LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued.
2. The relation of the servant was not that of tenant to land-
lord, where he occupied a house on the premises of his
employer as a part of the compensation paid to him. It
was an incident of his hiring and his right to the use
of the premises ceased when he joined a strike and ceased
to perform his duties. Id.
3. Accordingly, plaintiff could not recover damages for being
evicted and his goods set out of the house, upon his claim
of excessive force, nor could he recover damages because
of mortification, injured feelings, etc. Id.
LARCENY-See CRIMINAL LAW (8).
LAST CLEAR CHANCE-See STREET RAILWAYS (6).
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1-3).
LETTERS-See EVIDENCE (7); FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2); INSUR-
ANCE (2).
LICENSE-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8); CRIMINAL LAW (4);
INJUNCTION (1); INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-See CORPORATIONS (5); TAXATION
(2).
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-See DAMAGES (6).
LOCAL OPTION-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7).
1. Where the owner of a raft of cedar posts and poles which
went ashore in 1908 in Canada, brought suit against the
defendant for converting his timber, with which the de-
fendant's property became intermixed, going ashore at
the same point, three years later, and the evidence of
the defendant showed that the timber could not be
assorted on the exposed shore and that it was necessary
to collect all the logs and tow them to a Michigan port,
and that defendant, as soon as plaintiff made claim for
the value of the timber, offered to return it, and did not
claim to own the cedar, the plaintiff was not entitled to
treble damages under 2 Comp. Laws, § 5094 (2 How. Stat.
[2d Ed.] § 4156), since the statute relates to an unlawful
taking. Bennett v. Michigan Pulpwood Co., 33.
2. Evidence in an action for breach of contract to safely tow
plaintiff's logs, considered, and held, not to have required
the giving of a requested instruction that if the plaintiff
hired the tugs and booms by the day, subject to a custom
that the loss caused by the breaking up of the raft should
be borne by the owner, the verdict of the jury must be
for defendant. Karwick v. Pickands, 170.
LOGS AND LOGGING-Continued.
3. Held, also, that the charge of the court fairly presented the
issues of the parties to the jury. Id.
See EVIDENCE (6); SALES (2, 3).
LOSS OF CROPS-See DAMAGES (4).
It is necessary, in a criminal proceeding as well as in a
civil suit, to move to vacate an order which the relator
by mandamus seeks to have set aside: the rule applies
to an order quashing the information in a prosecution for
violation of the liquor law. Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit
Judge, 700.
See HIGHWAYS AND STREETS (2); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(2).
MANSLAUGHTER-See CRIMINAL LAW (6, 14).
MARRIED WOMEN-See BILLS AND NOTES (10-14); CONTRACTS
(1); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (9).
1. A workman who has lost a leg and sustained other in-
juries resulting in total disability is entitled, under the
workmen's compensation act (Act No. 12, Extra Session
1912, 2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939 et seq.), to recover
the compensation provided for total disability for a period
of not over 500 weeks up to a maximum of $4,000: addi-
tional compensation cannot be awarded for the loss of
the leg. Limron v. Blair, 76.
2. Recovery is permissible only under the Federal act
abolishing the fellow-servant rule and modifying the
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumed risk
(35 U. S. Stat. § 65, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322;
see, also, Act No. 104, Pub. Acts 1909, 4 How. Stat. [2d
Ed.] 4110 et seq.), in favor of an employee who was
engaged at the time of his injury in repairing a draw-
bar of a freight car that belonged to the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Company and that had been used to bring coal
into Michigan from a foreign jurisdiction. Gaines v. De-
troit, etc., Ry. Co., 376.
3. Opinion evidence of two physicians that pneumonia did
not result from injuries which decedent received in the
course of his employment, and which were followed by
his decease, contradicted by plaintiff's experts who gave
a contrary opinion, held, not to justify the court in re-
versing the finding of the industrial accident board
awarding compensation. Bayne v. Riverside Storage &
Cartage Co., 378.
4. In an action under the Federal statute affecting the right
of employees to recover for negligent acts of fellow-
servants or others (35 U. S. Stat. 65; U. S. Comp. Stat.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
Supp. 1911, p. 1322), evidence tending to show that de-
fendant's employee, in charge of the main repair track,
permitted cars to be backed upon the track while deceased
and another car repairer were working on one of the cars,
without warning or notice to them, and that such track
was their usual place of work, held, to present an issue
for the jury as to the negligence of such fellow-servant.
Evans v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 413.
5. Evidence tending to show that plaintiff's decedent was
caught on a revolving shaft, upon which he was making
repairs, that one of the pins or keys on the shaft pro-
jected, but not showing what his clothing caught on, and
testimony that he could have had the machinery stopped
while he was adjusting the gears, held, to warrant a di-
rected verdict for defendant. Cressler v. King Paper Co.,
422.
6. Findings of fact handed down by the industrial accident
board, on hearings pursuant to statute, are conclusive,
in the absence of fraud, if any competent, legal evidence
is produced to sustain the facts so found. Act No. 10,
Extra Session 1912 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939 et seq.).
Reck v. Whittlesberger, 463.
7. Although statements made by an injured employee relating
to his feelings, mental or physical, are admissible in evi-
dence in proceedings under the compensation act, state-
ments made as to the cause of the accident or source of
injury are not admissible. But it is not required by the
statute that the decision of the board must in all cases
be reversed because error may have been committed in
the admission of incompetent testimony, when there ap
pears in the record a legal basis for its findings. Id.
8. An employer's official report of an accident, filed with the
industrial accident board, as required by law, where the
employer had ample opportunity to satisfy himself of the
facts, and all sources of information were at his command
when he made the report, may be taken as prima facie
evidence that an accident occurred in the manner set
forth, which fact the evidence did not tend to controvert.
Id. 464.
9. Where plaintiff was caught by the freight elevator from
which he was attempting to alight at the second landing,
and it was not shown that the method of inclosing the
shaft had anything to do with the injury or was an im-
proper method, the court should have directed a verdict
for the defendant, although it was the contention of the
plaintiff that the shaft was not sufficiently inclosed, in
violation of section 12, Act No. 285, Pub. Acts 1909 (2
How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 4020). Fifelski v. Grand Rapids Gas-
light Co., 503.
10. It was erroneous to exclude testimony of experts, offered
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
by defendant, tending to show that the method of in-
closure was sufficient. Id.
11. Even the breach of a statutory duty is not actionable un-
less such breach causes injury either proximately or con-
currently. Id.
12. The rules relating to the obligation of a master to provide
a reasonably safe place for his servants does not apply
to a portion of a mine in which miners and trammers
were jointly engaged in taking out ore from a stope, and
in barring down rock after blasts so as to prepare a place
to perform their work. Kochin v. Superior Copper Co., 543.
13. Evidence being in dispute relative to the sufficiency of the
inspection made in a stope of defendant's mine after
blasting was done, and tending to show that the rock was
unstable and full of cracks, and that the decedent, a tram-
mer, had no duties in regard to such inspection, held, to
present a question for the jury as to the matter of negli-
gence. Id.
14. On the trial, the court erred in refusing a request of plain-
tiff's attorney to charge that there was no question of
contributory negligence, when it appeared that defendant's
counsel did not claim that the decedent was chargeable
with negligence and the evidence raised an issue as to
the sufficiency of the inspection only. Id.
15. Under either Federal or State statute, the liability of a
common carrier to its injured employee rests upon a
negligent act. Act No. 104, Pub. Acts 1909 (2 How.
Stat. [2d Ed.] § 4110 et seq.); 35 U. S. Stat. 66. Hollings-
head v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 547.
16. It was not actionable negligence on the part of a railroad
company to fail to warn a helper in the roundhouse of
the fact that he incurred a danger and risk of injury
in riding into the roundhouse on the step of the tender
which only cleared the doorway by ten and a half inches
at the side, notices having been posted in the roundhouse
and on the wall, warning employees to keep off the steps
of engines or cars entering the house, and plaintiff hav-
ing frequently ridden through the doors on engines of
different sizes; the danger was obvious and plaintiff
chargeable with notice of the risk. It was his duty to
familiarize himself with the situation and obvious dan-
ger of following the course which led to his injury. Id.
See COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1, 3); CONTRACTS (4);
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (1); LANDLORD AND TENANT (1, 2);
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (6); NEGLIGENCE (4).
MATTERS EQUALLY WITHIN KNOWLEDGE OF DECEASED
-See WITNESSES (3, 4).
1. Where complainant installed a furnace in the homestead
of the defendants under a contract with the wife alone,
who had no authority to act as agent for the husband,
and such husband signed no written contract as required
by 3 Comp. Laws, § 10711 (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 13767),
and at no time recognized the written agreement, no lien
was enforceable against the property. Holland Furnace
Co. v. Hartig, 342.
2. A contract to furnish materials for a homstead occupied
by defendant and his wife is not valid unless it is signed
by both husband and wife. John Wallace Sons Co. v.
Wilkinson, 693.
3. Complainant, a materialman, furnished lumber and ma-
terials for the reconstruction of a house upon real property
which belonged to one of the defendants. The premises
were occupied by a son-in-law of such owner, as the home-
stead of himself and family. The owner was not a party
to the contract. No evidence was offered which estab-
lished an agency in the son-in-law to bind the owner.
Held, that a lien could not be decreed upon the real prop-
erty for the value of materials entering into the remodel-
ing of the house. Id. 694.
MEMORANDUM-See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2).
MICHIGAN AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE ·
UNIVERSITIES.
MINES AND MINING-See CONTRACTS (5, 6); CORPORATIONS (5);
MASTER AND SERVANT (12, 13).
MOIETY-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2).
1. Complainant executed a warranty deed to a trustee of two
of his creditors to secure an indebtedness owing to them.
He claimed later to have paid the debt and received back
a quitclaim deed which he omitted to place upon record.
No notice appeared of record to show that the relation
of mortgagor and mortgagee existed. The land was re-
turned for unpaid taxes, was purchased by one McDade,
who then acquired the title from the trustee and alleged
mortgagee by quitclaim deed which he caused to be re-
corded. After the expiration of the period of redemption,
the bill of complaint was filed to clear up the cloud upon
the alleged title of complainant. Held, that under Act
No. 229, Pub. Acts 1897, as amended by Act No. 204, Pub.
Acts 1899, the title of defendant, a grantee of the tax pur-
chaser, was valid and the bill must be dismissed. Chand-
ler v. Richardson Lumber Co., 309.
2. In a suit by the wife of defendant to foreclose two mort-
gages which her husband had given to her as security
for money advanced to him, as complainant claimed, evi-
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