or in case of a private right, on behalf of the person to whom the duty is due (1879, People v. Central, etc., R. Co., 41 Mich. 166; 1898, State v. Spokane St. R. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 67 Am. St. Rep. 739; 1900, Mercur v. Media El. L., etc., Co., 7 Del. Co. Rep. 586); but see, 1897, Baylor v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 183 Pa. St. 167, 63 Am. St. Rep. 749,

but not to enforce a mere optional corporate privilege or to control discretion, 1871, State v. Canal, etc., R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 333; 1887, People v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58, 58 Am. Rep. 484; 1893, Florida, etc., R. Co. v. State, 31 Fla. 482, 34 Am. St. Rep. 30; 1895, State v. Richards, 16 Mont. 145, 50 Am. St. Rep. 476; 1896, State v. Board, etc., 134 Mo. 296, 56 Am. St. Rep. 503. See generally, 1885, Richardson v. Swift, 7 Houst. (Del.) 137, 40 Am. St. Rep. 127 (History of the Writ); notes, 89 Am. Dec. 728; 98 Am. Dec. 375; 51 Am. Rep. 78; 3 Am. St. Rep. 807; 7 Am. St. Rep. 484; 37 Am. St. Rep. 317; 59 Am. St. Rep. 198.

2. Particular applications:

(1) As to members.

(a) To compel admission of duly qualified persons: 1865, People v. Medical Soc., 32 N. Y. 187; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408, supra, p. 136; 1879, State v. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 670. See further note, supra, p.1171, § 354, and note 59 Am. St. Rep. 198. (b) To restore to membership, when unlawfully deprived, 1875, People v. N. Y. B. S. of Masons, 6 Thomp. & Co. 85, 3 Hun 361; 1899, Weiss v. Mus. Mut., etc., Union, 189 Pa. St. 446, 69 Am. St. Rep. 820. See further note, supra, p. 1171, § 354.

But see, contra, 1855, Union Church of Africans v. Sanders, 1 Houst. (Del.) 100, 63 Am. Dec. 187; 1879, State v. Hebrew Cong., etc., 30 La. Ann. 205, 33 Am. Rep. 217; 1883, Sale v. First Baptist Church, 62 Iowa 26, 49 Am. Rep. 136.

(c) To compel the calling of meetings, 1875, State v. Wright, 10 Nev. 167; 1878, People v. Cummings, 72 N. Y. 433.

(d) To compel the transfer of stock, on the books of the company by seller, or purchaser, or by sheriff under execution sale, 1868, Bailey v. Strohecker, 38 Ga. 259, 95 Am. Dec. 388; 1883, State v. First Nat'l Bank of Jeffersonville, 89 Ind. 302; see, infra, § 569.

But see, contra, 1872, Kimball v. Union Water Co., 44 Cal. 173, 13 Am. Rep. 157; 1879, Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365, 32 Am. Rep. 315; 1884, Treon v. Carriage Co., 42 O. S. 31, 51 Am. Rep. 794, note 798; 1886, Tobey v. Hakes, 54 Conn. 274, 1 Am. St. Rep. 114.

(e) To compel inspection of books, by members; 1898, Weihenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245; 1899, In re Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 45 L. R. A. 461, 53 N. E. Rep. 1103; 1899, State v. Pacific Br. Co., 21 Wash. 451, infra, p. 1645; 1900, In re Journal Pub. Co., 30 Miscl. (N. Y.) 326, 63 N. Y. S. 465; compare, 1899, Mathews v. McClaughry, 83 Ill. App. 224; 1899, In re Pierson, 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 215, 60 N. Y. S. 671; 1900, People v. Am. Un. L. Ins. Co., 31 Miscl. (N. Y.) 617, 64 N. Y. S. 916.

See further note, infra, p.1651, § 551.

As to inspecting books of foreign corporations, see, 1885, Richardson v. Swift, 7 Houst. (Del.) 137, 40 Am. St. Rep. 127; infra, p. 1653; 1898, Weihenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325; 1899, In re Crosby, 59 N. Y. S. 340; 1899, In re Rappleye, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 84, 59 N. Y. S. 338, infra, p. 1651.

(2) As to third parties or the public.

(a) To compel inspection of books by public officers: 1865, Firemens Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc., 23 Md. 296; 1869, People v. State Ins. Co., 19 Mich. 392; 1898, State v. Real Estate, etc., Assn., 151 Ind. 502, 51 N. E. Rep. 1061; 1899, State v. Workingmen's, etc., Assn., 152 Ind. 278, 53 N. E. Rep. 168.

(b) To pay taxes assessed upon its stock, 1874, Emory v. State, 41 Md. 38; 1875, Barney v. State, 42 Md. 480; 1885, Town of St. Albans v. National Car Co., 57 Vt. 68.

(c) To enforce religious trusts, 1848, People v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397; 1872, Feizel v. Trustees of First German Soc., 9 Kan. 592.

(d) To compel cemetery association to permit burial; 1876, Mt. Moriah C. A. v. Commw., 81 Pa. St. 235, 22 Am. Rep. 743.

(e) To compel gas companies to furnish gas to one complying with requisite conditions, on the same terms as others; 1870, People v. Manhattan G. L. Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 136; 1900, Mercur v. Media El. L. Co., 7 Del. Co. Rep. 586; compare, 1900, Mackin v. Portland Gas Co., 38 Ore. 120, 61 Pac. Rep. 134; 1902, Snell v. Clinton El. L. Co., 196 Ill. 626, 89 Am. St. R. 341.

(f) To compel city water companies to furnish water; 1891, Haugen v. Albina L., etc., Co., 21 Ore. 411; 1895, Am. Water W. v. State, 46 Neb. 194, 50 Am. St. Rep. 610; 1899, People v. Water Co., 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 413; 1893, State v. Joplin Water-W., 52 Mo. App. 312.

(g) To compel an irrigating company to furnish water; 1880, Price v. Riverside, etc., Irrigating Co., 56 Cal. 431; 1887, Wheeler v. Northern, etc., Co., 10 Colo. 582, 3 Am. St. Rep. 603; 1892, Combs v. Ag. Ditch Co., 17 Colo. 146, 31 Am. St. Rep. 275; 1898, People v. Farmers' High L., etc., Co., 54 Pac. Rep. 626.

(h) To compel telephone, telegraph and news gathering companies to furnish service to those complying with reasonable regulations.

1885, State v. Nebraska T. Co., 17 Neb. 126, 52 Am. Rep. 404; 1888, Central Union Tel. Co. v. State, 118 Ind. 194, 10 Am. St. Rep. 114; 1888, Commer. Union Tel. Co. v. N. E. Tel. Co., 61 Vt. 241, 15 Am. St. Rep. 893; 1889, West U. Tel. Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, 15 Am. St. Rep. 109; 1890, Central Union T. Co. v. State, 123 Ind. 113; 1898, Nebraska Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Neb. 627; 1899, Cumberland Tel. & T. Co. v. Morgans L. & T. Co., 51 La. Ann. 29, 24 So. 803; 1900 Inter Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 75 Am. St. Rep. 184. Contra, 1881, American Rap. Tel. Co. v. Conn. Tel. Co., 49 Conn. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 237, note 241; 1898, In re Baldwinsville Tel. Co., 24 Miscl. (N. Y.) 221, 53 N. Y. S. 574.

(i) To compel ditch, canal, irrigating, or railroad companies to construct and repair bridges, viaducts, farm and street crossings over their ways. 1871, Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. State, 37 Ind. 489; 1873, People v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Ill. 118; 1877, People v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569; 1880, Boggs v. R. Co., 54 Ia. 435; 1884, New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12; 1885, Fresno v. Fowler Sw. C. Co., 68 Cal. 359; 1885, State v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 33 Kan. 176; 1886, State v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 35 Minn. 131, 59 Am. Rep. 313; 1888, State v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 39 Minn. 219; 1888, Cummins v. R. Co., 115 Ind. 417, 18 N. E. Rep. 6; 1889, City of Oskosh v. R. Co., 74 Wis. 534, 43 N. W. Rep. 489; 1890, Commw. v. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 58, 20 Atl. 951; 1891, State v. C. M. & N. R. Co., 79 Wis. 259, 12 L. R. A. 180; 1892, Moundsville v. Ohio R. Co., 37 W. Va. 92; 1892, State v. Jacksonville St. R., 29 Fla. 590; 1896, C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 55 St. 557, 41 L. R. A. 481, s. c. (1898) 170 U. S. 57; 1897, State v. L. E. & W. R. Co., 83 Fed. 284; 1898, Chicago G. W. R. v. People, 79 Ill. App. 529; 1898, State v. R. R. Co., 71 Conn. 43.

Compare, 1899, People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 158 N. Y. 410, 53 N. E. 166. (j) To compel a railroad company to build its road according to its charter or articles of association, or the statute under which it is organized. 1819, Rex v. Severn & Wye R. R. Co., 2 Barn. & Ald. 646, 7 Eng. R. Co. 445; 1849, Cohen v. Wilkinson, 12 Beav. 125; 1856, State v. North Eastern R. Co., 9 Rich. Law (S. C.) 247, 67 Am. Dec. 551, supra, p. 44;. 1861, State v. Hartford, etc., R. Co., 29 Conn. 538; 1871, State v. Southern Minn. R. Co., 18 Minn. 40; 1873, Railroad Commrs. v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 63 Me. 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208; 1898, State v. Spokane St. R. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 67 Am. St. Rep. 739; compare, 1900, State v. Cowgill, etc., Co., 156 Mo. 620, 57 S. W. Rep. 1008.

See the next paragraph (k).

(k) To compel a railroad company to operate its road according to its charter: 1819, Rex v. Severn & Wye R. R., 2 Barn. & Ald. 646; 1873, Railroad Commissioners v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 63 Maine 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208; 1878, State v. S., C. & P. R. Co., 7 Neb. 357; 1885, State v. Repub. Valley R. Co., 17 Neb. 647; 1893, City of Potwin Place v. Topeka R. Co., 51 Kan. 609, 37 Am.

St. Rep. 312; 1898, State v. Spokane St. R. Co., 19 Wash. 518, 67 Am. St. Rep. 739; 1899, People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 Ill. 594; 1899, City of Bridgeton v. Bridgeton, etc., Co., 62 N. J. Law 592, 43 Atl. Rep. 715; compare, 1890, People v. Colorado Central R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 638; contra, 1886, People v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 103 N. Y. 95; 1887, People v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58, 58 Am. Rep. 484; 1892, Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Dustan, 142 U. S. 492; 1895, State v. Mo. Pac. R., 55 Kan. 708, 49 Am. St. Rep. 278; 1897, San Antonio St. R. v. Texas, 90 Texas 520, 59 Am. St. Rep. 484.

(1) To compel transportation companies to furnish facilities for transpor tation without discrimination: 1869, Commonwealth v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 254; 1870, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 55 Ill. 95, 8 Am. Rep. 631; 1881, Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 469, 10 Saw. 441; 1886, State v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 48 N. J. Law 55, 57 Am. Rep. 543; 1887, State v. Fremont, etc., R. Co., 22 Neb. 313; 1887, People v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 120 Ill. 48; 1890, People v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 638; 1891, Cornigton, etc., Co. y. Keith, 139 U. S. 128; 1893, Savannah v. Ogeechee C. Co. v. Shuman, 91 Ga. 400, 44 Am. St. Rep.43; 1898, People v. St. L., A. & T. H. Co., 176 Ill. 512, 52 N. E. Rep. 292; 1898, AttorneyGeneral v. Am. Ex. Co., 118 Mich. 682, 77 N. W. Rep. 317; 1899, People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 Ill. 594; 1899, Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 97 Va. 26, 32 S. E. Rep. 775; 1900, State v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1850, 28 So. Rep. 284; contra, 1886, People v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 103 N. Y. 95; 1887, People v. Ñ. Y., etc., R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58; 1892, Northern Pạc. R. Co. v. Dustan, 142 U. S. 492; 1895, State v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 55 Kan. 708, 49 Am. St. Rep. 278; 1897, Saylor v. Penn. Canal Co., 183 Pa. St. 167, 63 Am. St. Rep. 749.

Sec. 423. (3) Indictment.

See State v. The N. E. R. R. Co., 9 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 247, 67 Am. Dec. 551, supra, p. 44.

See, also, Art. II, supra, p. 1283, §§ 400-402.

Sec. 424. B. In courts of equity.

(1) Dissolution,—general rule.

HUNT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. THE LE GRAND ROLLER SKATING RINK COMPANY ET AL.1

1892. IN THE Supreme Court OF ILLINOIS. 143 Ill. Rep. 118-127.

[Appeal from superior court.]

BAKER, J. This was an information in equity, filed in the superior court of Cook county by the attorney-general, for and in behalf of the people of the state of Illinois, against the Le Grand Roller Skating Rink Company, otherwise called the Le Grand Company, and its stockholders, under section 25 of the corporations act, to dissolve the corporation and obtain a decree declaring the forfeiture of its charter and franchises. The superior court sustained a demurrer to the information, and dismissed the same out of court.

1 Only part of opinion given.

Two questions are discussed in the briefs and arguments of counsel: First, the right and authority of the attorney-general to file an information in equity under section 25 of the corporations act; and second, the sufficiency of the information here filed to warrant the relief prayed for therein. In the view we have taken of the matter it is necessary to consider only the first of these questions.

All of said section that is material to the present inquiry reads as follows: "If any corporation or its authorized agents shall do or refrain from doing any act which shall subject it to a forfeiture of its charter or corporate powers, or shall allow any execution or decree of any court of record for a payment of money, after demand made by the officer, to be returned 'no property found,' or to remain unsatisfied for not less than ten days after such demand, or shall dissolve or cease doing business, leaving debts unpaid, suits in equity may be brought against all persons who were stockholders at the time, or liable in any way for the debts of the corporation by joining the corporation in such suit, and each stockholder may be required to pay his pro rata share of such debts or liabilities to the extent of the unpaid portion of his stock after exhausting the assets of such corporation; and if any stockholder shall not have property enough to satisfy his portion of such debts or liabilities, then the amount shall be divided equally among all the remaining solvent stockholders. And courts of equity shall have full power, on good cause shown, to dissolve or close up the business of any corporation, to appoint a receiver therefor, who shall have authority, by the name of the receiver of such corporation (giving the name), to sue in all courts and do all things necessary to closing up its affairs, as commanded by the decree of such court."

ter.

The doctrine of the common law is that a corporation can not be dissolved at the instance of an individual, and that the state, or the attorney-general, as the representative of the state, is a necessary party to any suit to dissolve a corporation for a forfeiture of its charBut it is entirely competent for the legislative power to provide, by statute, for the absolute and final dissolution of a corporation at a suit of an individual, even though that is no part of the usual or general jurisdiction of either a court of law or a court of chancery. (Folger v. Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267; Mickles v. Rochester City Bank, 11 Paige 118, 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 304, and authorities cited in note 1.) It is not only the rule that without authority from statute a corporation can not be dissolved at the suit of an individual, but it is also the rule that without statutory authority a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation.

We think it clear that it was the intention of the legislature, by the enactment of said section 25, to afford remedies to creditors of corporations for the enforcement of their private and personal rights, and this even to the extent of permitting courts of equity, for good cause shown, to decree the dissolution of the corporation sued.

There being no power at common law to file this information, and no authority in the statutes unless it can be deduced from said section

25 of the corporations act itself, the question arises whether it was the legislative intention to confer by that section upon the attorneygeneral power to bring suits in equity to dissolve corporations. No language is used in the section that expresses such intention. The apparent scope of the section is merely to provide remedies to individuals for the enforcement of private and personal rights. The state and the attorney-general already had, and still have, full and adequate remedies at law for the enforcement of forfeitures of corporate charters and franchises and the dissolving of corporations, by writs of scire facias and by informations in the nature of quo warranto. So there was no occasion for vesting the attorney-general with power to bring suits in equity, unless it was contemplated, as a matter of public policy, to impose upon the state the duty of winding up the affairs of all corporations organized under the corporations act.

In our opinion the superior court was right in its conclusion that the attorney-general is not authorized by law to file a bill or information in equity, under section 25 of the act concerning corporations, for the purpose of dissolving a corporation for a forfeiture of its

charter.

The decree is affirmed.

Note. As a general rule, in the absence of special statutory authority, courts of equity have no jurisdiction to decree a dissolution of a corporation: 1830, Society v. Morris Canal Co., 1 Saxton (N. J.) 157, 21 Am. Dec. 41; 1831, Attorney-General v. Stevens, 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 369, 22 Am. Dec. 526; 1868, Folger v. Columbia Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 268, 96 Am. Dec. 747; 1877, Thornton v. Marginal Frt. Co., 123 Mass. 32; 1878, Hardon v. Newton, 14 Blatch. 376; 1879, Rice v. Nat'l Bank, 126 Mass. 300; 1880, Demke v. N. Ý. & R. Cement Co., 80 N. Y. 599; 1882, Strong v. McCogg, 55 Wis. 624; 1882, AttorneyGeneral v. Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361; 1892, Wheeler v. Pullman I. & S. Co., 143 Ill. 197; 1893, Repub., etc., Co. v. Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 24 L. R. A. 776; 1893, Mason v. Supreme Court, 77 Md. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 433; 1897, Wallace v. Pierce W. Pub. Co., 101 Iowa 313, 63 Am. St. Rep. 389, 38 L. R. A. 122, infra, p. 1747; 1900, Law v. Rich, 47 W. Va. 634, 35 S. È. Rep. 858. See next case.

Sec. 425. Same. Exception.

MINER v. THE BELLE ISLE ICE COMPANY, ET AL.1

1892. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN. 93 Mich. Rep. 97118, 53 N. W. Rep. 218.

[Bill for a receiver, an accounting, and to wind up the affairs of the ice company. In 1874, Miner and Lorman were partners in the ice business, and joint owners of property valued at $23,500. They concluded to form a corporation, and Miner put in $1,500 more, and the corporation was formed with a capital stock of $25,000, 1,000 shares of $25 each, Miner and Lorman with 435 shares each, I. J. C. 30 shares and L. C. 100 shares. In 1882 some difficulty arose between 1Statement abridged; only part of opinion given.