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there. He holds (in reluctant submission to the decided cases) during the slave's residence in England, the owner's right is suspended, but he contends that it is not extinguished; that the law does not abolish the right of property; but is merely passive, withholding all aid for its assertion, and that on the slave's return to the colony, the right revives, and is of the same validity as if the slave had never been in England.

The manner in which Lord Stowel attempts to make out this doctrine, is, perhaps, more liable to animadversion than the doctrine itself. He begins by noticing the celebrated case of the negro, Summerset; who, in the year 1771, having refused to accompany his master to Jamaica, and having been seized and put into irons on board a ship in the Thames, in order to be carried thither by force, was brought before the king's bench, upon a habeas corpus, and discharged. There can be no question, from the whole tenor and spirit of Lord Stowel's argument, that he disapproves of this decision, which was received, at the time, with the applause of the whole nation, and has been ever since referred to by all the law authorities, without exception, as deserving of all acceptation and regard. Lord Stowel speaks of it, however, as made in contravention of all preceding authorities, in subversion of rights, sanctioned by uninterrupted usage, and as amounting to a revolution of sentiment and opinion of the most sudden and extraordinary nature; and which can be only paralleled by one of the most celebrated convulsions in the annals of nations.

"Ad primum nuntium cladis Pompiani populus

Romanus ripento fit alius."

Against Lord Mansfield particularly, who was then chief justice, he charges this unjustifiable innovation, saying that the puisne judges acquiesced in silence-a very unfair representation of their share in the judgment, be it good or evil, as Lord Stowel can scarcely fail to know; since it was in cases only where the judges differed either as to the judgment to be given, or the reasons for such judgment, that they were formerly used to deliver their

opinions seriatim. Nay, in his judgment, Lord Mansfield expressly says, that he and the other judges "are so well agreed that they see no necessity for having the case argued, as was at first intended, before the twelve judges." The decision in the case of Summerset was not, however, altogether so rash and unwarranted by previous authorities, as in the outset of his argument it is stated by Lord Stowel to have been; in the sequel, indeed, he himself mentions the case of Shanly vs, Harvey, decided by Lord Northington, about two years before, in which the right of the owner of a slave to all property of the slave's acquisition (a right inseparably connected with slavery, by virtue of the maxim "quicquid acquiritur servo, acquiritur Domino") was disallowed, with the emphatic declaration, so often since repeated, that "as soon as a man puts his foot on English ground he is free." Of this declaration Lord Stowel remarkswith what propriety we shall presently see" that it is probably the first time that this doctrine was so broadly stated in an English court, and perhaps a little prematurely." But if Lord Stowel's zeal prevented his noticing in the proper place this previous decision, surely less learning than his might have supplied an acquaintance with the earlier and very remarkable case of Smith v. Brown and Cooper, in 2 Salkfield, 666, where Lord Chief Justice Holt, with the concurrence of his brethren, laid it down that "as soon as a negro comes into England he is frec." Other antecedent cases, not quite so clear or decisive in their effect, but yet affording a strong presumption in favour of the same doctrine, are collected and stated in the admirable argument of the truly learned Mr. Hargreave, in behalf of the negro Summerset; and upon a review of the whole, it is difficult to imagine how Lord Stowel could feel himself warranted in denouncing Lord Mansfield's decision in terms so strong, being only able to cite in opposition to it the opinion of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Talbot. It is also to be observed, that Lord Mansfield's decision, supported as it was by his brethren, and bottomed on the earlier decisions of persons so eminent as Lord Chief Justice Holt, and Lord Northington (to

say nothing of the aid it might have derived by inference from the early cases referred to,) has been since approved and adopted in all the cases subseqently cited for a different object in Lord Stowel's own judgment; and that by some of the judges, as, for example, the present Chief Justice Best, with a warmth of admiration which contrasts powerfully with the cold indifference betrayed by Lord Stowel, as to the great interests of humanity involved in the question. Lord Stowel was, however, very materially concerned to cast discredit on this famous judgment, because, in his apprehension, (he says) the determination of the ulterior question very materially depends on the construction to be put on that judgment, and the limitations and reservations with which it is to be received. Summerset's case is, indeed, in every point of view, of the most important nature; for unless the decision in that case, and the subsequent cases founded upon it, be good law, there is no reason whatever why negro slavery might not be introduced into England. Lord Stowel, therefore, states, in terms as narrow as possible, the precise point before the court in that case, and on which alone it was called upon to pronounce a decree; not, however, allowing the decision, even quoad such point, to pass without reflection, and rejecting all that fell from Lord Mansfield, on the general doctrine of the toleration or recognition of slavery as extrajudicial. How much this must be the object of those who are inclined to espouse the side advocated by Lord Stowel, the following memorable words uttered by Lord Mansfield, in delivering judgment, may serve to evince :-"The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself, from whence it was created, are erased from memory. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England, and therefore the black must be discharged."

To the position in these terms advanced, that slavery is incompatible with the spirit of British law, Lord Stowel replies by referring to the existence of villenage. But the position must be understood with reference to the spirit of our laws, since the present system of liberty in these countries was formed and established. No man, when he asserts that any act or doctrine is at variance with the spirit of our laws or constitution, can be supposed to challenge a comparison with the barbarous usages of remote ages: and it is confessed by Sir Thomas Smith, who wrote in the reign of Edward VI., that even then villenage had fallen into desuetude. But, as was ingeniously remarked by Mr. Hargreave, "the memory of slavery expired now furnishes one of the chief obstacles to the introduction of slavery attempted to be revived." And accordingly Lord Stowel finds himself under the necessity of grappling with the well known maxim of ancient villenage-"once free for an hour, free for ever"-which has been properly insisted upon as entitling the slave once emancipated by touching the British shores, to enjoy his freedom wheresoever British law prevails. This maxim was so much favoured, and so extensive in its effect, that the slightest act which could, by inference or implication, show that the lord had for a moment, treated his villein as a freeman, by forming with him, for example, the most trivial contract, was construed into a complete and solemn manumission. The advocates of liberty say, if slavery be at all known to the laws of England, it is only in the form of villenage, and must be bound by and subject to the same rules. Lord Stowel himself admits that, "if negro slavery was an exact transcript of ancient villenage, it might not be improperly so contended." He does not, however, specify any of the characteristics by which they are distinguished, with this exception, that the villein was a native, and the negro is a foreigner; whereas, in all the essential particulars of their condition, there is not the smallest difference between a villein in gross and a negro slave. That there was another species of villein (regardant) does not affect the argu

ment, since the villein in gross was entitled no less than the villein regardant to the benefit of the maxim above cited, in all its latitude of construction and implication.

His lordship also argues, that negro slavery cannot be pronounced irreconcilable with the spirit of British law, since the legislature has actually interfered for the purpose of regulating such slavery; and since the court of chancery and privy council are in the constant practice of entertaining suits, and carrying into effect contracts, the subject-matter of which is property in slaves. It certainly must be admitted, that England does recognize slavery in her colonies; that her courts of law do take notice of the local laws allowing of such property. But the question is, whether, in a case unprovided for by the lex loci, (as is the case of the return of a negro after having been emancipated by a residence in England,) an English judge shall not, when on appeal such case comes before him, be governed by the principles of British law. The colonial law, says Lord Stowel, knows no such species of emancipation as is pretended; it has its own solemn forms of manumission, and knows of none by implication. But unless Lord Stowel sit (which we do not apprehend to be the case) as a mere colonial judge, administering the lex loci, he knows of such a species of emancipation, and, we should insist, is bound to give effect thereto. If there should be any conflict between the colonial law and that of the supreme country, there can be no doubt which ought to prevail.

As to the cases enumerated in the concluding part of his judgment, and which Lord Stowel himself does not rely upon as direct authorities, it is only necessary to remark, that the question at issue now was not then raised; and that little is to be inferred from the tacit acknowledgment of the judges.

There is one view of the question which we do not know to have been taken by the counsel in that case, but which appears to be deserving of some attention. We should contend, that by the slave's residence in England, and consequent emancipation, he is remitted to his original state of freedom; and that his master's right of

property in him is wholly extinguished. Now, if he had regained his native Africa, could his owner follow there, recapture, and import him again into a colony? We apprehend that the statutes abolishing the slave trade would prevent the master's making such an attempt. But the negro is as free in England as he could be in Africa. By what right then can the master reclaim him on his entrance into the colony from England? He is to all intents and purposes a new slave-a fresh importation, in direct contravention of the statutes; for they make it immaterial whence the slave comes or is brought. Or let us suppose that a negro, of his own accord, never having been captured or enslaved, should visit one of the colonies, would his person be vacans possessio, which any white might seize and appropriate to his own use, and if not, why should the emancipated negro be in a worse situation?

We did not imagine that the return to the colonies of persons originally slaves, but emancipated by a residence here, and having here acquired property, was an event of common occurrence; but we find that it is by Lord Stowel's reference to statements made in the course of argument by Doctor Lushington. In observing upon these statements, his Lordship yields a scanty tribute to humanity, letting fall some few expressions in commiseration of the lot of those who are so unfortunate. They are almost the only words to be found in a very long judgment, which betray the smallest sympathy in his mind with those feelings of abhorrence and detestation towards this vile institution, which have been entertained for more than a quarter of a century by the people of this country, and in which every judge who has had occasion to speak of it, with the exception of Lord Stowel, has expressed his cordial participation. London paper.

SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA.

In the county of Goochland, a negro man during the last summer ran away from his owner, and made good his escape to Pennsylvania. He remained there some four months, when having made a fair experiment, and finding

liberty among strangers attended by the necessity of equal labour, and the responsibility of independence, and not the golden life he had dreamed, he spontaneously returned to Virginia and to slavery. He is one out of a hundred for shrewdness, and this last act, in our opinion, is not the least proof of it; for to those educated as slaves, and marked by nature, if not for that end, yet with colours that establish an eternal barrier between them and the whites, liberty among the. latter-a liberty attended with all the inconveniences and responsibilities of free agency, without any of its benefitsis but a shadow, and not to be put in competition with the substantial comforts of the Virginia slave, and the exemption from care which is concomitant of all slavery. This case, though an isolated one, is, we believe, a fair illustration of the mild and benevolent character of Virginia slavery in general—and though we profess, and really feel, the most ardent solicitude that the day may come when the soil of Virginia shall no longer be dug by slaves, and her character no longer be obnoxious to the reproach of holding human beings in bondage, yet that solicitude is created by our love and respect for our native state, and not by the expectation of ameliorating the condition of her slaves. Some little observation, and much inquiry, have long ago satisfied us that the slaves of Virginia enjoy more solid comfort, and are exposed to fewer hardships, than the labouring class of any portion of the Christian world. To exchange their condition for freedom, to be enjoyed either in the United States, in Africa, or the West Indies, would be subtracting materially from the sum total of human happiness. It is the condition of their masters, weighed down and impoverished by the nature of negro slavery, and of Virginia, blighted and held back in the glorious race of improvement and power, by the same cause, that impels us to pray for its final extinction, and enlists our sympathies in behalf of colonization schemes.

Richmond Whig.

This narrative would have been more interesting, if not more instruc

tive, if the circumstances of this sagacious slave had been stated a little more minutely. Perhaps he was а favourite personal attendant on some humane and wealthy master. Possibly a wife and family were left behind, and that his domestic attachments were more than an equipoise to the desire of freedom. A thousand circumstances may have conduced to render the life of this isolated individual more comfortable in the state to which he was habituated, than in the new and untried life of an independent and responsible freeman. It is no new thing for persons who have been bent to the servile yoke, to find a new gained freedom, after a short acquaintance with its cares and perplexities, a faded jewel. Present evil is often felt as a greater burden than that which is past, however unequal when fairly balanced. The chosen band, whom Moses led out of thraldom, were frequently reproaching him for the kindness he had done them. Habit had lightened the burden of slavery, while the evils of liberty were rendered more poignant from being new and unexpected. Yet who would say that their condition was not improved by the change?

There are, unquestionably, both in Virginia and the other slave-burdened states, many humane and conscientious masters, who render the lives of their slaves as comfortable as their condition allows; but to assume the case before us as "an illustration of the mild and benevolent character of Virginia slavery in general,” appears to be generalizing quite too hastily. How often do we hear of slaves eloping from this land of mild and benevolent slavery, to the free states, to encounter "all the inconveniences and responsibilities of free agency," and manifest the

greatest horror at the thought of being || taposition on the west of the Atlantic,

again reduced to the very enviable "exemption from care which is the concomitant of all slavery." If the opinions of the slaves themselves are to be assumed as the standard by which we are to estimate the comparative happiness of freedom and slavery, the decision need not be long in suspense. Many have encountered the greatest hardships to obtain their freedom; but very few, I presume, who were legally free, have solicited the boon of slavery.

Our good friend of the Richmond Whig, when he intimates that the free coloured race in Pennsylvania, are subjected to all the responsibilities of || free agency, without any of its advantages, seems to aim a blow at our political institutions, which happens to fall with greater weight upon those of his own state. There are few, if any, civil or political rights withheld in Pennsylvania on account of colour. We have not here, as in some of our sister republics, one code of laws for the white and another for the coloured population. If the latter class exercise no control over the legislation of the country, we must look to their own characters and conduct, not to the constitution or laws, for an explanation.

The broad assertion, that the colour must establish an eternal barrier between the two races, seems to me to contain more of the air than of the spirit of prophecy. Without adverting to the more extended application of the word eternal, we may inquire whether a physical or a political barrier was in view. Short as the period has been, even when compared with a measurable portion of time, since the two colours have been placed in jux

a few facts have already occurred, which spread at least a doubt over this confident prediction. The political barrier has nearly disappeared in the northern states; and the physical has been broken, to a considerable extent, in those of the south. To restore this eternal barrier, would require a dreadful waste of human life; as well as some other sacrifices, which the masters are not likely to make. It is not for me to decide, whether a complete amalgamation of the black and white population of the United States can or cannot take place. We are all too heavily encumbered with the prejudices engendered by slavery, to examine the subject with philosophic candour. If the objections to a complete assimilation are founded in nature, they must doubtless continue; if they are based upon prejudices resulting from transient circumstances, they may in time disappear. Posterity must decide the question.

We have in this notice a tolerable specimen of the logic of slavery. Although the condition of the slaves would be deteriorated by their restoration to liberty, either here or any where else, still the writer professes an ardent desire that the day may come when the character of Virginia shall no longer be obnoxious to the reproach of holding human beings in bondage. If the happiness of those human beings is improved by their servile state, where is the ground of reproach? Are the masters obnoxious to just reproach for securing to their slaves those substantial enjoyments, while they are themselves weighed down and impoverished by the system? The error so commonly made in the comparison of the comforts enjoyed by the free and

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