of the United States or of Great Britain to take at all into view, in adjusting its plans, the event of that reduction; for nothing is more clear than that the mischiefs, which either power may have to apprehend from France, must happen before the expiration of that term, or not at all;-and that if they can successfully combat her ambitious designs, for so long an interval, they may bid defiance to them for ever.-The continent of Europe, at the end of twenty years of subjection to the corroding despotism of France, would be much less formidable to England and the United States, than it is at this moment, when all its resources, now comparatively abundant, and wielded with a spirit as implacably hostile, and with an energy no less fearful than they would then be,-are, according to our author's own forcible representation, in pages 60 and 64, entirely at the disposal of Bonaparte.

The capacity of England to resist the assaults of France, although the latter should consolidate her dominion over the continent, and the true policy of the United States at this momentous crisis, are topics of which we shall speak more at large hereafter. So far, there will, we conceive, be no difference of opinion between us, and the author of the "Sketch."-The only matter in controversy, is, the sufficiency of his reasons for believing, that France must, "before many years shall have elapsed, be reduced to her former rank among the powers of Europe."-The principal grounds of his belief are as follows:-1st, That "great conquests which, like those of France, are rapidly effected, are rarely permanent, and that those only are permanent which are effected by slow degrees:"* 2d, That her pecuniary resources are nearly exhausted: 3d, That her population is insufficient to recruit the military establishment, requisite to keep the continent in awe: 4th, That the people of the continent are no longer the same feeble and degenerate race as heretofore, but have acquired in the school of adversity, energy and courage sufficient for their emancipation. These positions, all of which seem to us destitute of foundation, are attempted to be supported by minor and incidental considerations, to which we shall advert in the proper place. On each of the above points we shall animadvert as fully, as our narrow limits and restricted leisure will allow.

The first as merely speculative, can lead to no positive opinion. Admitting even, what we do not consider as correct,

* There is evidently a solecism in the sense of this phrase. The two propositions contained in the sentence, are incompatible with each other. We take the author according to his meaning, which is not, however, any where very precise on this point.

that the testimony of all history shows, that great conquests which are rapidly effected, are rarely permanent, it would by no means follow," that those only are permanent which are effected by slow degrees."-The fact can at the most, warrant no other inference, than that great conquests of the nature described, attended by nearly the same circumstances, as those recorded in history, are likely to experience the same fate. Thus in the case of France,-to furnish any plausible grounds of belief, such as our author entertains with respect to the decline of her dominion, drawn from the examples he cites, it would be first indispensable to show, a close resemblance in the general character of both.-The mere circumstance of a like rapidity of success, can generate no conclusion.

We cannot, moreover, admit it "to be a law governing the whole moral and physical world, that those things which are suddenly produced are deficient in durability, while those are long-lived which attain to maturity slowly." This is a doctrine to which no experienced naturalist will subscribe, and which, as far as we know, is not sanctioned by the authority of any great ethical writer. It would lead to a classification much more comprehensive and precise than any which has hitherto been successfully attempted, either in natural or moral philosophy. We need scarcely add, that the instances of the mushroom, the oak, or the ephemeron quoted by our author, cannot serve as the foundation of reasoning in a case like the present. -Examples drawn from the material world, prove nothing as to the immaterial. With respect to this branch of our author's argument, upon which he appears to lay much stress himself, and which is the strong-hold of many who speculate on the same subjects, we cannot reason more to our own satisfaction, than in the language employed by Mr. Burke, in the commencement of his first letter on the Regicide Peace. This great authority is discussing the validity of comparisons. similar to those, which we have just noticed, and expresses himself thus:

"Parallels of this sort rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, than supply analogies from whence to reason.The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy, are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings, subject to laws universal and invariable. The immediate cause acting in these laws may be obscure: the general results are subjects of certain calculation. But commonwealths are not physical but moral essences. They are artificial combinations; and in their proximate efficient cause, the arbitrary productions of the human mind. We are not yet ac

quainted with the laws which necessarily influence the stability of that kind of work made by that kind of agent. There is not in the physical order (with which they do not appear to hold any assignable connexion) a distinct cause by which any of those fabrics must necessarily grow, flourish, or decay; nor, in my opinion, does the moral world produce any thing more determinate on that subject, than what may serve as an amusement, (liberal indeed, and ingenious, but still only an amusement) for speculative men. I doubt whether the history of mankind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so, to furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a state. I am far from denying the operation of such causes: but they are infinitely uncertain, and much more obscure, and much more difficult to trace, than the foreign causes that tend to raise, to depress, and sometimes to overwhelm a community."

"It is often impossible, in these political inquiries, to find any proportion between the apparent force of any moral causes we may assign and their known operation. We are therefore obliged to deliver up that operation to mere chance, or more piously (perhaps more rationally) to the occasional interposition and irresistible hand of the Great Disposer.'

Our author commits a mistake as to the fact, when he asserts, that the testimony of all history shows, that those conquests alone are durable, which are effected by slow degrees. The reverse is rather the case.-With the exception of the Roman, all the great empires of long duration, were established in a comparatively short space of time. The Assyrian, the Persian, the Mahometan, and in modern times the Spanish and Portuguese in South America, are of this number.* -That of Alexander was, it is true, broken into fragments after his death, but not by the efforts of the conquered. The spoils fell to his generals, and his native kingdom, Macedon, retained, until the subjugation of all Greece by the Romans, that ascendancy which Philip his father had given her over the Grecian peninsula. There can be no parity of reasoning as to the Macedonian conquests in Asia, and those of France. The latter are not made, and to be maintained, at a distance, on another continent.-France herself is situate in the centre of her newly acquired empire, more advantageously than was Macedon in Greece, or Rome in Italy, to whose domestic dominion as it may be called, rather than to their foreign sway, her present power can be alone appropriately compared.

We refer the reader on this point to the English Universal History, to Bossuet's" Histoire Universelle," to Gibbon, &c,

The various conquests achieved over Asia after the destruction of the Roman power, were transitory indeed, but from causes having no connexion whatever, with the celerity of their accomplishment.-They were scarcely any thing more than predatory in their nature and object, and unaccompanied by any of the arts or circumstances, which were indispensably necessary to give them permanence. One body of invaders or usurpers was quickly dethroned and succeeded by another, and the case could not be otherwise, from the character and peculiar situation of the Asiatics.-Montesquieu remarks that in his day, Upper Asia had been already subdued thirteen times.* The reader has but to consult the remarks of the same author, concerning the constitution of the French monarchy in the reign of Charlemagne,† and to advert to the history of his immediate successors, to be satisfied, that the dissolution of the great empire which he so laboriously established, was in no manner influenced by circumstances arising out of the rapidity of its growth.-While the feudal system lasted, there could be no such concentration of power in one focus or head, as was indispensable for the permanence of such an empire.

We can find nothing in the circumstances under which existed, any one of the great empires of which we have here spoken, that has the remotest affinity to those, in which the French power is placed. Of course they can furnish no grounds of reasoning with respect to the duration of the latter.-If we want arguments from analogy, it is to Rome that we must recur, or to Macedon under the auspices of Philip. Here we think there is matter for rational conjecture, and we are sorry to add, that in this parallel, almost every thing seems to militate against the hypothesis, and to refute the assertions of our author. The successes of Rome, Macedon and France, are to be traced to nearly the same causes; to the sar.e insatiable lust of dominion, and perfidious refinement policy; to a decided superiority in military organization and tactics, on the part of the victors, and to a similar improvidence, irresolution and selfishness on that of the vanquished. The greater length of time consumed by the Romans in establishing their empire, was owing to the greater difficulties with which they

* L'Esprit des Lois. L. xvii. C.iv.

Ibid.-L. xxxi.

In the Philippics of Demosthenes there are to be found some very close and curious points of resemblance, between the character and policy of Philip and Bonaparte.-They can also furnish the British with important lessons, in relation to the question of peace with the new conqueror.

had to struggle. Their march to universal power was slow, because they were often compelled to halt, and even to retrograde. They never advanced a step, without encountering a new obstacle.

For somewhat more than five hundred years, until the final subjugation of the Cisalpine Gauls, and the extinction of the Carthagenian power, Rome contended with her equals as it were, and was always in danger of being overcome. During two hundred years more, until the usurpation of the Cæsars, while engaged in the extension of her empire abroad, she was exposed to the most serious perils, and assailed by enemies but little inferior to herself in strength. In surveying her history, during these two eras, without losing sight of her extraordinary resources of every kind, you are oftentimes astonished how she was able to extricate herself from the portentous hazards, which multiplied about her on every side, and at almost every moment, and which seemed to threaten her with inevitable destruction.-On the contrary, in reviewing the progress which France has made in the subjugation of the continent, since the beginning of her revolution, there is not in fact, when the advantages under which she set out, and the character of the external obstacles which she had to overcome, are duly considered, wherewithal to excite much amazement. The inquirer experiences no great perplexity in conceiving, and even unravelling the issue. We find nothing, for the accomplishment of which, under such circumstances, the interval of twenty years would appear too short;-nothing in fine, either in her domestic concerns or her foreign relations, which was not, from the commencement, and in every stage of her revolutionary career, distinctly foreseen and minutely predicted.*

The many centuries which were required for the erection of the fabric of Roman greatness, could make but one serious difference in favour of its permanence; by producing an effect which our author takes for granted, but which is not attested by history. We mean the complete assimilation of the conquered to their subduers; the entire resignation and reconcilement of the former to the yoke of their tyrants.

On this subject we appeal to the writings of Mr. Burke generally: Of this illustrious statesman and political prophet, who like the haruspices of old, may be said to have divined from the entrails of the victim, it is almost too little to affirm, in the language of Thucidydes concerning Themistocles, that he was, τῶν τε παραχρήμα δι ελάχισις βολῆς κράπσος γνώμῶν καὶ τῶν μελλίνίων επί πλείςον το γενησομενο τρις θα είκασης.