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net annual revenue shall exceed the aggregate of the annual expenses, including the interest on the debt, we agree with him in the general correctness of the sentiment. There is no real amelioration of circumstances, no general reduction of debt, as long as the new loans contracted, must be proportionably larger, on account of old loans paid off. On the face of the case, it would have been as well to pay off less, and to borrow less. But, if he concludes from this, as we must suppose that he does, since no provision for a sinking fund has been attached to the contemplated loan, that sinking funds are useless, we cannot help thinking, that he errs, and that he pays too little attention to general principles, and to the vast political importance of steady measures.

Believing ourselves that sinking funds are of great impor tance, and that their establishment, or, in other words, the establishment of legislative provisions for the steady, and gradual discharge of public debts, coeval with their creation, should become a fundamental law of the financial code of the Union, we could still wish the following regulations to be incorporated with the law creating the national bank.

Government, by the tenor of the constitution of the national bank, should be debarred from ever applying the annual amount of its dividends, to any other purposes than the discharge of the principal of the public debt, in conformity with eventual legislative provisions to that effect.f

When not so applied let the institution be bound to invest the amount in gold and silver, to be retained in their vaults, the more to increase the solidity of the establishment.

Finally, it would be expedient to enact, that the rates of discount shall be lowered, agreeable to a certain fixed ratio, in proportion as the unappropriated funds of government, in the national bank, accumulate.

With a system of taxation, that could never fail to be productive, such as we have proposed, gradually introduced; with a currency-convertible, abundant, and of general circulation; with a pre-organized, constantly augmenting sinking

* See the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the 10th January, 1812.

Dividends, to the amount of one million of dollars per annum, thus ap plied, would extinguish in twenty-one years, forty millions of debt at par, if funded at six per cent., and the interest payable yearly. If payable every six months, or quarterly, the process of extinction will be more rapid in pro portion.

fund; with unbounded credit-such as must necessarily result from the above circumstances, and moreover supported by a well-constituted, national bank-what might not be our financial power? With our customhouse duties annihilated; our resources of whisky taxes, &c. &c. untried; our public credit, equivocal; holding sinking funds, in contempt; deeming a national bank unnecessary, and, therefore, unconstitutional; so circumstanced every way, that even a successful loan may enrich us only with a debt, and leave our hands as empty as before-how great is our financial impotence!

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Memoir on the Affairs of Spain.

WE are about to present our readers with a brief Memoir on the circumstances of Spain at the commencement of the struggle, in which she is now engaged. It was written in the autumn of 1808, by a gentleman, who had been an eye witness, of the transactions at Bayonne to which he refers, and who resided, as well there as in Spain,-under auspices which opened to him the best possible sources of information. The most entire reliance may be placed on the facts he communicates. We have but to regret, that considerations of a private na ture, have rendered it necessary for him, to suppress a multitude of others still more curious and important. The Memoir, even in its present shape, was not originally intended for the press. The manuscript in our possession is autogra phical, and of unquestionable authenticity. This document will be deemed valuable in an historical point of view, and we are anxious that nothing should be lost to the world, which can serve to throw light upon a subject destined, we have no doubt, to form hereafter, the most interesting and instructive portion of human annals.

We do not fully coincide with the author, in his enthusiastic admiration of the conduct of the Spanish nation, nor in his sanguine anticipation of the final discomfiture of her oppressors. Yet he is one to whose opinion we would readily subscribe, in any case where our own judgment was not almost peremptory, and we must confess that he has displayed a very imposing sagacity, in his predictions concerning the progress of the Spanish struggle, to its present stage. This is not the place for us to inquire into the aspect which it may hereafter assume. It would be now, after what we said elsewhere, worse than idle, as indeed it must be at all times on this subject, somewhat presumptuous, to attempt to draw back the curtain of futurity. If any positive prophecies are allowa ble, they are certainly those that accord with the vehement as pirations of every honest heart, and tend to raise the spirit of philanthropy which may be said, together with "the best hopes of our better nature," to droop and die away, under the prospect of a sinister dispensation of the Almighty Providence, in the case of the Spaniards. At every such cheering augury, coming from a quarter to which deference is due, we most heartily rejoice, and are ready to ejaculate with the utmost fervency of desire,—" quod felix faustumque sit.”

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If any thing extraneous to the present Memoir, and more specific than the general act of the invasion of Spain, could heighten the horror which they are calculated to excite against the French government, in the breasts of our readers, we would remind them of the letter of Bonaparte to the prince of Asturias, published in the first number of our Review. There is also another state paper from the same source, and subservient to the same end, to which we would claim their attention. We allude to an official message of Bonaparte when first consul, addressed to the legislative body, and the tribunate of France, wherein he holds the following language, on the subject of the elevation of a Spanish prince to the dukedom of Tuscany. "After having," says this grateful ally, and disinterested champion of freedom," restored the ancient limits of Gaul, it was incumbent upon the French people to restore to liberty, nations connected with them by a common origin, and by the tie of mutual interests and congenial manners. The liberty of the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics is therefore assured. The French people had yet another duty to perform, imposed both by justice, and generosity. The king of Spain has been faithful to our cause, and has suffered for it. Neither our reverses of fortune, nor the perfidious insinuations of our enemies, have been able to detach him from our interests; he will meet with a just return: a prince of his blood is about to ascend the throne of Tuscany.'

In another message, announcing to the same assemblies, the conclusion of the treaty of Luneville, there is a passage of a like tenor, which equally deserves to be quoted." The republic owed it to its engagements, and to the fidelity of Spain, to make every effort to preserve entire the territory of the latter. This duty she fulfilled in the course of the negotiation with all the energy which circumstances allowed. The king of Spain has acknowledged the fidelity of his allies, and in his generosity has made that sacrifice to peace, from which they laboured to exempt him. He acquires by this conduct new titles to the attachment of France, and a sacred claim to the gratitude of Europe!!!"

MEMOIR ON THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.

The affairs of Spain attract, at this moment, the attention of all Europe. They excite an interest, the more lively, the more it is attempted to envelop them in mystery. Besides, it was generally expected, that Spain would occasion no greater difficulties than Portugal; that the French government would only have to order its troops to take possession, in order to acquire an absolute sway over this fine country. The situation

of Spain, at the time, gave to these conjectures, a great degree of probability. Her finances were exhausted by the constant drain, arising from the demands of the French government, and by the considerable expenses, required for the support of her army and navy. By far the greatest proportion of her regular forces was removed, and dispersed, either in the north of Germany, or in Portugal. The administration of the public concerns, exclusively in the hands of the Prince of Peace, had become odious, and contemptible in the eyes of the nation, and relaxed all the ties which attached it to the crown. Under circumstances so deplorable, it was natural to imagine, that Napoleon, freed by the treaty of Tilsit from all apprehension of interference on the part of Russia, would encounter few, or no obstacles in his project to master Spain.

Such was certainly the opinion of Mr. Beauharnais, ambassador of France at Madrid. But he was grossly mistaken, when he took the universal hatred of the Spaniards against the Prince of Peace, for a disposition favourable to a change of dynasty; an idea which, nevertheless, prompted the French government to relinquish the original plan of reducing Spain by gradual encroachments, in order to strike at once the decisive blow.

The event, however, did not entirely correspond with the calculations of Mr. Beauharnais. The occurrences at Arranjuez, on the 6-18 March, electrifying, as it were, the Spanish nation, rekindled their predilection for their legitimate sovereign, and their aversion to foreign dominion. The grand duke of Berg became convinced of it, from the moment he entered Madrid, and the disgrace of M. de Beauharnais was one of the first consequences of the disappointment.

The French journals vied with each other, in representing the insurrections, which broke out in several Spanish provinces, immediately after the transportation of the royal family to France, as assemblages of a factious mob, inimical to order, which the approach of French troops would promptly disperse.

Having traversed the greatest part of Spain in the months of May and June last, I made it my particular business to observe the true state of things. All that I myself saw, or was able to collect from persons, highly respectable, and worthy of confidence, I shall faithfully state in this narrative.

As soon as I entered Spain, I had occasion to perceive thatpublic opinion, roused by the recent occurrences, was by no means favourable to the French. Nay more, the animosity of the Spaniards against their perfidious allies (for it is thus they in

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