Mr. Blunt, on the disposition of whose grounds and plantations I have so often with pleasure descanted, could not accede to Mr. Barnaby's unsettling opinions, but confessed himself unable to reason others into the conviction which he felt himself, that there existed in the general constitution of our minds some established rules and principles of taste. "It appears to me," continued this gentleman, "from the little acquaintance I have with the subject, that all the great rules in the fine arts have fixed foundations in our general nature. The sense of the beauty that arises from a due subserviency of parts to their whole; the love of variety, subordinate to a general uniformity; the pleasing pride of surmounting small difficulties; the spring that results from novelty, and the grateful feeling which accompanies every expansion of thought; are sources of satisfaction with which most minds are provided, and are distributed in analogous though unequal portions among all mankind.

"These principles, I am convinced, are throughout human nature the same in kind, though different in degree, according to the primary organization of different minds. In some, indeed, they languish for want of exercise; in some they are warped by wrong application; but in sound and cultivated minds they will operate for the most part in producing a sympathy and correspondence of taste. Where men of a cultivated relish are found to differ, the difference is generally traceable to some accidental association or temporary perversion, and supposing the pride of opinion and contest removed, might in most cases be reconciled by a fair investigation of their respective principles of disgust and approbation.

"I must not forget, indeed, to include among the principal causes of varieties of taste, the difference in

the opportunities afforded to different men. As the qualities of every thing in this world are appreciated by comparison, two minds equally constituted may pronounce different decisions as to the same object, from the same principles of judging; or, in other words, one man shall approve, on the account of its possessing more titles to his approbation than other similar objects to which hitherto he has been accustomed, the same thing that another man will condemn, because of the scarcity it exhibits of the same claims to admiration comparatively with those perfecter objects which have fallen within the range of his observation. They are both in search of the same qualities, and both acknowledge the same pretensions in the subjects of their contemplation; but they discover more or less of these qualities and pretensions, according to the ratio in which the chances of life have thrown the treasures of art into the paths of their inquiry. It is in quantity, and not in quality, that they differ; in the relation, and not in the essence; in the accidental, and not in the intrinsic character of the object of their difference. It is even from this conformity of their principles, that their practical disagreement arises; for, did they found their approbation and dislike on dissimilar qualities, they might both allow the same portion of merit on different accounts to one and the same object, though there were ever so wide a disparity in their sources and materials of comparison. For the same reason a man may differ from himself, and pronounce very opposite decisions in the different periods of his life, without adopting any new principles of taste, or undergoing any subsequent change in the conformation of his mind."

Our travelled member now took up the question, and entertained us with so many sensible remarks,

that, on my return home, finding that my mother was gone to bed, I tried my utmost to recollect the substance of his discourse; and having arranged it as well as I could in my mind, I resolved to present it in my present paper to my readers.

Addressing himself to Mr. Blunt, "It has always struck me," said he, "that there is a good deal of vanity and impertinence at the bottom of the common remark, there is no disputing about tastes, and that it often means little else than, 'I am at a loss to support my opinions, and rather than confess myself wrong, I will deny the existence of any measure or rule of decision.' I consider, however, that my taste' is one thing, and 'taste' is another; and that, in a multitude of instances, we must understand my taste' to be my want of taste.'

"Surely a strong proof, à posteriori, that true taste has its basis in the fixed and fundamental principles of our nature, is furnished from the gradual improvement of the fine arts, and that involuntary convergence of general opinions on all subjects in which it is concerned, as, in the progress of national refinement, the faculties of men are advanced by exercise and culture. Without supposing this sort of polar truth in the region of taste, we should have some difficulty in accounting for the uniform tendency and constant direction, which, in a civilised country, is sure to characterise the arts of elegance and design. Without such a point of union, we might expect to see them in a perpetual fluctuation, subject to the lubricous empire of the moment, and shifting their character with every gale of popular caprice.

"I have no doubt but that the rules of taste are in themselves as susceptible of demonstration as t objects of pure reasoning, having their sources theory as sound and complete; but as, by the nat

of their appeal, and the peculiar delicacy of their structure, they are exposed to the fluctuating influence of our passions and affections, their operation must perpetually be liable to external hindrances, to the deceptions of seducing lights, to the misguidance of false associations, and the silent intrusion of prejudices and partialities.

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Unhappily for the simplicity, the prevalence, and the application of these rules, as national civilisation and refinement advances, and exercise improves us in the execution of all the elegant arts, fresh combinations, habits, and associations arise, to throw fresh perplexity into the theory of taste, and to involve principles in difficulty and confusion. proportion, therefore, as use and emulation have advanced the elegance of our models and the facility of our practice, the task of the critic becomes complicated and arduous: he finds that false beauties have increased with equal fecundity; and that the public judgement is to be watched with nicer caution, and assisted by more discriminative lessons.

"I do not know," continued the traveller, "how we can otherwise account for the manifest relationship that subsists between all the finer arts, if we do not suppose it to arise from their common connection with the same general principles of our nature. It is to the soul that we are to trace back this illustrious pedigree: after pursuing it through all its various ramifications, we are brought at last to that trunk of original feeling seated in our common nature. Their family-titles and their records, their ensigns armorial and their bearings, are all deposited here. Here are substantiated their heraldic claims; here their legiti macies are proved, and here their dignities confirmed. The origin then of this alliance is situated deep in the mind; and the constancy and uniformity of hu

man feelings form the only ground of connection between those arts which appeal to the imagination and the passions. But the minds of individuals may be discoloured and perverted by prejudice, by interest, and by false associations; we are therefore not to consider how particular men are affected; but the general course, the average, if I may so say, of human feelings, is to be taken in forming rules and principles for the conduct of those arts which found their claim of excellence upon the power they possess over the heart and the fancy. Hence arise all those delicate and beautiful analogies, which are so easily discoverable by a philosophic mind in the arts of music, poetry, painting, and oratory.

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Unless we admit this original source of alliance, their union is inexplicable by a superficial comparison of their external frame and structure. There are, indeed, many outward marks of an admirable correspondence and connection, but the causes are remote and radical in the mind. Music and painting fall under the cognisance of different senses; but this difference is in their external character and effects: it is in their interior constitution and principles, and their operation not superficially on the senses, but intimately, and ultimately on the passions and feelings of the mind, that their relationship is to be looked for. Loud and exalted music elevates the soul through the ear, in the same manner as through the eye it is affected by a noble and romantic scene in painting. The flowing contour in the outline of figures pleases us, for the same reasons as the gradual rise and decay of notes in melody. Sweetness of tone, like beauty of shape and colour; and smooth and level surfaces, like equable and gentle sounds, inspire elegant and gay sensations into the bosom, or soothe us into soft tranquillity and placid composure. The widest and