And first of the African natives who have been imported as slaves into the western world.

These slaves are of several descrip- || tions. As prisoners of war; persons condemned by the African tribunals for real or imputed crimes; insolvent debtors sold to satisfy the claims of creditors; persons kidnapped, and a few who were slaves in Africa, and sold by their masters to relieve themselves and their families from the pressure of famine. To advert for a moment to the first class, the prisoners of war.

The natives of Africa, while residing in their own country, whether they are settled in cities, or wandering in the deserts, are, in relation to us, independent nations. The extravagant donations of Eugene IV. and Alexander VI. would not at this time be considered as conferring a right even to the lands, much less to the persons, whom their christian adventurers might discover. Nothing that we can discover in the laws of nature, or of nations, can give to us or the nations of Europe, any other right to enslave the natives of Africa, than they possess to reduce to servitude the lordlings of the north. The scattered tribes, that people the African continent, are generally independent communities. In relation to each other their rights are equal, whatever may be their relative powers to maintain them. "Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the state of nature, nations or sovereign states, are to be considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature. It is a settled point with writers on natural law, that all men inherit from nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they can

not be deprived without their own consent. In a state, the individual citizens do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, because they have made a partial surrender of them to the sovereign. But the body of the nation, the state, remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all other men, all other nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted to them."* "Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and obligations, as equally proceeding from nature, nations composed of men, and considered as so many free men living together in a state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce, any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant, a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom. By a necessary consequence of that equality, whatever is lawful for one nation, is equally lawful for any other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one, is equally so in the other."+

If, therefore, the petty monarchs of Africa may lawfully invade each other's dominions, for the purpose of seizing their people as slaves, so may the nations of Europe. Those nations that encourage this practice, by purchasing the prisoners obtained by these sanguinary contests, give their sanction, as far as principle is concerned, to the piracies of the Algerines, and the other Barbary powers. That a large part of the African wars may be justly attributed to the slave trade, is sufficiently proved. In numberless instances, these wars have been avow

* Vattel's Law of Nations, Preliminaries LVI. + Ibid LXIII,

edly waged for no other purpose. The avidity of the African chiefs for the productions of Europe, often stimulates them to those marauding expeditions, by which the trade is supplied. But even those wars, which are not undertaken directly and avowedly to furnish the victims of this odious traffic, may often be fairly attributed to this fruitful source of misery and crime. The injuries to families and nations, which arise from the public wars and private pillage produced by this traffic, cannot fail to create jealousies and antipathies among the neighbouring tribes. The destruction of the villages and fields, by which these marauding expeditions are accompanied, must often subject the wretched survivors, who elude the pursuit of their invaders, to all the miseries of famine, and drive them to invade the property of others. Hence wars of defence and revenge, as well as aggression. Thus war and the slave trade, like the farmer and the manufacturer, feed and support each other.

What then are the rights of war?-It is not necessary, in this case, to inquire whether wars of any description are compatible with the principles and doctrines of the Christian religion; or whether even a sound and rational policy would ever dictate a national resort to physical force. Nothwithstanding my own opinion, that these questions would be correctly answered in the negative, I shall assume as correct the usually admitted principles of national law.*

This assumption is made, not because of any doubts that the principles of peace, as advocated by the society of which I am a member, and by many individuals of other persuasions, are not only completely defensible upon evangelical grounds, but are most con

"War," says Vattel," is that state in which we prosecute our right by force."+ "As nature has given men no right to employ force, unless when it becomes necessary for self-defence, and the preservation of their rights; the inference is manifest, that, since the establishment of political societies, a right, so dangerous in its exercise, no longer remains with private persons, except in those rencounters where society cannot protect or defend them." "A right of so momentous a nature, the right of judging whether the nation has real grounds of complaints, whether she is authorised to employ force, and justifiable in taking up arms, whether prudence will admit of such a step, and whether the welfare of the state requires it; can only belong to the body of the nation, or the sovereign, its representative." "The right of making war belongs to nations only as a remedy against injustice; it is the offspring of unhappy necessity. This remedy is so dreadful in its effects, so destructive to mankind, so grievous to the party who has recourse to it, that, unquestionably, the law of nature allows of it only in the last extremity, that is to say, when every other expedient proves ineffectual for the main

sistent with political wisdom. The experience of William Penn, in the settlement of Pennsylvania, appears to me a complete justification of their policy. The letters of Whelpley to governor Strong contain a masterly, and, as I conceive, an unanswerable defence of them, on the principles of scripture and reason. But, well knowing that very different opinions on this subject are commonly entertained, I thought it more eligible to deduce my conclusions from premises more generally admitted.

+ Law of Nations, book iii. chap i. + Ibid. chap iii.

tenance of justice."* He who is engaged in war derives all his right from the justice of his cause. Whoever therefore takes up arms without a lawful cause, can absolutely have no right whatever; every act of hostility that he commits is an act of injustice. He is chargeable with all the evils, with all the horrors of war; all the effusion of blood, the desolation of families, the rapine, the acts of violence, the ravages, the conflagrations, are his works and his crimes. He is guilty of a crime against the enemy whom he attacks and massacres without cause; he is guilty of a crime against his people, whom he forces into acts of injustice, and exposes to dangers, without reason or necessity; against those of his subjects who are ruined or distressed by the war, who lose their lives, their property, or their health, in consequence of it; finally, he is guilty of a crime against mankind in general, whose peace he disturbs, and to whom he sets a pernicious example."+

Applying these principles to a large part of the African wars, it follows conclusively, that the victors acquire no rights whatever over the vanquished. Indeed, the common sense of mankind revolts at the assertion, that those who assail the peaceful village at the dead of night, set it on fire, and then seize the terrified inhabitants as they are endeavouring to escape from the flames, acquire by this act any right over the victims of their murderous ra

pacity; or that those who encourage and support these barbarous measures, are any other than partners in the guilt. The claim to a right in the persons of those ill-fated natives who are seized by those lawless invaders, is

evidently worse than unfounded. Consequently, no right can be transferred to the purchaser. Nor does any number of successive purchases alter the nature of the right.* The cipher multiplied a thousand fold is a cipher still.

It however sometimes happens, that the aggressor is overcome, and the invading troops themselves become prisoners of war. Here the case is materially changed. A just vengeance, it may be said, will visit, upon the aggressor, the fate that was designed for the aggrieved. But we may observe, in the first place, that the design of the invaders being cruel and unjust in the highest degree, it is difficult to perceive the justice or mercy of following the example. It is further observable that, in these cases, the lead

*In our slave states it is fully admitted, that a person being held as a slave, and descended from a line of actual slaves, still entitled to his freedom in case any link of the slave chain can be proved to be defective. Some hundreds of slaves were liberated in Virginia a few years ago, because they were descended in the female line from an Indian ancestor, who was not legally held as a slave. The case of Mary Butler, decided in the general court of appeals in Maryland about forty years ago, is a striking exemplification of this doctrine. By a law of 1663, a white woman marrying a negro slave became a servant for life, and the issue of such marriage became slaves. Mary Butler was descended from such marriage, and her ancestors for three generations had been held as slaves, yet she was adjudged free, because the white female ancestor was not convicted of having intermarried with a slave, or at least the conviction was not proved. A defect in the original title thus destroying the claim, after it had been admitted for more than a century. Vide Harris and M'Henry's Reports, Vol. 2.

ers are the principal offenders; the common soldiery in the African, as well as in the more civilized armies of Europe, have little to do but to obey the command of their chiefs. If the punishment awarded is to be estimated by the degree of criminality, it is obvious that much the heaviest share ought to fall on those who direct the offence. Hence the European trader, who stimulates the untutored negroes to these deeds of rapine, should, at least, share with them in the consequence.

Waiving however all considerations of inequality of guilt, let us for a moment inquire, what rights over the persons of the vanquished are acquired by the victors, supposing the aggression wholly on the side of the former.

The rights of war resulting from the justice of the cause, those engaged in war are supposed justifiable in the use of such means as the end requires. "The lawfulness of the end does not give us a real right, to any thing further than barely the means necessary for the attainment of that end. Whatever we do beyond that, is reprobated by the law of nature, is faulty, and condemnable at the tribunal of consci""* ence. The right to take the life of an enemy, depends upon the necessity of the case; when that necessity ceases, the right no longer exists. Hence, when an enemy ceases to resist, the usages of civilized nations require that his life should be spared. To massacre an enemy who has thrown down his arms, and manifested a determination to submit, is justly reprobated as murder rather than lawful war. A nation may detain in custody the prisoners taken in war, as long as such detention is ne

* Vattel, book iii. chap. viii.

cessary for its own safety, or as long as it is required for the purpose of obtaining the just ends of the war, but no longer. Whenever peace is restored between the belligerent nations, the right of detaining the prisoners ceases of course, because the necessity no longer exists. To detain the prisoners after the war has been ended, is, in regard to them, to continue the war. The ancients founded their imaginary right to enslave the prisoners of war, upon the presumption, that their lives might have been justly destroyed; but the foundation being unsound, the superstructure falls of course. We therefore arrive at a conclusion, to which probably few will object in theory, whatever course may be adopted in practice, that no right can be derived from the African wars to enslave the prisoners, and that consequently none can be transferred to the European traders by whom they are purchased.

The second description of slaves, consists of persons condemned by the African tribunals for real or imputed crimes. As those who are derived from this source are well known to be generally the victims of avarice, not of justice; that whole families are often sold for the imputed delinquency of one of its members; and that whenever the tribunal is within the atmosphere of the trade, slavery is the usual sentence passed upon criminals, whatever may be the character of the offence, a few observations on this branch of the subject must suffice. Those Europeans who submit to the degraded office of executioners to the petty despots of Africa, even supposing they have no agency in the decisions, are certainly assuming a station below the character of civilized men. The right however which they derive from the purchase

of the unhappy convicts is the question to be examined.

The legitimate object of penal laws is the reformation of criminals and the prevention of crimes. The right of society to punish the violations of law, arises from the necessity of the case; the right of self-preservation. The infliction of punishment, as a retaliation of injuries, is the assumption of a prerogative which belongs not to man.* It is not the magnitude of crimes, simply considered, but their effect on the peace of society, that furnishes the proper measure of their punishment. Whenever punishments exceed the measure which the security of society demands, they become acts of tyranny. Banishment from the land of our birth, without any attendant and continued punishment, is one of the severest inflictions, short of absolute death, which can be meted to man. It is only in cases of a highly dangerous character that nations can justly resort to it. Those members, who cannot be retained without manifest injury or danger to the community, may be expelled. When the necessity of expulsion arises from

* Vengeance belongeth unto me, I will recompense, saith the Lord. Heb. x. 32.

+To persons capitally convicted the king frequently offers a pardon, upon condition of their being transported for life. Many have, at first, rejected this gracious offer, and there have been one or two instances of persons so desperate, as to persist in the refusal, and who, in consequence, suffered the execution of their sentence. Christian's Notes to Blackstone's Commentaries.

As to the end, or final cause of human punishments. This is not by way of atonement or expiation for the crime committed; for that must be left to the just determination of the Supreme Being: but as a precaution against fu

the crimes of the sufferer, it seems just that the necessary expense should be defrayed by himself; but there the claims of society terminate. It is obvious, that even if none were condemned for imaginary crimes, we should find it extremely difficult to establish a just claim to the service, during life, of even this class of African slaves.

The right to the other descriptions of imported slaves is, if possible, still

ture offences of the same kind. This is effected three ways: either by the amendment of the offender himself; for which purpose all corporal punishments, fines, and temporary exile or imprisonment, are inflicted: or by deterring others by the dread of his example from offending in the

like way, "ut poena (as Tully

expresses it) ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat;" which gives rise to all ignominious punishments, and to such executions of justice as are open and public: or lastly, by depriving the party injuring of the power to do future mischief; which is effected by either putting him to death, or condemning him to perpetual confinement, slavery, or exile. The same one end, of preventing future crimes, is endeavoured to be answered by each of these three species of punishment. The public gains equal security, whether the offender himself be amended by wholesome correction, or whether he be disabled from doing any farther harm: and if the penalty fails of both these effects, as it may do, still the terror of his example remains as a warning to other citizens. The method however of inflicting punishment ought always to be proportioned to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means to exceed it: therefore the pains of death, and perpetual disability by exile, slavery, or imprisonment, ought never to be inflicted, but when the offender appears incorrigible: which may be collected either from a repetition of minuter offences; or from the perpetration of some one crime of deep malignity, which of itself demonstrates a disposition without hope or probability of amendment. Bl. Com. B. IV.