established commercial relations, for which they issue their promissory notes. These are taken to the banks by the receivers, and are there discounted.

After some time, returns will be received for the commodities shipped, consisting of a variety of produce. These returns will also be sold for promissory notes, which again find their way to the banks, and are, by means of the usual process, converted into, bank money.

One transaction will succeed another, and thus our merchants, while pursuing their trade-even allowing that they never extend their business beyond their real means-will keep at least one million of bank money in constant circulation. What will occur when embargoes, and other restrictions on trade, put an end to their activity? The bank engagements will be gradually cancelled, and the respective parties, who were engaged in trade, will remain stationary, with their houses, lots, ships, and other property, and, perhaps, with cash enough to defray their personal expenses. But, the winding up will leave no heaps of silver and gold disengaged, for which it becomes necessary to find employment.

All bank money in circulation-with the few exceptions above stated-denoting a debt to the banks, bearing an interest of a little more than six and one third per cent., it is impossible the greatest part of this debt should not be cancelled, as soon as money ceases to be worth more than six and one third per cent. To the extent cancelled, bank money will disappear. It is not in the nature of things, that it should long maintain itself in circulation, when it ceases to be worth what it costs.

Though bank money, to a great amount, may be in the possession of persons, who owe nothing to the banks, yet, those who do owe, being prompted by circumstances to discharge their engagements, without contracting new ones, the bankvalues of the former, in the rotation of business, will come into the hands of the latter, will be employed by them to extinguish bank debts, and become extinct themselves.

In other words, an embargo, and similar measures, will cause a diminution, or a total winding up, of all foreign business, of which a proportionate disappearance of bank money must be the consequence. Because, it is business which actually does realize, or, which keeps alive the hope that it may realize, considerable profits beyond bank interest, that maintains bank money in circulation.

Embargoes, and commercial restrictions, therefore, will have a tendency to reduce the circulating medium of the coun try, nearly to its specie means.

These specie means we know to be very limited. An embargo, therefore, must make money scarce, and prove in a high degree disadvantageous to the financial operations of govern

ment.

As bank money costs six and one third per cent., it cannot be imagined that it should be readily, and to a large amount, lent to government, at six and one seventh per cent.-to which the interest lately offered by government, considering that it is receivable quarterly, is equal-that is, at an interest per cent. below its real value, particularly when those, who borrow from the bank, and usher bank money into circulation, have no opportunity of earning more than bank interest with it.

ΣΤ

Government, other circumstances equal, will always find the greatest facility of borrowing, in the full tide of trade; because then the banks will be largely applied to for discounts, by reason of the opportunities, which trade and brisk circulation afford, of earning more than bank interest, by the employment of bank money; and of the bank money, thus put into circulation, considerable portions will accumulate, and remain with persons, whom convenience, safety, and other inducements, will dispose to make advances to government at a moderate interest.

When, from an opposite state of things, from the reduced prices of real estate, and similar circumstances, bank money becomes scarce, it will court a different, and more advantageous employment. Though money, in this situation of affairs, may not be worth six per cent. in money; yet it becomes, intrinsically as it were, dearer, because all commodities become cheaper. Investments, in imperishable articles, then hold out the prospect of large profits, on the revival of business, while public securities will not improve.

Embargoes, therefore, as far as they cause business to stagnate; circulation, to become languid; bank money-our principal money-to become scarce: as far as they produce the constant effect of a diminished circulating medium,—a dispirited community, and an universal state of suffering, without, like war itself, calling forth any new emotions, or propelling to a new course of activity; as far as they absolutely deadenare a most miserable preparation for war, and must above all, exert a fatal influence over the financial concerns of government. They destroy revenue, on the one hand; render borrowing difficult on the other; and certainly must put the nation in a humour, not the most propitious to the successful introduction of new taxes.

The strength of a commercial country lies in its activity,in circulation. The power of a commercial country is therefore precarious, unless it has a navy to protect its commerce. The idea of Napoleon, that a nation, like England, is if at all, only vulnerable in her commercial relations, has some foundation. The species of embargo, which he attempts to realize, through the continental system of exclusion, would with her prove the more fatal, on account of her now inconvertible currency. Any measure, therefore, which actually did tend to preserve her extensive commerce, we should feel ourselves logically bound to consider as a judicious measure of self-preservation. Any measure, bona fide, though erroneously, intended to preserve it—we should still not think ourselves obliged to consider with regard to ourselves, as an act of oppression, and insult, demanding resistance-coute qu'il coute. We should consider it as a question of interest and policy, but not of principle, whether to resent it, or not? And we should feel the more reluctant to decide rashly on resenting it, if, by so doing, we necessarily threw ourselves into the arms of a power, more uncongenial-as to fundamental principles of conduct; more inimical-as to ultimate views; whose complete success would be our certain destruction; who has still less to offer than Great Britain in palliation of outrages on our commercial rights, yet more wanton and savage, than any which any other power has ever inflicted upon us.

It is really a phenomenon-unique-and most worthy of attention, that we should voluntarily fasten upon ourselves the very measure, which the genius of Napoleon has devised, as the true weapon with which to strike at the power of a commercial people, viz., the annihilation of their commerce.Hostile to political freedom, to popular institutions, and of course to commerce, the natural support of both, it seems a master stroke of policy in the French Emperor, to effect our own downfal from the political consequence we had acquired, by the mere attempt to make us instrumental in the projected destruction of Great Britain. It is, moreover, worthy of observation, that the same lack of sense, and superabundance of imbecility among the rulers of the nations of the continent of Europe, which have been so favourable to the execution of his designs there, should seem to prevail as egregiously, and to serve him equally well here.

We have yet to advert to a circumstance which attended the enactment of the present embargo, of a nature to defeat in great part, its efficacy as a measure of state-thrift. We allude to the formal annunciation of the intentions of the government

on the subject, several days before the law could regularly pass in congress. By this extraordinary proceeding, time was given to our merchants,-who did not hesitate to avail themselves of the opportunity,-to send their ships to sea laden with a vast amount of American property, although the detention of our wealth at home, so as to preserve it from the risk of confiscation abroad, was proclaimed to be one of the leading motives, as it was in fact, the only plausible justification, of the step about to be taken. If any thing could have taught the administration, how little confidence is reposed in their judgment or character by the public, it was the conduct of the mercantile body on this occasion. The latter so far from trusting to the sagacity, or concurring in the ostensible policy of their rulers, exerted an incredible degree of activity, in putting their fortunes beyond the reach of legislative precautions. To them, the protection professed to be extended by the measure of the embargo, was evidently more terrible, than the chance of being despoiled by the British. Rather than commit their property to the discretion, or safe keeping of their sapient government, they choose to throw it upon the mercy of our enemy elect.

It would seem, from the manner in which the embargo was ushered into existence, that the Executive did not dare to encounter the clamor, which would have been raised,—the universal discontent which would have been excited,-had the whole navigation and produce of the country been actually arrested. Or, if the previous intimation given, were not authorized by the Executive, but proceeded from the friends of administration in the committee of foreign relations, the circumstance would show, as indeed was the case, that these gentlemen were either actuated by a similar apprehension, or were conscious of the pernicious tendency of the measure, they had resolved to adopt merely in compliance with the Executive will, and desirous therefore of paralyzing its operation as far as possible. Without doubt, the escape of a certain number of our vessels, is to be considered as a subject for patriotic rejoicing; yet the manner in which the embargo was announced, although productive of this advantage, led to a practical injustice, in benefitting one portion of the mercantile community alone, that which happened casually to be in a situation to profit by it.

No one will seriously contend that the present embargo is, under any point of view, calculated to facilitate the preparations now said to be making for war. We have already shown

that it is of material detriment to our financial interests, and of this fact, the issue of the loan just opened, will be a conclusive proof. How it can operate beneficially, with respect to the collection of a military force-except by multiplying vagabonds and paupers-we would defy the most ready invention to explain, or the most lively fancy to conceive. Had it been really intended as a custody or security for the wealth of the country, permission would have been given, as we have before intimated, to our merchants, to withdraw without loss of time, from England, the large amount of property which they have now there; and good care would, moreover, have been taken, by preserving inviolate the secret of the intentions of government, that the property actually in our ports should be kept at home. For, on the face of the transaction, nothing could be more preposterous and even criminal, than that the government, while it declared its invariable determination to go to war with any particular power, and af fected to take means to secure our property from the gripe of the chosen enemy, should, nevertheless, at the same time, afford an opportunity which it well knew would not be lost, to our merchants, of placing within the reach of that power, a large amount of treasure, in addition to what was already in the same state.

The question, then, of the motives by which the Executive and his coadjutors in congress, were actuated, in adopting the present limited embargo, can admit of no other than the following solution:-Either the measure was taken, in obedience to the commands or threats of Serrurier the French minister, without a reference to our own particular concerns, but in aid of the continental system of his imperial majesty, and particularly of his hallowed designs on Spain and Portugal: Or it was meant as a loop-hole by which to escape from the threatened war with Great Britain, as a probation for the people subsidiary to the renovation of the old embargo scheme, in contradistinction to a real war system: Or lastly, it was intended in fact, as it is in promise, as the precursor of war,-in this sense and in this event only however,-that it might, from the unrivalled deformity of its aspect, and the insufferable ills of its operation, finally reconcile the mass of the people to actual hostilities;-so humiliate and annoy the country, that any alternative would seem preferable, and be greedily embraced.

Reluctant as we are to admit, even the possibility of what covers us with shame, in our capacity of American citizens, we must confess that we are strongly inclined, to the first interpretation of the origin of this embargo. The uniform course