were great, they were aggravated to a greater degree than really existed, with a view to justify the measures upon the character of which he had so repeatedly spoken. If this were not the case, why were their lordships told that these measures were absolutely necessary to be adopted, and that measures of conciliation would be of no possible avail? Had this spirit been acted upon throughout? Had not his majesty's ministers yielded to arguments in favour of conciliation, the force of which they were in the first instance prepared to deny? That clause in the misdemeanor bill for limiting the period during which a prosecution could be brought against an individual to one year, was, in his opinion, a concession of infinite importance: it at once relieved the subject from the incertitude in which he must exist under the previous state of the law, which empowered the attorney general to suspend a prosecution over his head to an indefinite period. A few years ago, when a similar concession was demanded, they were told they were asking for that which was in direct opposition to the prerogative of the Crown; and yet, within the last few days, this doctrine had been exploded, and the prerogative of the Crown on this subject, if it had ever existed, was abandoned by the ministers of the Crown themselves. With respect to another bill which had been before that House, and which contained the monstrous provision, that a person convicted of a second political libel should be transported for seven years a provision which both himself and other noble and learned lords had laboured in vain to have excluded, and which the House had at length decided in deference to his majesty's ministers, was a provision which was absolutely necessary. After their lordships House had been dragged through the mire for the purpose of attacking a most obnoxious punishment to political libel, in what state was the bill about to be returned to them? It was about to be returned to them with that obnoxious clause expunged, and this, too, by the concession of one of those ministers by whom it had been introduced. He was happy therefore to perceive that ministers were at length, and in some respects disposed to conciJiate. That disposition had been tardily evinced; but "Dum vita, spes est." He believed that, by judicious conciliation, the spirit of discontent which prevailed

in the country might yet be altogether subdued; and he was happy to find that in another place, a first effort of this description had been made. He had seen that, in the other House, leave had been given to bring in a bill upon that question of parliamentary reform, to which the noble lord opposite never heard any allusion without dismay. Leave had been given to bring in a bill to destroy one of the most venal and corrupt boroughs in the kingdom, and to transfer its right of representation to one of those populous towns which had hitherto existed without that advantage; and this too, he was told, for he had only read it in the reports, was a concession which had been made by one of the ministers of the Crown. Upon the question of parliamentary reform, he hoped he might be permitted to say a few words. He thought it was intimately connected with the state of public feeling at this moment. He had long been a member of parliament, but he was not aware that he had ever given a vote on this question; if ever he did, he was sure he must have given it against any general question for a reform of parliament. He was far from thinking that any part of the difficulties that existed in this country were to be ascribed to the construction of the other House of Parliament: still less did he believe that any of those difficulties could be removed by a reform of any description. It appeared to him, that the excellencies of our constitution consisted in its anomalies, all descriptions of persons who were at all essential to public business finding their way to the House of Commons; ministers and their opponents, financial man, lawyers on each side, all found their level in the House of Com mons, and any ill consequence from the ambition of individuals was thus prevented. As to war, he was satisfied that were the House of Commons more popularly elected, there would still be a greater dispo sition for war than that House had hitherto displayed. He had read upon this subject an article of considerable merit in a number of the Edinburgh Review, about two years ago, in which it was plainly demonstrated that the great practical excellence of the British representation arose from its diversity; and that if we adopted any one system of general representation, it would be found defective in its result, inasmuch as it would give excess of power at particular times to particular interests. The great practical benefit of a constitutional I

parliament, as it now stood, was, that it placed the talent of the country upon an equal footing, and the ministers of the Crown were at all times met by persons of equal ability, in whatever course they might think proper to proceed. This principle, he trusted, would ever be most studiously preserved. But while he entertained these feelings on the subject, and while he did not wish to advocate any specific principle of change, still he could not extend this principle so far as not to feel the necessity of admitting, that where they found any parts of the constitution practically bad, it was their duty to proceed to the amputation of such tainted parts. In this view, he conceived that if a system of corruption were found to exist under local circumstances, it would be wise to transfer the right of representation to some of those great commercial towns which had hitherto been excluded from that right. To that extent he was willing to concede; and he believed that this was the true spirit of conciliation which was calculated to suppress the discontents of the people. It was temperate, and it was all they could rationally ask for. It was peculiarly worthy of remark, that this important concession had been made by one of his majesty's ministers; and from that he was induced to come to the conclusion, as he had said before, that the discontents which prevailed were more the consequence of bad government than of any other definable cause. He had now only to say, that if the situation of the country really demanded the adoption of these measures, his motion would only go to limit the necessary duration of this bill. If the bill went into a committee, he should move, that its duration should be restricted to the 1st of July, 1822.

Lord King said, that every thing he had heard from the noble viscount tended to confirm his objections to the bill. He objected to it as part of a system of coercion of the very worst nature, the effect of which was to alter the constitution of the country, without even the formality of an examination. After the speech from the throne at the commencement of the session, in which parliament were told that it had been necessary to make a large addition to the military force, and in which the existing distresses and discontents had been so strongly insisted on, he had expected that ministers would come down to the House, in order to move for a commit

tee to inquire into the state of the country, and the propriety of adopting the measures which they considered necessary for its protection. To his surprise, however, he found that the general practice of parliament was in this instance to be departed from; that no committee was to be appointed; and that ministers having committed themselves by a rash approbation of the transactions at Manchester, were resolved, upon that account, to prevent parliament from the exercise of one of its most important and necessary functions. The fact was, that it was impossible that any examination could take place without their conduct becoming a subject of reprehension. If a disease was of such a nature as to require a strong remedy, he thought it was first incumbent to examine the patient, and to see to what extent that remedy should be applied. When their lordships were called upon to pass such bills on the ground of the prevalence of discontent, they were bound to inquire into the cause of that discontent; they were bound to inquire whether it had its origin in the distress of the people, or whether it arose from their distrust in parliament itself? If it arose from distrust, the passing of such measures by acclamation, and merely on the notoriety of the case, was calculated to aggravate the evil, by furnishing new proof of the subserviency of parliament. It was possible that strong measures might be necessary, but they could not be necessary without examination, and without the accompani ment of a conciliatory spirit on the part of government. He was glad to find that some concessions had been made, but it was to be observed that they did not originate with ministers, who so far from manifesting a disposition to conciliate the people, had taken advantage of the panic into which the country was thrown, to alter the constitution. One of the greatest dangers existing at the present day was this disposition of the government to adopt measures of severity and coercion. The ministers had forgotten or confounded the distinction between a free and an arbitrary government, which was, that the one rested on conviction and affection, while the other relied upon the strong arm of force. If they acted on the bona fide intention of protecting the constitution, they would pass those measures as a temporary experiment, and limit their operation by the extent of the danger. In his opinion, even a stronger measure would

verse, and was of such a nature that his noble friend opposite had declared, that he thought it upon the whole an amendment of the old law: the fourth related to the prevention of tumultuous and seditious meetings; and he would ask whether this was a time for such large meetings as had been recently witnessed-meetings of fifty or sixty thousand persons, assembled together by itinerant orators, meetings which had no parallel either in ancient or in modern history, and which were calculated for any purpose rather than the purpose of calm and tranquil deliberation. A noble earl who had spoken before him had passed high encomiums upon our unpaid magistracy; but in the objections which he had made to the authority given by this bill to them, he had both done and said much to their disparagement. Happily for this country, its magistracy was of such a character, that no persons could be more safely entrusted with discretionary power. The noble earl had also misunderstood what had fallen from the noble viscount. The noble viscount had never said, that the bill ought to be re-enacted at the end of 5 years, whether or not circumstances should be such as to require it: but whether it was to be so re-enacted or not, it was of importance that the industrious part of the population should not be kept in a state of perpetual alarm by the machinations of those who were so frequently calling these turbulent meetings. The measure might, in some respects, be contrary to the spirit of the constitution; but there were cases, and he thought the present was one, in which all theory was bound to yield to dire necessity. The principle of vitality was, how ever, so strong in our constitution, that he did not entertain any doubt of the evils under which the country now labour ed being soon surmounted, and of our again enjoying that tranquillity which we were entitled to enjoy, from the success of our arms, the civilization of our people, and the excellence of our laws and general institutions.

The Earl of Donoughmore declared, that though he was glad that the country was to be afflicted by this measure for a shorter period than was at first proposed, he must object to it both as a part of a whole, and upon its own demerits. If it did not absolutely take away one of the most important rights of the people, it certainly limited and narrowed it considerably it vested in the ministers of the (VOL. XLI.)

Crown, or at least in those whom they appointed, the right of calling all public meetings, which was the next thing to taking away that great constitutional right altogether. The people had not been convicted before either House of parliament of any such offence as to demand so severe a punishment. But supposing the facts proved relative to the meetings at Manchester, and in the other northern counties, was that a sufficient ground for divesting every subject of the realm, from one end of it to the other, of the most valuable constitutional right which they inherited from their forefathers? He said to their lordships, "No." The noble viscount who had opened the debate had taken every thing for granted: he had said that every noble lord was convinced of the existence of the evil, and of the necessity of repressing it; and therefore that he would not trouble their lordships with any argument upon it. Now, he would tell the noble viscount, that he, for one, was not conscious of the existence of the evil. But even if he was convinced that the evil did exist in England to as great a degree as was stated, and that the present measure was calculated to repress it, he must be allowed to ask why it was to be extended to Ireland? Ireland did not deserve these severe measures. Was there any proof that the people of Ireland had sinned in any way against the constitution. But even if there was such proof, still he should say, that these were not the remedies which fitted her condition. Ministers had of late been in the habit of panegyrising his unhappy country, and as a proof how well the panegyric was deserved, they now introduced pains and penalties to follow it. Now, the inhabitants of that country must have acted either rightly or wrongly; if they had acted rightly, they did not deserve to be burthened with enactments like these; if they had acted wrongly, these were not the enactments to produce their amendment. He did not, however, object to the bill now before the House, solely because it was bad in itself, but also because it came in bad company. It was part of that system which had lately been introduced into the two Houses of Parliament, and by which both of them had been polluted. It was part of a whole system of coercion-of a systematic restriction of the liberties of the people. The country was first frightened by an exaggerated statement of dis(4L)