tional. He saw no reason for concluding, that the secrecy of the communication was to be indefiite; neither did he think the paper contained a charge against any person, unless, in as far as an attempt, on the part of the noble lord, to exonorate himself, might be supposed to imply blame in others. The best excuse for Lord Chatham, in not communicating his narrative to his colleagues in the first instance was, that from the situation of the government at home, he did not know who his colleagues were, and therefore went to the fountain head. He would, however, vote for Mr. Whitbread's motion. The Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed great surprise at the conclusion of Mr. Windham's speech, as his arguments were all on one side, and the vote he was to give on the other. It was unquestionably Lord Chatham's intention in writing that narrative, which was his statement and defence, to make it public at some period. He did conceive that it was unconstitutional to communicate that statement directly to his majesty, with a charge of secrecy. This, however, was not a crime, but a venial error, from which no practical inconvenience had occurred. If so, the justice of the case might be satisfied, by adopting the previous question; which would imply, that the offence was of a nature so slight as not to call for a serious judgment. Mr. Whitbread replied to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and also to Mr. Bankes, and to Mr. Stephen. He was asked, "Will you be so inhuman as to tear the stones from the monument of the father, to He bruise the head of the son would appeal to those, who had opportunities of judging of his ha bits and feelings, whether in pri vate life he was capable of violating any of those social affections that bound man to man. But here he was not his own master. He would discharge his duty as an honest and independent servant of the people, and hold up the proud, noble, and constitutional conduct of William, Earl of Chatham, as a glaring contrast with the suspicious, clandestine, and unconstitutional conduct of John, Earl of Chatham. Mr. Whitbread, in the course of his speech, animadverted, in some instances with severity, on the inconsistencies in the evidence given by Lord Chatham, on his examination. There were other inconsistencies, he said, which it was not now necessary for him to dwell on, as they had been so clearly pointed out by his right honourable friend, Mr. Ponsonby.-He trusted, in conclusion, that the house would not suffer the Right Honourable Chancellor of the Exchequer to take refuge under the shabby shelter of the previous question, and give the country an opportunity of saying, that parliament dare not to do its duty. General Loft vindicated the conduct of Lord Chatham, and assured the house, that the noble lord had expressed to him his readiness to come back, and answer to any points in his evidence, that were supposed to want explanation. General Grosvenor, as to the alledged inconsistencies in the noble lord's evidence, said, he had hoped, that the noble lord, in the conversation he had held with Mr. Whitbread, at the bar, had had satisfied the honourable gentleman, that there was nothing contradictory in his answer. His lordship gave his evidence, one of the days, he could not recollect which, under the disadvantage of indisposition. He was fatigued by the length of the examination, In fact, he was quite done up. On a division of the house, which had become exceedingly clamorous for the question, there appeared For the previous question, 188. Mr. Whitbread's first motion was carried, and he waved the second. Mr. Canning then proposed the amendment mentioned in his specch; and Mr. Whitbread seconded it. This motion being also carried, Mr. Whitbread moved that the resolutions agreed to, be laid before his majesty, by such members as were of his majesty's most honourable privy council: on which some members exclaimed, By the whole house." This proposition called up Mr. Wilberforce, and Mr. B. Bathurst, both of whom concurred in the wish, that nothing of heat or personality might appear upon the proceedings of the house. The main ob ject had been obtained, by recording on the journals, the sense the house entertained of the transac tion, in a constitutional point of view; and proceeding any further would not be for the dignity of the house. Mr. Whitbread coincided entirely with this observation, and with the consent of the house, with drew his motion. In consequence of these resolu tions, Lord Chatham resigned his office of master-general of the ordnance. CHAP. CHAP. V. Summary View of the Impolicy and Misconduct of the Expedition to the Scheldt-Resolutions moved by Lord Porchester on that Subject.Debate of four Days.-Lord Porchester's Resolutions negatived. The Conduct of Ministers with regard to the Policy of the Expedition to Walcheren approved. The Retention of Walcheren also approved. HE discussion respecting the Earl of Chatham's narrative, formed a kind of episode in the general inquiry into the Scheldt expedition; but that episode of a nature still more interesting than the main action itself, as involving a question, on the decision of which nothing less depended than the liberty of the country, with all the blessings in her train, or the degradation, torpor, and vices of despotism. While the energies of a country are preserved and fostered by liberty, errors in policy and war may be repaired. Where liberty is extinct, the victories of the despot serve only to rivet the chains that bind his unhappy subjects. Under the impression of this great truth, our intelligent readers will admit the propriety of bestowing a greater proportion of space in our annals on the discussion of a principle, fundamental to political and civil liberty, than on the causes of the failure of any particular project, on the part of government; though this, at the time, might excite greater interest and livelier passions. House of Commons, March 21. The committee appointed to enquire into the policy and conduct of the expedition to the Scheldt, having finished their long and painful labours, Lord Porchester, who was the principal manager, as well as mover of the investigation, rose to submit a series of resolutions, declaratory of his sentiments, on that most important subject, which had occupied so much of their attention, since the commencement of the present session. Of the expedition in general, Lord Porchester said, he had hoped to find, that such dreadful failures were, at least, in part attributable to those uncontroulable causes, which are incident to all the operations of war, and enter. prises dependent for their success, on the state of the elements. But what had the disastrous issue of this expedition proved? To be the result of predicted and anticipated causes. It had verified every prediction, and realized every fear, expressed by all those most competent to decide upon its policy and practicability, but whose opinion, on this occasion, his majesty's ministers did not deem it expedient to follow. This position Lord Porchester proceeded to establish, by a clear and comprehensive analysis of the evidence, taken at their bar. The commander in chief, Sir David Dundas, had given it as his opinion, June 3, 1809, that in what ever way Antwerp was to be approached or taken, the service was one of very great risk, and in which the safe return of the army so employed might be very precarious, from the opposition made, and the time consumed in the operation, which enabled the enemy, in a short time, to assemble a great force, from every part of the Netherlands, and Holland, and even from Westphalia, and from the course of the Rhine, as well as from the frontier of France. General Calvert had stated the utter impossibility of laying down any thing in the shape of detailed reasoning, without a knowledge of local circumstances, and to what extent those circumstances would admit of a naval co-operation. Colonel Gordon had given it as his opinion, so far back as the 29th of May, that the first operation necessary, would be to get possession of Cadsand and South Beveland. And yet it was not until the expedition had actually failed, that it had occurred to his majesty's ministers, to consider of the necessity of taking possession of these places, or of hinting at it, in the instructions given to the officers entrusted with the "execution of this project. The inference, with which Colonel Gordon concluded his observations was, "that this attempt would be a most desperate enterprise, cannot be doubted; and that in the attempt, whether successful or otherwise, a very large portion of our navy would be put to imminent hazard." The next opinion taken by the commander in chief, was that of General Brownrigg, whose opinion respecting the ulterior and main object of the expedition, the destruction of the arsenals at Antwerp, was, "That a force passing over from Walcheren to South Beveland, would take possession of Landvliet, on the main land; and the distance from thence to Antwerp being only six leagues, might succeed in taking the latter place by a coup de main." Of all the plans proposed, Lord Por chester considered this as by far the most extravagant and imprac ticable. The next opinion taken was that of General Hope, who was of opinion, that an attempt to take Antwerp by a coup de main, in the only way which was at all practicable, would be "attended with great risk to the force em ployed, without, perhaps, any ade quate security for the attainment of its object." Here then were five military opinions, four of them decidedly adverse, and the fifth not favour able to the expedition. His ma jesty's government next applied to two naval officers, Sir Home Popham and Sir Richard Strachan. Sir Home Popham, in his memoranda, particularly pressed two points, namely, "That the troops should be embarked in ships of war, as transports were a great impediment to promptitude in attack, and that, as the season was ad vancing, the expedition should be ready to sail by the 26th or 27th of June, about the time of the full moon.' The ships of war were not to proceed up the Scheldt, and the hopes of promptitude were enlivened by the vast number of horses sent out, as well as by not dispatching the expedition, which ought to have sailed on the 27th of June, till the 27th of July. Sir Richard Richard Strachan assured the noble lord at the head of the admiralty, that he entertained but very little hope of ultimate success at Antwerp. Nothing was communicated to him on the subject of the difficulties of going up to Ant werp: but he remembered, that when he remarked, that all he thought could be done, would be the reduction of Walcheren, Lord Mulgrave replied, that the country would be little satisfied with doing nothing more with such an armament than taking Walcheren. Upon the repetition of his fears, the noble lord assured him that he had the fullest confidence of success; and that he had reason to think they should do very well. As to the plan of the expedition, Lord Porchester confessed that, with all his anxiety and industry to obtain information, he had not been able to learn what was the mature of the arrangement proposed. His own conviction was, that there were as many plans, as departments, engaged in the expedition. Lord Castlereagh's plan, if one might guess from the outline, was to make a dash, which disdained to stop at even the most desperate risks and appalling dangers. The plan of the admiralty, at least that fixed on at the sailing, was much more prudent, as it did not hazard the navy in a most intricate navigation. The Chancel lor of the Exchequer's whole at tention was absorbed in calculating on that arrangement which should convey the expedition with the least possible quantity of dollars. To what plan the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Canning) was more particularly attached, he could not tell. But it was pro bable that he, too, just at that time, had some little plan of his own, which he did not communi cate to his colleagues. The admiral appeared to have a plan; but the commander in chief appeared to have had no plan. From the whole of his examination it was clear that he had not, at ang time during the campaign, considered of any plan at all. Neither was there any pointed out to him in the instructions of government. It was difficult, therefore, Lord P. declared, for him to settle what plan he should proceed to discuss; but he should, at all events, endeavour to follow up what seemed to have been the intention of the government. The general understanding, he said, of the business seemed to be, that part of the army was, in the first place, to take possession of the island of Walcheren, and another corps to take Cadsand: the main body was to advance to Landvliet. This was so far the apparent plan, which, however, in some of the documents before the house, was said, in not very intelligible language, to relate to a "second ulterior, simultaneous, and subsequent operation." But this ulterior, simultaneous, and subsequent operation was given up, because the commander in chief apprehended that, before he could proceed in it, he should have to undertake, perhaps, two or three preliminary sieges. Lord Porchester proceeded to point out, and comment on, those parts of the evidence before the house, that bore most directly on the present question, and from all the data that formed the foundation of the expe dition against Antwerp, contended that |