remainder. Error to Jackson; Parkinson, J. Submitted April 20, 1914. (Docket No. 85.) Decided July 24, 1914. Assumpsit by Charles B. Ensign against T. C. Dunn and wife on a promissory note. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed. J. M. Hatch & Son, for appellant. R. H. Rossman, for appellees. STEERE, J. This action was brought in the circuit court of Jackson county upon the following promissory note: "JACKSON, MICH., Feb. 17, 1909. "One year after date I promise to pay to the order of W. S. Hunter, Jr., ($200.00) two hundred dollars at the office of Value received, with interest at five per cent. per annum until paid and attorney fees if not paid at maturity. "MRS. T. C. DUNN, "Address, Jackson. Mich. Indorsement on the back: "W. S. HUNTER, JR." Plaintiff's declaration was upon the common counts in assumpsit, with notice that under the money counts said note would be given in evidence, a copy of which was attached to the declaration. The record does not disclose whether Mr. T. C. Dunn was served with process or not, but he did not appear in the case, which has proceeded against Mrs. Dunn as though he were not a party. Mrs. Dunn entered her appearance and pleaded the general issue, giving special notice with her plea that at the time of the execution of said note she was a married woman, under the disability of coverture; that the indebtedness for which the note was given did not relate to her sole and separate property, and she received no consideration therefor. The case was tried before the court without a jury. There is little conflict in the testimony. Plaintiff in the first instance introduced the note in evidence and rested. Defendant Mrs. Dunn, as a witness in her own behalf, testified that at the time the note was executed she was a married woman, the wife of defendant T. C. Dunn, whose signature appears to the note as surety; that the note was given for a lighting system bought by Mr. T. C. Dunn, her husband, installed at the home of her mother on a farm 411⁄2 miles from Jackson where she and her husband were then living, her husband working the farm on shares for her mother; that her father had owned the farm at the time of his death, nine years previous to the trial, and by will left it to his wife, Mrs. Dunn's mother, for life, and at her death to Mrs. Dunn and her sister in equal shares if both survived their mother, if not, to the survivor of them, and, if neither of them survived the mother, then to his nearest relative; that |