in full for the assets in his hands, although third parties
had become interested in the reorganized corporation, the
evidence was not such as to bar the right to an account-
ing in favor of the parties interested in the estate on the
ground of laches or acquiescence. Id.
4. And third parties, who acquired an interest in the corpora-
tion as reorganized, after having made a full examina-
tion of the records and conveyances, being attorneys at
law, were chargeable with notice of the condition of dece-
dent's estate, and complainants could not be held to have
lost their rights by estoppel because the third parties
bought stock. Id.
5. That the second corporation held State tax deeds for the
taxes of 1897 and 1899, upon the mining property, by
assignment, and had remained in possession of the prop-
erty more than five years after obtaining the tax titles,
did not entitle it to rely upon the five-year statute of
limitations, where the duty rested on the original pur-
chaser of the tax deeds to pay the taxes, for which the
sale had been made, also on the officers of the first cor-
poration, who became officers of the reorganized company.
Id.
6. Where a corporation was in default for filing its annual
report as required by Act No. 137, Pub. Acts 1907, as
amended (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 9543), the directors
were not relieved of liability for an indebtedness incurred
after the filing of the last report, because the annual re-
port was, in fact, filed two days after the 11th of March;
as soon as the liability became fixed, it remained en-
forceable against the directors, though the action was not
instituted during the period of default. Reuter Hub &
Spoke Co. v. Hicks, 250.
7. Complainants were stockholders in a corporation which
controlled and owned the license to manufacture certain
patents. One Hyde was also trustee under an agreement
providing that Hyde should hold in trust the stock of a
subsidiary corporation organized to operate under an
assignment of the said license. It was provided by the
trust instrument that upon Hyde selling any preferred
stock of the subsidiary company he should convey or
make over to the corporation in which complainants
were stockholders, a number of shares of the common
stock equal to the shares of preferred stock sold, and that
the purpose of the trust arrangement was to assure to
the said corporation an equal number of the shares of
stock which might be issued to purchasers. By a subse-
quent resolution of the corporation in which complain-
ants were members, the directors instructed the trustee
to sell two shares of common stock in his hands with
the preferred stock offered by him up to a stated amount.
The common stock was fully paid up by the grant of a
license to the subsidiary corporation. The resolution
further provided that the shares of common stock so sold
or issued should be taken from the number held by the
majority stockholder, who consented to the arrangement.
Held, that demurrer was properly sustained to a bill
charging mismanagement and breach of trust. Reid v.
Church Balance Gear Co., Ltd., 520.
See BILLS AND NOTES (15, 16); CONSTITUTIONAL Law (4, 5);
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
CORRESPONDENCE-See EVIDENCE (7).
COUNTIES-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1-3); HIGHWAYS AND
STREETS (2).
COUNTS-See ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
COUNTY ROAD SYSTEM-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3).
COURT RULES-See AFFIDAVITS (1, 2).
COVENANTS-See DEEDS (2).
CREDITORS' SUITS-See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1, 2).
CRIMINAL LAW.
1. Upon the trial of a prosecution for attempted rape, evi-
dence of a third party concerning the appearance of the
complaining witness, who, on recovering consciousness,
ran screaming from her house to a neighbor's, was not
objectionable because time enough had intervened between
the attack and the time when the witness saw her, to
permit an appearance to be feigned, when the assault
was not denied and the testimony of the complaining
witness harmonized with the facts so claimed and shown.
People v. Jansma, 62.
2. Cross-examination of a character witness concerning the
effect which information that respondent had committed
such an offense as he was charged with, would or did
have upon his opinion, is improper. Id.
3. It is erroneous to refer in the charge of the court to the
complaining witness and to attempt to explain her testi-
mony that she did not want to press the prosecution, on
the theory that she shrank from publicity or notoriety.
Id. 63.
4. An executed and completed sale is necessary to sustain a
prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors without hav-
ing a license; an actual delivery by which title is trans-
ferred is an essential element of the offense. People v.
Perenchio, 314.
5. In a prosecution for murder, the respondent is presumed
to be innocent until the presumption is overcome by
testimony which establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and it is the duty of the trial court to so instruct
the jury, in substance, or in exact words, if the respond-
ent so requests. People v. Rogulski, 481.
6. Where the trial court directed a verdict for respondent,
on the questions of murder and voluntary manslaughter,
leaving to them the question of involuntary manslaughter,
assault and battery or assault, under the information,
and he instructed the jury that there was no presump-
tion that respondent committed manslaughter unless the
crime was proved, and the burden of proof was on the
prosecution to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the respondent was guilty, and that defendant was en-
titled to every reasonable doubt, cautioning the jury at
length as to this phase of the case, the court did not
commit error, in the absence of a request for more specific
instructions as to the presumption of innocence. Id.
7. Respondent was charged with murder. The evidence
showed that he killed the victim, a young man who was
hunting and trespassing on a farm; that respondent had
been offered a sum of money for every gun which he
should bring in, by an employee of the owner of the
premises; that he attempted to take the gun from dece-
Ident who tried to recover it and was shot, some of the
testimony tending to prove that respondent purposely
fired the weapon. The court did not submit the murder
charge to the jury, or permit them to find that respondent
was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, but charged the
jury that they might find him guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter or the lesser offenses included in such charge.
Held, that no error was committed in charging that he
had no legal right to take the gun from the boys, and
if he was in the act of taking the gun from the boys when
he shot decedent, even accidentally, he was guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter. Id. 482.
8. If the jury found that respondent obtained possession of
the gun either by a ruse or by violence, with the wrong-
ful intention to permanently deprive the owner of it and
convert it to his own use or deliver it to another for
a reward, his act amounted to larceny, if not robbery.
If he intentionally but without malice aimed or pointed
the gun at decedent, designing no mischief, and by its
discharge death resulted, he was guilty of a careless use
of firearms in violation of statute and the offense was
manslaughter. 3 Comp. Laws, § 11511 (5 How. Stat. [2d
Ed.] 14560). Also, negligence in the use of firearms
may, at common law, render the possessor liable to a
charge of manslaughter. Id.
9. Under the short form of information for murder, a convic-
tion for involuntary manslaughter was not unauthorized.
Id.
10. In the absence of the sheriff, the undersheriff is the
proper officer to act in summoning talesmen: the fact that
the officer has been active in his duty in assisting the
prosecuting attorney is not ground for disqualifying him
from summoning jurors to try the case, in the absence
of any showing of interest or disqualification other than
such official's acts. People v. Ponsford, 659.
11. The evidence showing that respondent, charged with mur-
der, voluntarily made harmful admissions after his ar-
rest, in the presence of the chief of police and a court
stenographer, who reduced a part of the statements to
writing, it was not erroneous to admit testimony relating
to such statements or admissions. Id.
12. The refusal to strike out a part of the alleged statement
was not prejudicial to the accused, when the testimony
given by him upon the witness stand covered the same
ground and was identical with it. Id.
13. Where affidavits were filed after the conviction of a re-
spondent, in support of the claim that one of the jurors
was disqualified and that he had talked with one of the
persons who was present at an assault, etc., occurring on
the night of the murder and in which the accused and
the deceased participated, but there was no evidence that
the juror formed any opinion as to the merits of the
prosecution and he expressed no opinion in regard to the
guilt of the respondent, the trial court did not err in re-
fusing to set aside the verdict. Id.
14. Respondent, who was convicted of manslaughter, was not
entitled to have a verdict directed in his favor, upon
evidence tending to show that he and his companions
started out with the intention of committing an assault
or other crime, that he was present at the attack upon
decedent, and actively participated in the events that led
up to the assault, including a chase of the decedent prior
to his murder.
15. While the statement to the jury by a prosecuting attorney
that he believes the accused is guilty, has been held to
constitute reversible error, it is not ground for reversal
that the prosecutor stated on the trial of a prosecution
for murder that he believed the testimony showed beyond
all reasonable doubt that the respondent was guilty as
charged; since it is, as a general rule, permissible to
state what evidence convinces him and should convince
the jury of respondent's guilt. Id. 660.
See AFFIDAVITS (1, 2); APPEAL AND ERROR (9); EVIDENCE (1,
16, 17); INJUNCTION (1); INTOXICATING LIQUORS; MAN-
DAMUS; TRIAL (2, 3); WITNESSES (1).
CROSS-EXAMINATION-See APPEAL AND ERROR (5); BILLS AND
NOTES (5-7); CRIMINAL LAW (2); EVIDENCE (1); RAILROADS
(3); TRIAL (7).
1. Damages for loss of the services of plaintiff's wife, arising
from personal injuries suffered by her in a runaway ac-
cident, which was caused by defendant's servant in charge
of a motor car, are recoverable in an action by the hus-
band, notwithstanding the provisions of Act No. 196, Pub.
Acts 1911 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11552), giving the wife
the right to her earnings and services. The statute means
that all earnings acquired or services performed as a re-
sult of her personal effort in any separate business carried
on by her in her own behalf, or any services performed
by her for others than her husband belong to her. Her
labor, companionship, society, and assistance in the dis-
charge of her family and household obligations still belong
to the husband. Gregory v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 101.
2. Nor did the trial court err in submitting to the jury the
question of the value of the wife's services, although no
direct or express evidence was offered on the subject; and
it was not improper to permit the jury to fix the damages
to be recovered according to their good judgment and
common sense. Id.
3. Seven hundred dollars for loss of the services of plaintiff's
wife who was disabled from washing, ironing, milking and
similar labor, upon testimony tending to show permanence
of such injuries, was not an excessive verdict such as to
require the court to grant a new trial. Id.
4. It was not prejudicial error to submit to the jury, as an
element of damages for false representations or warranty
of a team of horses, the question of plaintiff's right to
recover for delay in his farm work and loss of crops re-
sulting from the sickness and death of one of the horses
which proved to be sick of distemper or influenza; knowl-
edge or notice of the purpose for which the horse was
purchased being established, the record also showing that
the jury made no allowance for such loss of profits. Glann
v. White, 320.
5. In an action of tort it is not improper to permit a recovery
for indirect or consequential injuries resulting from the
wrongful act. Id. 321.
6. Under a declaration in assumpsit and bill of particulars
claiming the value of certain machinery delivered to de-
fendant, plaintiff could not, at the trial, seek a recovery
for liquidated damages as stipulated in the contract of sale.
Dowagiac Manfg. Co. v. Schneider, 538.
See FRAUD; INJUNCTION (2); INSURANCE (6); LANDLORD AND
TENANT (1, 3); LOGS AND LOGGING (1); WATERS AND
WATERCOURSES (2).
DAMS-See INJUNCTION (2); WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (5).
DEATH-See EVIDENCE (17); MASTER AND SERVANT (4); NEGLI-
GENCE (1).
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (4).
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