of affidavits supporting the motion upon the accused or
his attorney, as well in cases in the recorder's court of
the city of Detroit as in the circuit court. Subdivision b
of Circuit Court Rule 19 applies to practice in the record-
er's court in such cases. Glinnan v. Judge of Recorder's
Court of City of Detroit, 192.
2. Affidavits employed in a criminal case as a basis for a
motion for change of venue should be entitled in the court
and cause. Circuit Court Rule 37 b. Id.
See CRIMINAL LAW (13); EVIDENCE (5).
AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
ALTERATIONS-See CONTRACTS (2, 3); EVIDENCE (11).
AMENDMENTS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8); PLEADING (6).
ANIMALS-See DAMAGES (4); RAILROADS (1); TRIAL (6).
ANNUAL REPORTS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4); CORPORA-
TIONS (6).
1. Unless the claim that the trial court made prejudicial re-
marks has been brought to the notice of such court, it will
not be considered on error. Neal v. Neal, 115.
2. Under an assignment that the court erred in admitting
evidence that the car which caused plaintiff's injuries
was running faster than other cars had run during the
morning in question, no question was raised for review,
on appeal, as to testimony which the witness gave, that
the cars were stopping as they stopped on other days,
no such testimony as was covered by the objection being
introduced. Purulewski v. Detroit United Ry., 133.
3. In equity an appeal lies from an order denying defendant's
motion for a rehearing, and a motion to dismiss is denied,
on the ground that the order is final. Perkins v. Perkins,
166.
4. Testimony, in a negligence case, having been received to
show that the wrench which plaintiff was using when
he was hurt was defective, whether improperly admitted
or not, did not amount to reversible error where the
trial judge afterwards withdrew that subject from the
consideration of the jury, leaving for their considera-
tion only the failure to guard belts and pulleys in which
plaintiff's arm was injured. Johnson v. Union Carbide Co.,
403.
5. Nor was it erroneous to exclude the proposed cross-exam-
ination of plaintiff as to his bringing another action in
APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued.
which he recovered damages for personal injuries, sus-
tained prior to the injuries in question, although it would
have been proper to show that plaintiff had given con-
tradictory testimony at the trial, or to show his physical
condition; no such purpose being suggested or disclosed
for the examination. Id.
6. In cases tried without a jury, the Supreme Court, on error,
will not find any of the facts; it may reject such find-
ings of the trial judge as are unsupported by the evidence;
the ultimate facts are to be found by the trial court
whether the testimony is undisputed or disputed. Wilson
v. Sauble, 406.
7. Although counsel for all parties consent, it is not permis-
sible to consolidate, on appeal, a foreclosure suit in equity
with an action at law in attachment, involving practically
the same facts and evidence, but different questions of
law, where the parties insist upon their equitable, legal,
and technical rights in both proceedings, and numerous
assignments of error are urged, the questions involved
in the chancery cause being distinct from those raised
in the action at law. Stevens v. Stevens, 449.
8. On error an exception is necessary to review the action of
the trial court in submitting a special question to the jury.
Dowagiac Manfg. Co. v. Schneider, 538.
9. Errors assigned to the general charge of the court with-
out referring to the portions which are claimed to be
erroneous or designating the appropriate page or para-
graph of the record, will not be considered. People v.
Ponsford, 660.
10. Where the trial court expressed an opinion that a motion
for a new trial did not take the place of exceptions before
sentence, as claimed on the argument, by the attorney
for respondent, and the proper steps were not taken to
raise the points in the way provided by the statute
authorizing a review of the case by that method, the
trial court did not err in overruling the alleged exceptions
as frivolous and passing sentence before proceedings were
taken to appeal the cause. Id.
See CRIMINAL LAW (12); DIVORCE (3); EQUITY (1, 2); JURY;
PLEADING (1, 2); STREET RAILWAYS (8).
ARCHITECTS-See CONTRACTS (2, 3); EVIDENCE (8); NEGLIGENCE
ARGUMENTATIVE CHARGE-See CRIMINAL Law (3).
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-See EVIDENCE (1); TRIAL (1).
ARGUMENT OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY-See CRIMINAL
LAW (15).
ARMY-See SOLDIERS' HOME (1).
Act No. 168, Pub. Acts 1899, amending section 10006, 3
Comp. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 12669), as to the
time for filing the declaration in the cause, applies to
actions commenced by capias only, not to suits begun by
the issuance of a summons. Bender v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 50.
ASSAULT-See CRIMINAL LAW (1).
ASSIGNMENTS-See INSURANCE (1); WITNESSES (3).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR-See APPEAL AND ERROR (2).
ASSUMED NAME-See NAMES (1, 2).
ASSUMPSIT-See DAMAGES (6); FRAUD; PLEADING (2, 3).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK-See MASTER and Servant (16).
AUTOMOBILES-See DAMAGES (1).
BEST EVIDENCE-See EVIDENCE (13).
BILL OF COMPLAINT See EVIDENCE (13).
1. Neither suspicions nor gross negligence on the part of a
holder of negotiable paper will affect his right, unless the
suspicion or circumstances amount to bad faith: knowl-
edge short of bad faith will not amount to notice. And
where the testimony of the plaintiff's good faith is undis-
puted, it is the duty of the court to so charge the jury.
Van Slyke v. Rooks, 88.
2. Makers of a promissory note who had an opportunity to
inspect the paper when they signed it, but supposed that
they were signing an agreement to form an association
to purchase the horse for which the note was given, were
liable, in an action on the instrument, if the jury found
that the fraudulent conduct of the person who procured
their signatures did not mislead them, or if their negli-
gence in signing the notes was such that they should be
required to suffer rather than an innocent holder. As to
a defendant who signed the notes without looking at them
or being misled as to the purport of the papers by the
payee, a verdict should have been directed in favor of the
plaintiff. Id.
3. Although one of the makers denied signing the instru-
ment, which plaintiff's proofs showed that he executed,
the other joint makers were not relieved of responsibility.
Id. 89.
4. In charging the jury on the question of the burden of
proof, no greater weight of evidence ought to be required
than an ordinary preponderance, the use of the words
"fair preponderance" while not reversible error might
BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.
well be avoided. There is no rule of law which adopts
any sliding scale of belief in civil actions. Id.
5. Cross-examination of plaintiff's husband, who claimed to
have obtained the note upon which action was brought
for a loan of $300 and for an existing indebtedness, was
improperly restricted by the trial court, who refused to
permit counsel for the defendant to ask him where he got
the $300 in support of the defense that the note was forged
and the claim fraudulent. Neal v. Neal, 114.
6. Where the defense of fraud is set up, a wide latitude should
be allowed upon the cross-examination of a witness who
participated in the transaction. Id.
7. Defendant claimed, in an action upon a promissory note,
that he had not executed the instrument which was writ-
ten in his wife's handwriting upon one of the forms taken
from the book of the defendant. His wife testified that
the payee came to her and asked her to draw up two $500
notes for the use of his son who owed him $1,000; that
she prepared the notes in blank, taking a form from her
husband's book of blank forms, and gave them to the
payee. Defendant's counsel asked the payee, who was
a witness, whether he had not subsequently attempted to
trade a note of his son for an automobile, and the witness
denied doing so. Thereupon the attorney offered to show
that the witness did have a note of his son at the time
inquired about, and offered to trade it for the automobile.
The court excluded the testimony. Held, that the testi-
mony was admissible as bearing upon the probability of
the testimony of the wife of defendant, that the notes
were prepared for the son and not for her husband to
sign. Id.
8. Such testimony was also competent to impeach the testi-
mony of the payee who had denied having notes of his
son, or that there was any such indebtedness. Id. 115.
9. Held, that the verdict was not manifestly against the
weight of the evidence. Id.
10. The maker of a note signed by her husband, with the
qualifying phrase "as surety," admitted the execution of
the note where she did not deny it under oath, and testi-
fied that she signed the instrument, and she must be held
to have executed it in the manner and form alleged and
as shown by the instrument, she as principal and her
husband as surety. Ensign v. Dunn, 456.
11. The fact that the husband signed the note "as surety"
under his wife's signature may be regarded as of signifi-
cance in determining her relation to and participation
in the transaction for which the note was given, namely,
the purchase of a lighting plant to be installed upon prop-
erty that she had an interest in. Id.
12. Defendant's testimony that the note was given for a light-
BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.
ing plant which was installed in her mother's home and
that the witness signed the note, but the husband was
the one who purchased such plant, was a conclusion. Id.
13. If the note was given for a debt of her husband it would
be void as to her, no matter in what capacity she or he
signed it. Id.
14. If the plant was purchased either by her or by her hus-
band for her, to be installed as a fixture on realty in
which she had an interest and her husband none, the note
given for the purchase price was valid. Id. 457.
15. No valid authority to execute negotiable paper of a cor-
poration was conferred on the secretary by a resolution
granting power to the secretary to indorse checks, drafts,
bills of exchange, certificates of deposit, etc., and receipt
for the same and to receive and receipt for the cash or
negotiable bills of exchange. Northville State Bank v.
Detroit Silver Refining Co., 515.
16. And the trial court did not err, in an action on a promis-
sory note of the corporation, in excluding from the evi-
dence a paper purporting to be a resolution of the com-
pany, signed by its president and secretary, which
authorized the making of the note sued upon, where the
evidence did not show when it was adopted and it ap-
peared that the president who signed it had resigned
shortly before the note was executed and that none of
the money obtained on the note reached the treasury of
the defendant, and a verdict was properly directed for
the defendant corporation on the ground that proper
authority to execute the paper was not shown. Id.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF CORPORATION-See BILLS AND
NOTES (16).
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF SOLDIERS' HOME-See SOLDIERS'
HOME (3).
BONA FIDE HOLDER-See BILLS AND NOTES (2).
BONDS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7).
BOOKS OF ACCOUNT-See EVIDENCE (15).
BOUNDARIES-See ADVERSE POSSESSION.
BREACH OF CONTRACT-See EVIDENCE (6); PLEADING (6);
VENDOR AND PURCHASER (1, 4).
BREACH OF WARRANTY-See DAMAGES (4, 5).
BROKERS-See EVIDENCE (19).
BUILDING CONTRACT-See CONTRACTS (2, 3); EVIDENCE (11);
NEGLIGENCE (2).
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