Armistice.

away the government and others-dishonoured-we might scatter the elements of peace, excite a spirit of national desperation, and thus indefinitely postpone the hope of accommodation. Deeply impressed with this danger, and remembering our mission-to conquer a peace-the army very cheerfully sacrificed to patriotism -to the great wish and want of our country-the eclat that would have followed an entrance-sword in handinto a great capital. Willing to leave something to this republic-of no immediate value to us-on which to rest her pride, and to recover temper-I halted our victorious corps at the gates of the city, (at least for a time,) and have them now cantoned in the neighbouring villages, where they are well sheltered and supplied with all necessaries.

On the morning of the 21st, being about to take up battering or assaulting positions, to authorize me to summon the city to surrender, or to sign an armistice with a pledge to enter at once into negotiations for a peace-a mission came out to propose a truce. Rejecting its forms, I despatched my contemplated note to President Santa Anna-omitting the summons. The 22d, commissioners were appointed by the commanders of the two armies; the armistice was signed the 23d, and ratifications exchanged the 24th.

- Negotiations were actively continued with, as was understood, some prospect of a successful result up to the 2d inst., when our commissioner handed in his ultimatum, (on boundaries,) and the negotiators adjourned to meet on the 6th.

Some infractions of the truce, in respect to our supplies from the city, were earlier committed, followed by

Violation of the armistice by Santa Anna.

apologies on the part of the enemy. Those vexations I was willing to put down to the imbecility of the government, and waived pointed demands of reparation while any hope remained of a satisfactory termination of the war. But on the 5th, and more fully on the 6th, I learned that as soon as the ultimatum had been considered in a grand council of ministers and others, President Santa Anna, on the 4th or 5th, without giving me the slightest notice, actively recommenced strengthening the military defenses of the city, in gross violation of the third article of the armistice.

On that information which has since received the fullest verification, I addressed to him a note on the 6th. His reply dated the same day, received the next morning, was absolutely and notoriously false, both in recrimination and explanation.

Being delayed by the terms of the armistice more than two weeks, we had now, late on the 7th, to begin to reconnoiter the different approaches to the city, within our reach, before I could lay down any definitive plan of attack.

The same afternoon a large body of the enemy was discovered hovering about the Molinos del Rey within a mile and a third of this village, where I am quartered with the general staff and Worth's division.

It might have been supposed that an attack upon us was intended; but knowing the great value to the enemy of those mills (Molinos del Rey) containing a cannon foundry, with a large deposit of powder in Casa Mata near them; and having heard, two days before, that many church bells had been sent out to be cast into guns the enemy's movement was easily understood,

Chapultepec.

and I resolved, at once, to drive him early the next morning; to seize the powder and to destroy the foundry.

Another motive for this decision-leaving the general plan of attack upon the city for full reconnoissance-was, that we knew our recent captures had left the enemy not a fourth of the guns necessary to arm, all at the same time, the strong works at each of the eight city gates, and we could not cut the communication between the foundry and the capital without first taking the formidable castle on the heights of Chapultepec which overlooked both and stood between. For this difficult operation we were not entirely ready, and moreover we might altogether neglect the castle, if, as we then hoped, our reconnoissances should prove that the distant southern approaches to the city were more eligible than this south-western approach.

Hence the decision promptly taken, the execution of which was assigned to Brevet Major-General Worth, whose division was reinforced with Cadwalader's brigade, of Pillow's division, three squadrons of dragoons, under Major Sumner, and some heavy guns of the siege train under Captain Huger, of the ordnance, and Captain Drum of the 4th artillery-two officers of the highest merit."

For the particulars of this decisive and brilliant result, General Scott refers to General Worth's despatch, and the reader will find them in the life of that officer, in a subsequent part of this book.

The enemy having several times reinforced his line, the action soon becoming much more general than I had expected, I called up from the distance of three