pears to have been at all times necessary to give vigour and effect to the resolutions of their leaders. To these constituent parts of the Hebrew government we may add the Oracle or voice of Jehovah, without whose sanction, as revealed by Urim and Thummim, no measure of importance could be adopted either by the council or by the judge. It has been justly remarked, at the same time, that however extensive the power might be which was committed to the supreme court of the nation, and how much soever the authority of a military judge among the Israelites resembled that of a Roman dictator, the privilege of making laws was at no period intrusted to any order of the Jewish state. As long as the Hebrews were governed by a theocracy, this essential prerogative was retained by the Divine Head of the nation. "Now therefore hearken, O Israel, unto the statutes, and unto the judgments, which I teach you, for to do them, that ye may live, and go in and possess the land which the Lord God of your fathers giveth Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you.' you. It is the opinion of learned men, that the Council of Seventy, established by Moses in the Wilderness, was only a temporary appointment, and did not continue after the Hebrews were settled in the Land of Canaan. The only national assembly of which we can discover any trace subsequently to that event, is the occasional meeting of the Princes of Tribes and Chiefs of Families to transact business of great public importance. Thus, in the case of the war against Benjamin, of which we have a full account in the book of Judges, we are informed that the heads "of all the tribes, even of all the tribes of Israel, presented themselves in the assembly of the people of God." On that memorable occasion, the interests and character of the whole Hebrew commonwealth were at stake; for which reason the natural leaders of the tribes gathered themselves together at the head of their kinsmen and followers,-even four hundred thousand men that drew the sword,-in order *Deut. iv. 1, 2; xii. 32. "Hoc igitur argumento maximo est; juris illius majestatis quod in legibus ferendis est positum, nihil quicquam penes hominem fuisse."-Conringius de Repub. Heb, to consult with one another, and to adopt such measures as might be deemed most suitable for punishing the atrocities which had been committed at Gibeah. During the period to which this part of our narrative refers, the supreme power among the Hebrews was occasionally exercised by judges,-an order of magistrates to which nothing similar is to be found in any other country. The Carthaginians, indeed, had a description of rulers, whose names, being derived from the same oriental term, appear to establish some resemblance in their office to that of the successors of Joshua. But it will be found upon a comparison of their authority, both in its origin and the purposes to which it was meant to be subservient, that the Hebrew judges and the suffites of Carthage had very little in common. Nor do we find any closer analogy in the duties of a Grecian archon or of a Roman consul. These were ordinary magistrates, and periodically elected; whereas, the judge was never invested with power except when the exigencies of public affairs required the aid of extraordinary talents or the weight of a supernatural appointment. On this account the Hebrew commander has been likened to the Roman dictator, who, when the commonwealth was in danger, was intrusted with an authority almost unlimited, and with a jurisdiction which extended to the lives and fortunes of nearly all his countrymen. But in one important particular this similarity fails. The dictator laid down his office as soon as the crisis which called for its exercise had passed away; and in no circumstances was he entitled to retain such unwonted supremacy beyond a limited time. The judge, on the other hand, remained invested with his high authority during the full period of his life, and is therefore usually described by the sacred historian as presiding to the end of his days over the tribes of Israel, amid the peace and security which his military skill, aided by the blessing of Heaven, had restored to their land.* The Hebrew judges, says Dupin, were not ordinary magistrates, but men raised up by God, on whom the Israelites bestowed the chief government, either because they had delivered them from the oppressions under which they groaned, * Livii Hist. lib. xxviii. 37; lib. xxx. 7. Bochart, Geog. Sacra, part ii. lib. ii. 24. or because of their prudence and equity. They ruled according to the law of Jehovah, commanded their armies, made treaties with the neighbouring princes, declared war and peace, and administered justice. They were different from kings, 1. In that they were not established either by election or succession, but elevated to power in an extraordinary manner. 2. In that they refused to take upon them the title and quality of king. 3. In that they levied no taxes upon the people for the maintenance of government. 4. In their manner of living, which was very far from the pomp and ostentation of the regal state. 5. In that they could make no new laws, but governed according to the statutes contained in the Books of Moses. 6. In that the obedience paid to them by the people was voluntary and unforced, being at most no more than consuls and magistrates of free cities.* But it is less difficult to determine what the judges were not than to ascertain with precision the various parts of their complicated office. In war, they led the host of Israel to meet their enemies; and in peace, it is probable they presided in such courts of judicature as might be found necessary for deciding upon intricate points of law, or for hearing appeals from inferior tribunals. Those who went up to Deborah for judgment had, we may presume, brought their causes in the first instance before the judges of their respective cities; and it was only, perhaps, in cases where greater knowledge and a higher authority were required to give satisfaction to the litigants that the chief magistrate of the republic, aided by certain members of the priesthood, was called upon to pronounce a final decision. It belongs to this part of the subject to mention the provision made by Moses, and established by Joshua, for the due administration of justice throughout the land. "Judges and officers," said the former, "shalt thou make thee in all thy gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee; and they shall judge the people with just judgment. Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither * Complete History of the Canon, book i. c. 8. take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise and pervert the words of the righteous." To the same purpose Josephus relates, in his account of the last address delivered by Moses to the Hebrew people, that this great legislator gave instructions to appoint seven judges in every city, men who had distinguished themselves by their good conduct and impartial feelings. Let those who judge, he adds, be permitted to determine according as they shall think right, unless any one can show that they have taken bribes to the perversion of justice, or can allege any other accusation against them.* Between the "judges" and the "officers" nominated by the Jewish lawgiver there was no doubt a marked distinction; though from the remote antiquity of the appointment and the obscure commentaries of the rabbinical writers it has become extremely difficult to define the limits of their respective functions. Maimonides asserts, that in every city where the number of householders amounted to a hundred and twenty there was a court consisting of twentythree judges, who were empowered to determine in almost all cases both civil and criminal. This is unquestionably the same institution which is mentioned by Josephus in the fourth book of his Antiquities, and described by him as being composed of seven judges and fourteen subordinate officers, or assistants, selected from among the Levites; for these, with the president and his deputy, make up the sum of twenty-three specified by the Jewish writers. În smaller towns, the administration of law was intrusted to three judges, whose authority extended to the determination of all questions respecting debt, theft, rights of inheritance, restitution, and compensation. Though they could not inflict capital punishments, they had power to visit minor offences with scourging and fines, according to the nature of the delinquency and the amount of the injury sustained.† Of the former of these judicial establishments, there were two fixed at Jerusalem even during the period that the Sanhedrim of Seventy was invested with the supreme authority over the lives and fortunes of their countrymen, one of which *Deut. xvi. 18, 19. Josephus's Antiquities, book iv. 8. E sat in the gate of Shusan, and the other in that of Nicanor. The place where these judges held their audience was, as Cardinal Fleury remarks, the gate of the city; for as the Israelites were all husbandmen who went out in the morning to their work, and did not return till the evening, the gate of the city was the place where they most frequently met; and we must not be astonished to find that the people laboured in the fields and dwelt in the towns. These were not cities like our provincial capitals, which can hardly subsist on what is supplied to them by twenty or thirty leagues of the surrounding soil. They were the habitations for as many labourers as were necessary to cultivate the nearest fields; hence, as the country was very populous, the towns were very thickly scattered. For a similar reason among the Greeks and Romans, the scene of meeting for all matters of business was the market-place, or forum, because they were all merchants.* Among the Jews, the judges took their seats immediately after morning prayers, and continued till the end of the sixth hour, or twelve o'clock; and their authority, though not in capital cases, continued to be respected by the Israelites long after Jerusalem was levelled with the ground.t With the aid of the particulars stated above, the reader may have been enabled to form some notion of the civil and political circumstances of the ancient Hebrews. They enjoyed the utmost degree of freedom that was consistent with the objects of regular society, acknowledging no authority but that of the laws as administered by the elders of their tribes and the heads of their families. The equality of their property, too, and the sameness of their occupations, precluded the rise of those distinctions in social life which, whatever may be their use in older nations, are opposed by all the habits of a people whose sole cares are yet devoted to the culture of their fields and the safety of their flocks. The form of government which suits best with such a distribution of wealth and employment is unquestionably that which was established by Moses on the basis of the ancient patriarchal rule. But it is worthy of notice, that this model, so convenient in the earliest stage of social existence, was imperceptibly changed by the increasing power and intelli * Fleury, Mœurs des Israelites, xxv. Lewis, Orig. Heb. lib. i. 6. |