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purchaser for the benefit of the seller's creditors. Id. 226.
his stock of merchandise, that the provisions of statute
of equitable cognizance. Id.
right, is not to be inferred against a complaining creditor,
FUTURE OR CONTINGENT INTERESTS–See CONTRACTS (7).
GARNISHMENT—See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (3).
1. A valid gift of a mortgage or other chose in action may
be made by manual delivery without a written assign-
ment. Hoyt v. Gillen, 509.
note as an intended gift from decedent to defendant, held,
GRAND RAPIDS CHARTER-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1).
GUARDIAN AND WARDSee WITNESSES (4).
HEARSAY EVIDENCE-See EVIDENCE (4, 16, 18); MASTER AND
1. The objection that a road is open at one end only, is not,
as a matter of law, conclusive on the issue of public :
termini in other public highways. Rogren v. Corwin, 53.
highways and providing for State assistance in creating
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS-Continued.
highway commissioner to establish a trunk line high-
State Highway Com'r, 599.
HOMICIDE-See CRIMINAL LAW (7); EVIDENCE (17, 18).
Conflicting testimony relating to the mental condition and
competency of decedent considered, and held, to establish her capacity to execute a bill of sale of her household furniture and certain notes, with the advice and assist
ance of her attorney. Hannan v. Larsen, 595. See BILLS AND NOTES (10-14); CONTRACTS (1); DAMAGES
(1-3); DIVORCE (1, 4); MECHANICS' LIENS (1, 2); MORTGAGES (2, 3); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (9); WITNESSES (3,
5, 6). IMPEACHMENT—See BILLS AND NOTES (8); EQUITY (2); RAIL
ROADS (3); TRIAL (7); WITNESSES (1, 2). IMPLIED CONTRACTS–See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (1). INDEMNITY—See INSURANCE (6). INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-See NEGLIGENCE (4, 5). INDORSEMENT ON INFORMATION–See WITNESSES (1). INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD-See MASTER AND SERVANT (1,
3, 6-8). INFANTS–See CORPORATIONS (3); NEGLIGENCE (1).
INFORMATION–See CRIMINAL LAW (9).
1. Complainant's bill for an injunction was demurrable on the
theory that he had another adequate remedy, upon averments contained in the pleading, that every legal question involving his license to do transitory business and the validity of an ordinance revoking it had been raised in a case instituted in justice's court, in which the complainant was charged with violating such ordinance of the de
fendant municipality, which cause the complainant had removed to the circuit court by writ of certiorari, and the court having determined the questions involved adversely to the claims of the complainant, who took no appeal.
Vernakes v. City of South Haven, 274. 2. An injunction to restrain defendant power corporation
from overflowing the lands of defendant, who had made no complaint against the erection of the proposed dam, merely claiming greater damages than defendant willing to offer, and who furnished material for the construction of the dam, was properly refused by the court of first instance, on the ground that the proprietor of the land was estopped by his conduct from objecting to the use of the dam, and would be entitled to damages only. INSURANCE-Continued.
Morrison v. Queen City Electric Light & Power Co., 624. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (12); NUISANCE (1); SOLDIERS'
HOME (4); WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (2-5).
INSTRUCTIONS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (4, 9); BILLS AND
NOTES (4); CRIMINAL LAW (3, 5-8); LOGS AND LOGGING (2, 3); MASTER AND SERVANT (14); SET-OFF AND RECOUPMENT; STREET RAILWAYS (2, 3); TRIAL (3, 6); WITNESSES (7).
1. After breach of a contract for the purchase of real and
personal property covered by insurance, and after the vendee had assigned his interest in the policy to the vendor, canceling the land contract and assigning all interest in the policy to him, the defendant insurance corporation, which had notice of the transaction, is held, by an equally divided court, to be liable on the policy upon which it had indorsed a clause stipulating that the vendee held the property under contract, and the loss, if any, should be payable to plaintiffs and vendee as their interests might appear. MCALVAY, C. J., and STONE, OSTRANDER, and STEERE, JJ., dissenting, on the ground that a material change of interest had occurred, avoiding the
policy. Gourlay v. Insurance Co. of North America, 286. 2. Where the evidence of an insured tended to establish that
he sent notice to defendant of his injury, pursuant to the conditions of his accident policy, that he received a reply signed by one of defendant's claim clerks, and that the defendant cashed a check contained in his letter, the court was not in error in holding that the sending of the notice was established. Hummer v. Midland Casualty Co.,
386. 3. The provisions of such accident policy requiring notice as
soon as possible after suffering an injury, could not be held, as matter of law, to have been intended only as a protection against fraud and misrepresentation; and it was plaintiff's duty to give notice as promptly as possible after an injury to his eye; delay for five months or over
was not a compliance therewith. Id. 4. No reversible error was committed, on the trial, in re
opening the case, after plaintiff closed his testimony, to admit testimony of his physician to show the contents of a letter which had been attached to the proofs of injury, but which contained no facts prejudicial to the de
fense. Id. 5. It was not erroneous to permit the attending physician,
who knew plaintiff's condition, to give his opinion that plaintiff was incapacitated from attending to his business
during about three and a half months. Id. 387. 6. But plaintiff was not entitled, under a policy providing
that the insurer should pay an indemnity of $2,500 if the injury resulted in the loss of an eye (or other similar injuries) within 100 days from the date of the accident, that in case the injury from the date of accident rendered him continuously unable to perform any of his business duties and resulted in the loss of one eye, he should be entitled to a weekly indemnity of $25, to recover, in addition to the $2,500, the weekly indemnity so provided for, when it appeared that the injury to his eye was not serious, but by some mistake he obtained a medicine containing caustic acid which caused further injury and resulting blindness; and that he was not continuously dis
abled from the date of his original injury. Id. 7. In the absence of provisions in the policy working for.
feiture in case notice of the injury was not given as soon as possible, or in case proofs were not filed within the time stated, the insurer might waive such conditions, and a waiver was established by testimony that showed the insurer had no intention of complaining about the failure to give notice in the stated period, and was not prejudiced
by the neglect. Id. 8. Testimony that the loss of plaintiff's eye was caused by
the introduction into it of acid, that the proofs of loss or injury were filed within 100 days from the date of the accident, and within 60 days from the time that plaintiff became satisfied what the result would be, held, to be
within the conditions of the policy. Id. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER (6).
INTENT—See CONTRACTS (9); STATUTES; WILLS (1-3). INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT–See CONTRACTS (2, 5, 6, 8). INTERSTATE COMMERCE-See MASTER AND SERVANT (2).
Taking orders for intoxicating liquors which the vendor
later shipped from the city in which he was authorized
People v. Perenchio, 314.
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER–See CRIMINAL LAW (7, 9).
ISSUE—See TRIAL (5).
ISSUES FOR JURY—See MASTER AND SERVANT (14).
JOINT DEFENDANTS–See ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
JOINT MAKERS–See BILLS AND NOTES (3).
JUDGMENT—See APPEAL AND ERROR (3, 6); ESTATES OF DECE
DENTS (8); FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1, 2); INJUNCTION (1). JUDICIAL NOTICE-See EVIDENCE (12). JURISDICTION-See EJECTMENT; EQUITY (4); ESTATES OF DECE
DENTS (2, 5-7); FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1, 2, 4). JURY.
A juror will not be held disqualified because he is an alien,
if the record permits an inference that he might be a qualified elector. Also, the objection is not well taken,
after judgment in a civil action. Neal v. Neal, 115.
See CRIMINAL LAW (10, 13). LACHES-See CORPORATIONS (3); EQUITY (1, 5, 6). LADDERS, USE OF-See NEGLIGENCE (3). LAND CONTRACTS–See USURY (1); VENDOR AND PURCHASER. LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. Evidence that plaintiff's employer, after plaintiff had
joined a strike, notified him to quit and surrender up the house and premises that he occupied as a part of his employment, and thereupon sent men to put him out, who, after advising him why they came, removed his furniture to the street, and that the plaintiff cautioned them against damaging it, but they injured the furniture to the extent of $14.50, held, to be insufficient to show excessive force or forcible entry and detainer, although plaintiff's judgment for the damage done by their neglect is allowed to stand. Lane v. Au sable Electric Co., 26.