Mr. WEAVER. And that was Wednesday afternoon? Dr. GALLINA. I would say-I remember that conversation Thursday morning. Mr. WEAVER. Thursday. Excuse me, you had a question. Mr. TERRELL. I just wanted to get Mr. Higgins you said there were periodic losses of power during the day. You mean offsite power? Mr. HIGGINS. Not complete offsite power, but to localized panels within the plant, which were Mr. TERRELL. Would it not be recorded in the chronological sequence of events that you had losses of power that may have triggered the pressure spikes in the containment building? Mr. HIGGINS. I do not think that the spike-this spike that we had was caused by an electrical transient. But it is possible that quite often when you have electrical transients you do get spikes in equipment. So it is possible the operators may have thought that. Mr. TERRELL. Would that be a significant factor in the course of events over this period of time? Mr. HIGGINS. There was not loss of power; there were some localized losses of power to particular panels within the plant. The plant's power supply, the electrical distribution system is very complex. It comes from offsite, and it is cascaded down through various electrical distribution buses and switchboards and breaker cabinets and this type of thing. And at portions during the day, some portions, some pieces of equipment did lose power. Mr. TERRELL. You do not know why? Mr. HIGGINS. I was not able-that was really peripheral, and I was not able to follow that. As I said, I was following-because of the other things, I was following at the time Mr. CRESWELL. That was more likely due to cables shorting out, perhaps due to moisture resulting in Mr. TERRELL. Did this electrical problem occur with some degree of frequency during the course of events on March 28. Mr. HIGGINS. I don't know what the frequency is. Mr. CRESWELL. This was later on in the afternoon. Mr. TERRELL. Of Wednesday? Wednesday afternoon? Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Mr. WEAVER. But nothing serious-this did not cause any serious problem? Mr. CRESWELL. This was not safety related equipment affected. Mr. HIGGINS. They did lose at one point all the radiation monitors in the unit 2 control room; they were deenergized. Mr. CHENEY. What about the movement of water Mr. HIGGINS. And they were reenergized Mr. CHENEY [continuing]. From the sump in the containment building to the auxiliary building. Mr. HIGGINS. What about that? Mr. CHENEY. Was that accidental, automatic, or what? Mr. HIGGINS. I think again I would refer that to Jim Creswell. Mr. CRESWELL. Those sump pumps came on automatically whenever the water level attained a certain level in the sump, and they-I do not recall how long they pumped, but they were shut off from outside Mr. CHENEY. Did they only pump one time and then never ag Mr. CRESWELL. As I recall, that is the case, yes. Mr. CHENEY. And that was fairly early on in the incident? Mr. CRESWELL. That is before any substantial fuel damage. activity levels more than likely were activity levels that you wo expect during the formal course of operation, not indicating Mr. CHENEY. Was this not the source of most of the off radioactivity? Mr. CRESWELL. Well, there is another leakage path that we investigating right now, but we have no concrete-we cannot mak concrete statement. Dr. GALLINA. The primary source, we believe, was the water in aux building. There was another path, but I think once they pum] out the flow drains in the aux building, the releases decrea dramatically. Mr. CHENEY. Would it be fair to say in general, pending obtaini additional information, that the-if that transfer of water had occurred, there would not have been-there would have been low offsite releases? Mr. CRESWELL. This transfer of water occurred very early on, rig around 4 o'clock, and substantial fuel damage was done after 6 a. Dr. GALLINA. Well, it is still primary coolant. Mr. CRESWELL. It is still primary coolant. Dr. GALLINA. Quite a bit of activity. Mr. CHENEY. Some gases Dr. GALLINA. When the one operator went down there, he said i was reading 10 r per hour in the puddle, and the puddle was approx mately 1 foot deep on the floor. So any puddle of water readin was Mr. TERRELL. When did you say the sump pump came on; 71⁄2 mi utes into the event? Mr. CRESWELL. That sounds reasonable. Dr. GALLINA. You have to realize, too, this water is under very hig pressure, so any gases that are dissolved are kept in solution. As soo as they are out into the sump and out into the auxiliary building, th gases come off, the readily dissolved gases. Mr. CHENEY. Well, does anyone else have anything they want t ask? Mr. HOLMES. I have a question I would like to ask. In your inspec tions of the different reactors that you have been exposed to, the different types of plants which have been designed like General Elec tric and these, what is your opinion on the relative level of automation from the feedback signals and automatically controlled areas required handling these problems? How does this plant compare to other plants that you have run into? Mr. HIGGINS. I am not-I do not have the detailed knowledge of all the electrical schematics and circuitry. From my level of knowledge, I would say it is similar. The automation in the control rooms are similar. They are certainly different between plants, and they sense different parameters and they control using different components. And certainly the levels of feedback would vary between the major vendors, General Electric, Westinghouse, and so forth. But they do vary from plant to plant even from the same vendor. But in general, I would say it is similar, although there certainly are differences when you get into detail and the magnitudes of the types of things you are asking about. Mr. HOLMES. So you do not sense that there is any further bit of information that need be displayed on the panels in the sense of these horns and lights going off in these systems as opposed to the ones here? Mr. HIGGINS. No; I do not think there would be a major difference in the number of alarms or horns between-if this had happened at a boiling water reactor or another vendor's pressurized water reactor; no, I do not. Mr. CHENEY. Early in your comments today you were asked if there were too many people in the control room. You indicated, I believe, that you felt the problem was not that there were too many people in the control room, so much as it was some people who could provide key pieces of information not present. Is that an accurate interpretation? Mr. HIGGINS. I think that is true, and the reason I say that- Mr. HIGGINS. If there was somebody-and I do not know if anybody could have done this-but if there was somebody that could have assimilated the information as the event was happening and presented the type of thing that Mr. Michelson did here, that certainly would have been very valuable during the incident. But I do not know that anybody with all that was going on could have done that type of thing. Mr. CHENEY. Did you see Mr. Michelson's presentation? Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Mr. CHENEY. Has he in his presentation-is there anything in your mind, based on his experience, being onsite a week afterward, that would be inconsistent with what he presented here, any piece of information or evidence that conflicts Mr. HIGGINS. I do not see any errors of fact. He may have come to a wrong conclusion, which I was not independently able to check or verify. Mr. CHENEY. I understand. But you did not see any fundamental conflict? Mr. HIGGINS. No. Mr. CHENEY. Henry, do you know if Jim is coming back? Mr. REIS. He should be back in a few minutes. Mr. CHENEY. I do not have any more questions. I am sure we could go on all day, but I would like to thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. HIGGINS. You are welcome. Mr. CHENEY. Anything else? Dr. MYERS. We had asked Mr. Allen, also from region I, but it would seem Mr. SCOVILLE. Could you hold on just a second until Mr. Weaver returns to the room just to make sure Mr. HIGGINS. Sure. [Pause.] [Whereupon, at 6:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] ACCIDENT AT THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWERPLANT FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1979 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 10:10 a.m. in room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. James Weaver presiding. Present: Representatives Weaver, Carr, Markey, Vento, and Cheney. Staff present: Messrs. Reis, Myers, Scoville, Thurber, Burnam, and Terrell. Also present: Edward Frederick, Craig Faust, William Zewe, Gary Miller, and Frederick Sheimann. Mr. WEAVER. The task force will come to order. We continue our inquiry into the facts of the Three Mile Island accident beginning on March 28, 1979. We are very pleased to have two fine people with us today. Would you please identify yourselves. There is a recorder here. Do not let that worry you. We want some record of the questions and answers. So if you would, just identify yourselves, where you work, and what you were doing on the morning of March 28. Would you please start? PANEL FROM THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT NO. 2, METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES, CONSISTING OF EDWARD FREDERICK, CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR; CRAIG FAUST, CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR Mr. FREDERICK. My name is Ed Frederick. I am a control room operator for Metropolitan Edison Co. at Three Mile Island Unit No. 2. I was the control room operator on duty when the accident occurred. Mr. WEAVER. What is a control room operator? Mr. FREDERICK. A control room operator is a licensed person, licensed by the NRC, who is designated to operate the controls of a nuclear powerplant, for which he is qualified, and no one else is allowed to touch the controls unless he is licensed. Mr. WEAVER. Turn those knobs? Mr. FREDERICK. Touch the switches or in any way manipulate the controls that could in some way affect the state of the reactor. Mr. WEAVER. On one shift how many control room operators are there? Mr. FREDERICK. On our shift there are two control room operators licensed with reactor operator licenses. There is a foreman and a supervisor, each with senior reactor operator licenses. So four licenses |