If our Government should once begin to issue a credit currency, there would be no placing limits on the amount. Treasury notes bearing interest, it may, in times of exigency, be forced to have recourse to; but such notes do not form a currency, in the strict sense of the word. They are regarded by capitalists as profitable investments, and as such are hoarded. They may be occasionally used in payment of debts, but so also are stocks, and so is corn, and so is tobacco. Treasury notes bearing interest do not injuriously affect the standard of value, nor can they become the money of the country. In their essential character they resemble the five and six per cent. stocks of the States, and differ from them only in being receivable in payment of public dues to the General Government. The issue of them is to be avoided as far as practicable, on the general principle that the incurring of debts in any shape should be avoided, as far as possible, by a republic.

The proper medium for all commercial transactions, of a less amount than five dollars, is silver; for all transactions between five and fifty, or, perhaps, five and one hundred dollars, the proper medium is gold; and for all transactions of fifty or a hundred dollars, and upwards, the proper medium is notes of bankers responsible in the whole extent of their private fortunes, and bills of exchange. So far as treasury drafts can be incidentally of use in commercial transactions, well and good. But any attempt of Government to furnish a paper medium for general commercial purposes must infallibly do harm. Let commerce alone, and it will furnish a medium for itself.

It may perhaps be urged that this rule would work very well in ordinary times, but that the crisis is a peculiar one, and that in the general derangement of the banking business, perhaps the breaking up of the present banking system, it would seem incumbent on Government to suffer its credit to be generally used till a new and better banking system can be established. This question need not be discussed here. "One thing at a time" is a good rule in legislating, as well as in other business. In one of the "sub-treasury" bills of a previous session, a provision was introduced to allow the Secretary of the Treasury, when there were surpluses in the treasury, to invest the same in State stocks, and when there were deficiencies, to dispose of these State stocks, or to issue treasury notes to a limited amount. It is by investing their surplus earnings in securities readily convertible into cash, and by occasional uses of their personal credit, that large private dealers are enabled to meet punctually all their engagements. There would seem to be strong reasons in placing the Government on the same footing, in this respect, as individuals, especially in a country where the revenue fluctuates to an extent unknown in other lands. But a distinguished Senator from South Carolina had the provision struck from the bill, with the intent that the naked issue of "constitutional treasury" or "no constitutional treasury" might not be embarrassed by collateral questions. On the same principle, all plans for such temporary relief as the present

crisis may demand, should be kept distinct from plans for forming a treasury system for the United States, intended to be of a permanent character. No plan of relief can, indeed, be effective, unless a good fiscal system be first adopted.

What has been said must convince the reader of the wide scope the debate on the Independent Treasury system will be likely to take, and of the great difficulty there will be in carrying a bill that will embrace many details. Yet even providing for the few points which are essential will require an act of no small number of sections. Hence the necessity of throwing aside every thing of an extraneous nature.

One point which ought to be kept in view in the drawing up of such an act, is, that its provisions should conflict as little as possible with the established order of business in the public offices, either at Washington or elsewhere. Clerks in public offices go on very well according to an established routine, but if any attempt is made to introduce new principles of practice, they are generally as much at a loss as Edmund Burke says lawyers are, when the file affords no precedent-as much at a loss as the sailor is without quadrant or compass. So well convinced was the French ministry of this, that when its treasury affairs, some thirty years ago, got into inextricable confusion, it did not attempt to reform the old system, but built up a new system at its side, called the Treasury of Service, and which gradually took the place of the old one.

On this principle, there would be an impropriety in using the Mints as Treasury offices. All the affairs at the Mint at Philadelphia proceed according to an established order, which cannot but be broken by requiring the officers thereof to act as general fiscal agents. The business of coining money is as distinct from the proper business of a Treasury office, as can well be conceived. Nothing will be gained by devolving incongruous duties upon public agents. Where there is a certain quantity of work to be done, there must be a certain number of men to do it, and only by a proper division of labor can that number be reduced within the narrowest limits possible. The Mint at Philadelphia is, moreover, inconveniently situated for the business of a Treasury office. And the existence of Mints, both at Philadelphia and New Orleans, affords additional arguments why Treasury offices should be established in those two cities, rather than why they should not. The accounts of the Mints have hitherto been checked by those of the deposite banks. When an old check is removed, a new one should be instituted in its place.

For similar reasons, it will be proper to organize a Treasury office at Washington, with three officers to be appointed by the President and Senate. Otherwise the Treasurer will be left without that check on him in local expenditures which has heretofore been afforded by the accounts of the deposite banks. The Treasurer would have, moreover, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, to superintend the operations of all the Treasury offices, which would render assistance to him indispensable in effecting local receipts and disbursements. If Con

gress should not establish such an office, it would be necessary for him to organize it himself as well as he could, as otherwise the whole business of the Department would be thrown into confusion. But he could not organize it with all the checks and guards that are requisite, and therefore it is desirable that provision for it should be made by law.

In about eight Treasury offices, in proper locations, three-fourths, perhaps four-fifths of all the public receipts and payments, exclusive of those of the Post Office Department, might be advantageously concentered. Yet after having provided for the proper organization of these, Congress will not have done all its duty. The public revenue of the United States is collected at about one hundred and twenty custom-houses, at about eighty land offices, and at upwards of thirteen thousand post offices, besides small amounts collected by clerks of courts, by marshals, by the Commissioner of the Patent Office, and by other officers from miscellaneous sources. The revenue is disbursed at as many points as it is collected. In a good fiscal system all unnecessary transfers of public money will be avoided. It would be folly to bring a sum of money from a distant custom-house or land office with full knowledge that the public service would require its disbursement in a short time in the immediate neighborhood of that very land office or custom-house. Yet it would be proper to provide for its security while there: and for this reason, all custom-houses and land offices should, so far as they act as fiscal agencies, be regulated on the same principles as the Treasury offices. There will be no great difficulty in this, if the general principles of the law be once well settled. As there are in all land offices, and all custom-houses, except the smallest, at least two officers appointed by the President and Senate, they can be made effectual checks and guards upon one another, by being made jointly responsible for the money committed to their custody. In custom-houses where cashiers are employed, they ought to be appointed by the Treasurer of the United States, as his agents. The cashier and assistant cashier of the late collector at New York, (Mr. Swartwout,) were early aware of the manner in which he was misapplying the public funds, but as they received their appointments from him, and were dependant on him for the means of earning their daily bread, they gave no intimation of his misconduct to the Department at Washington.

As there should be unity in the fiscal system of a country, the same general principles should be applied in regulating the money concerns of the Post Office. Where cashiers are employed, they ought to be appointed by some other authority than the postmasters, on whom they ought to be checks, and who ought to be checks on them.

The fiscal system of no country is complete, unless it affords the means of receiving and making payments wherever they are due. For all general purposes, the custom houses and land offices, would be preferred as subordinate fiscal agencies. But cases might occur in which it would be expedient to use a post office, on account of its being most

convenient for business, or on account of the postmaster's being most of a man of business. Provision could be made for such cases, by granting authority to the Treasurer to appoint, by and with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, and of the Post Master General, cashiers to such post offices as it might be necessary to select as subordinate fiscal agencies of the Treasury Department.

That there might be uniformity throughout the system, a sufficient number of inspectors should be appointed by the President and Senate, to examine all the fiscal agencies, both great and small, of the Treasury Department. Those post offices which should perform fiscal duties for the Post Office Department only, might be left to be examined, as they are at present, by agents appointed by that Department.

Against this plan various objections will be brought. It will, in the first place, be said that it will increase the power and patronage of the Executive. To this objection there are two answers. The first is, that the objection is not a legitimate one. The Constitution provides for the establishment of a Treasury, and the same Constitution declares that all appointments to office shall be made by the President by and with the the consent of the Senate. Till the Constitution is, in this respect, altered, it is unnecessary further to consider the objection in this light. As reasonable would it be, as our population increases, to withhold justice from the people, by affirming that providing for the appointment of additional judges would increase the patronage of the Executive. As reasonable would it be, to refuse to declare war when the safety of the nation required such a measure, because war would make it necessary for the President to appoint a number of new officers. Executive patronage is a great evil, and ought to be diminished as much as possible. The true way to diminish it is, to confine the Government to the few objects pointed out by the Constitution.

The second answer to this objection is, that instead of increasing, it would materially diminish the patronage of the Executive. It would, indeed, give to him the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint about thirty new officers: but then, on the other hand, it would take from him the power of allowing the public officers, or rather the power assumed by the public officers, to use millions of the public money. A system of this kind would not give to any public officer, from the President downwards, any new power over the public money, but take away great part of that they now possess. It would diminish their power and add greatly to their responsibilities.

As to corruption, that would be much more likely to creep in, and much more likely to be concealed, under a system in which public accounts and private accounts should be mixed together, and in which public funds held by public agents should be regarded as mere debts due to the Government, than under a system, in which public accounts and private accounts, and public money and private money should be kept entirely separate.

The second objection to this plan will be, that it will be expensive. It will cost money, it must be confessed, but so does every thing that is worth having. The salaries of the principal officers must be sufficiently large to ensure the services of men of talent and integrity; and they must be paid for the responsibilities they assume, as well as the duties they perform. As the officers of the custom-houses and land offices would in some instances be required to perform additional duties and assume additional responsibilities, they should, in justice, receive additional compensation. Besides this, there would be the expense of fitting up eight Treasury offices, and of providing such custom-houses and land offices, as have them not, with proper securities for keeping books and money. But this expense would not be great. A couple of rooms and a vault in a custom-house, would suffice for the largest Treasury office: and if any of the custom-houses or land offices are without means of safely keeping books and money, they ought to be provided with them, whether the constitutional treasury system is established or not.

For every dollar this system would cost, it would probably save ten, perhaps one hundred. It would be almost impossible that defaults to any great amount could occur under it, and in this way millions would be saved. It would take away from disbursing officers the temptation to draw for public money in advance of the time required by the public services, in order to employ it in their private speculations: and it would make it the interest of both the collecting and disbursing officers to have their accounts settled as promptly as possible. Hundreds of thousands of dollars, which under the present system remain in the hands of collecting and disbursing officers, would, under the constitutional system, become available for public purposes. Nor would this be the only advantage gained. The banks do not consider themselves compensated for acting as fiscal agents, unless very large amounts of public money are left in their vaults. Under a constitutional system, the whole balance in the Treasury need not, in ordinary times, exceed one million, or, perhaps, two million dollars. Thus several millions, which, under the old system, could not be used without seriously embarrassing if not breaking the banks, would become immediately available. The bare interest on these sums might pay all the necessary expenses of a good treasury system. In the economy to which it would lead, in the faithful application of public money in all departments of government, a still greater advantage would probably be gained. And as there would then be no danger of the public ereditors being paid in depreciated paper, the people would save millions as well as the government.

If, however, the American people are not willing to pay the necessary expenses of providing for the safety of the public money, that money must be left as heretofore exposed to danger of loss from public officers employing it in their private speculations, and from banks using it in their current business. The plan of special deposites has been tried, and like that of general deposites proved a failure.