was the appeal made to the divine than to human authority in vindication of this law. It is certain that we find no fuch punishment inflicted by the law of Mofes and if David feized, as the learned gentleman has affirmed to the house, upon the estate of Saul, this was certainly the commission, and not the penalty, of treason. As to the cafe of Mephibofheth, he was not fo much as accused of treason, but of ingratitude; and the punishment inflicted upon him was the mere act of arbitrary power. But admitting that the kings of the Jews acted upon the principle of this iniquitous law, their example can be no authority; for Samuel had before warned the Jews of the oppreffions they were to expect from kings: he had told them that the king would take their fields, their vineyards, and their olive-trees, and give the best of them to his fervants.' The charge of treafon was no doubt made use of to furnish a pretext for thefe enormous injuries; and the experience of our own govern-` ment may convince us what tyranny might be exercised under a veil so specious. It will be alleged, perhaps, that this law, however inconsistent with humanity and juftice, is neceffary to the preservation of the government; but is this the fact in the eaftern countries, where punishments ftill more horrid and barbarous are inflicted in cases of this nature? These unjust and odious penalties only serve to lull a government into a fatal security, and to embolden arbitrary minifters to tyrannize over the people, till, inflamed by repeated acts of oppreffion, the train is fet fire to, and the ministers, with their master, are blown up by the combuftibles which they had fo affiduously prepared for the de ftruction of others." The house, however, agreed to the amendment, by a majority of eighty voices; and a new proof was exhibited to the world of how little estimation, in the view of princes, are all confiderations of moral and political justice, when deemed incompatible with their intereft or fecurity.

This

At

This year, 1743, the Swedes terminated an unsuccessful war with Ruffia, by a peace figned at Abo, by which they were totally detached from their political connection with France. This event, so intimately affecting the general state of politics in Europe, requires a distinct elucidation. the death of the last monarch of Sweden, the celebrated Charles XII. A. D. 1718, who had governed with a fway the most arbitrary and imperious, and whofe rafh and romantic enterprises had reduced his country to the verge of ruin, Sweden found itself in a fituation the most favorable. for finally abolishing defpotifm, and establishing a free and A diet equal government on a folid and permanent basis. being immediately convoked, the throne of Sweden was declared VACANT-Charles having died without iffue, and the claim of his fifters to the fucceffion being barred, conformably to a fundamental law of the kingdom, by their previous marriage. The ftates, therefore, determined to make an offer of the crown to Ulrica Eleanora, confort of Frederic, hereditary prince of Heffe Caffel, fubfequently affociated in the government, to the exclufion of the duke of Holstein, fon of the elder fifter, on the exprefs condition that this princess should declare her readiness to hold the crown in virtue of a FREE ELECTION, and should take an oath to adhere to the new formula or model of government, now, by the authority of the nation, folemnly inftituted. "The counsellors and states of the kingdom assembled, having," as they exprefs themselves, "experienced the fad confequences of that arbitrary power which has fo much weakened and injured the kingdom, to the almost irreparable ruin of us all, have feriously and unanimously refolved to abolish entirely a power which has proved fo prejudicial." It is to be remarked, that the diet, or states-general of the kingdom of Sweden, confifts of four distinct chambers or houses the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, the peasants. Thefe, agreeably to the conftitution now established, were

to

to be convoked every three years, or more frequently if occafion required. And fhould the king, or fenate in his abfence, neglect to affemble them at the expiration of this term, or even should they not convoke them on the very day the states had, the last time they were affembled, chosen to appoint for their next meeting, thefe fhould then have a right to affemble of themselves. And whatever the king or fenate should have done in the mean time, was to be confi dered as void. The time fpecified for the fhorteft legal du ration of the diet was three months; but the power of diffolution was vested in themselves alone. While the states were affembled, they were in fact poffeffed of the whole fupreme power; the authority of the king and fenate was then fufpended-they became mere cyphers, having little or no fhare in the public tranfactions but what confifted fimply in affixing their feals and fignatures to whatever the diet fhould think proper to refolve. The legiflative power the states referved at all times wholly to themfelves, the king and the fenate not even poffeffing a negative on those resolutions which directly attacked the regal and fenatorial rights. "For the preservation of thefe," it is remarked with juft derifion, they were to depend on the MODERATION OF A POPULAR ASSEMBLY." The following powers were likewise vested in the states alone: those of declaring war or making peace-that of altering the standard of the coin-whenever a vacancy happened in the fenate," that of presenting to the king three perfons, one of whom his majesty was bound to make choice of to fill the vacant office-laftly, that of difmiffing any member of the fenate whose conduct they disapproved. During the feffion of the diet, a flanding fecret committee was chofen, felected from the three orders of nobles, clergy, and burghers, of which one half were nobles-the order of peafants

*

Vide Hiftory of the Swedish Revolution, A., D. 1772, by Charles Francis Sheridan, efq.

peasants being too mean and infignificant to be associated in this commiffion-by which the ordinary functions of the fenate were almost entirely fuperfeded, and the executive powers of the government exclufively exercifed. With regard to the judicial power, the states affumed to themselves a right of exercising that also, whenever they thought proper, by taking at pleasure caufes out of the high courts of justice established by law, to try them before a temporary tribunal erected by themselves, and compofed of their own members. Nothing, therefore, could be more formidable than the power of this affembly, or more fubversive of liberty; as, in reality, it united within itself the legislative, judicial, and executive powers-and as the province and jurifdiction of the occafional tribunal comprehended all cafes of treason, sedition, and public libel, it was evidently, at the fame time, both judge and party. Even during the intervals of the diets, the king was little more than a cypher of state, and was distinguished from the other fenators, confifting of fourteen in number, only by the privilege of a double voice in the first instance, and of a cafting vote in cafe of an equality of voices. The fenate were empowered to assemble themselves whenever they thought proper, and to tranfact the national bufinefs whether the king were present or not; and to their refolutions his majefty was obliged to affix his fignature. The great employments of the state were conferred by a majority of voices in the fenate; and to others of inferior importance three perfons were nominated by the fenate, one of whom the king was obliged to appoint. Thus the outward pomp and decorations of majesty were almost all that remained of a prerogative lately fo formidable: but a more recent experience foon taught the Swedes that political oppreffion might exist under a variety of forms, and that the liberty of the people was not neceffarily increafed in proportion as the power of the monarch was diminished; and the fcenes of corruption, distraction, and anarchy, which enfued, were

the

the most decifive proofs of the numerous and radical defects of the new formula of government. When compared with the British conftitution, the prodigious fuperiority of the latter is manifest in almost every point of view in which they can be placed-their whole structure, genius, and fpirit forming a moft inftructive and striking contrast. In England, the crown is vefted by the conftitution with the whole active power of government, fubject to the authoritative inspection and control of parliament; and it is alfo poffeffed, by means of its extenfive patronage, of that degree of influence over the legislative body which must not only preclude the idea of foreign intrigue and interference; but of that fpecies of oppofition which arises from the natural and inceffant defire of aggrandizement, the interests of the individual members being opposed to the aggregate intereft of the body---the negative of the king and the power of diffolution coming likewife in aid of that prerogative which is at once fo open to the attack, and so unequal to the encounter. On the other hand, the constitutional powers of parliament, and its component principles, are fuch as eminently to qualify it for its province of legislation and control. The houfe of commons is invested with the fole difpofal of the national revenue, which, of itself, gives it a decided preponderance over the other, and, with respect to rank, the higher branch of the legislature. The commons of England are not, like the commons of Sweden, divided into diftinct chambers, by which their collective force is fenfibly enfeebled. The English house of commons likewise contains a much greater combination of interests than, in confequence of the abfurd restraints on the freedom of election, can take place in Sweden: where the burghers and peasants must be actually of the feveral claffes of the community which they reprefent. Also, in Sweden all the privileges of the nobility, that of fitting in the diet excepted, extending to all the defcendants of nobles, a vast proportion