REVISION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY

ACT OF 1946

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3690) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, S. 3690, and its companion bill, H. R. 9757, represents the first major revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Heretofore amendments in the nature of corrections or improvements in the original legislation have been adopted, but as time has gone on the development of the atomic-energy program has been such that, in the opinion of the joint committee and of the Atomic Energy Commission and of public and private groups generally, revision of the act of 1946 is desirable and in fact essential in the national interest. Indeed, the original act, as passed in 1946, contemplated that such changes from time to time would be indicated as we learned more about the program and as the practical uses for atomic energy became increasingly apparent.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed after months of study of the problem by a special Senate committee established under Senate Resolution 179 of the 79th Congress, second session. At that time it was impossible to evaluate the possibilities of the utilization of atomic energy because of the novelty of the development and the lack of any experience in peacetime

uses.

Due to the fact that in 1946 the proven practical use was almost entirely in the field of weapons, although the envisioned peacetime uses seemed limitless, it was considered necessary to establish, for the time being, a strict Government monopoly and control over the use and application of atomic

knowledge. At that time the United States had exclusive possession of all of the data that had been developed. Other nations, notably Great Britain and Canada, had through their scientists made substantial contribution to the development of this program, but they did not possess all of the information. Also at that time we were the exclusive possessors of atomic weapons, and we undertook not only a stewardship of the weapons, but also of the information on their production and development as a force which could maintain peace and prevent, for as long a time as possible, any other nation with predatory intentions from securing the know-how and threatening the security of the world.

In the original act, as pointed out above, it was contemplated our objectives would eventually be to open up as rapidly as possible the opportunities for private initiative to develop peacetime phases of this science, and that as rapidly as possible the Government monopoly, except in the weapon field, Iwould be abandoned and free enterprise in this country and abroad would be given the opportunity to attack the problems of peacetime development.

We did not retain our exclusive knowledge in atomic energy for very long. At no time did we assume that no other nation would ever succeed in making atomic weapons or in developing atomic knowledge independently, but we learned all too soon that traitors and spies had disclosed much of our fundamental information to the Kremlin which enabled Russian scientists, with the essential cooperation of German scientists who had been taken to Russia after World War II, to make atomic weapons several years earlier than under their own independent efforts.

In addition, British scientists and

science, having contributed substantially to our own development program, were able to go forward with their own program and make atomic weapons. This, of course, is no surprise because of the recognized high degree of competence and development of British scientists and British science. Canada, while apparently electing not to accentuate the weapon phase of atomic energy, nevertheless has done important work in research and development pointed toward peacetime applications.

So that I may not be misunderstood, I want to emphasize that while the United States devoted vast amounts of money and effort toward the development of weapons, we have devoted a very substantial portion of our effort toward research and the development of peacetime uses in the fields of biology and medicine and industrial applications; in fact, many times the effort in these fields of all other countries of the world put together. So, again, I want to make it clear that our military research and development has not excluded the research and development in the humanitarian and economic fields.

We still possess vast superiority in weapon power, in spite of the fact that other nations can make atomic weapons. By the same token there is no doubt in my mind when I say that we also are more advanced than any other nation in the exploration and knowledge of the peacetime possibilities of atomic use.

So far as weapons are concerned, 8 years ago, they were considered to be only strategic weapons, to be used at long range and against limited strategic targets. Today, the concept has altered substantially and while the strategic use is still one of the most important, the practical tactical use of atomic weapons in support of the operation of ground forces is an important part of our military plan. Indeed, today we have atomic weapons of varying degrees of power and effect in our arsenal, which are available for use

both tactically and strategically, and we have developed the means for their delivery.

Also 8 years ago the prospects of useful atomic power for the production of electricity in all of its varied uses seemed to be very remote indeed. The problems of military security and the vast expense involved in experimentation then were practical deterrents for private investment. Today, however, the use of atomic power in the economy of this country and in other countries is much more clearly envisioned. While competitive power probably will not be a reality for a number of years, even with the advanced knowledge which we now possess, nevertheless, we believe that the time has come when the way to reduced costs has probably been pointed out sufficiently to justify private investment and experimentation with reasonable chances-in fact, I think I may be safe in saying with practical certainty—that the genius of private enterprise and free competition can develop economically sound competitive power plants much sooner than was earlier considered possible.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has, as directed in the original act, maintained constant studies of the entire program. This committee has unique powers and authority for access to information and has assumed a great responsibility to the other Members of the Congress and to the American people. This responsibility has been accentuated because of the essential secrecy involved in the program. It has been my privilege, along with the junior Senator from Colorado [Mr. MILLIKIN], the senior Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], to serve on this committee, and on the special committee which reported the original act, at all times since late 1945. Representatives COLE of New York, DURHAM, HINSHAW, HOLIFIELD, VAN ZANDT, and PRICE have likewise served continuously on the joint committee since its creation.

The other members of the joint committee have served for substantial periods. I would be remiss in my statement to the Congress if I did not say that this committee has been free from partisan political motivation in the discharge of its responsibilities, and while the partisan membership has altered slightly from time to time, nevertheless, I can envision no situation where unpartisanship and nonpartisanship have been more in evidence than in the 8 years' history of the joint committee's operations.

In this bill, S. 3690, and its companion bill, H. R. 9757, there are at the present time certain areas of disagreement which are set forth in the dissenting views of various members of the committee. It no doubt is a practical impossibility to get complete agreement on every sentence, paragraph, and section of a bill of such complexity as the Atomic Energy Act, but I assure my colleagues that any views of individual members are presented with the utmost impartiality so far as any partisan influences may be concerned, and they express their own views as they see them in the broad public interest.

With respect to the names of Members of Congress who have served continuously on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to which I made reference a moment ago, I wish to say that while the distinguished senior Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] did not enter the Senate until 2 or 3 months after the committee began to function, he has, nevertheless, served continuously on the committee since he entered the Senate, and so, for all practical purposes, should be included in the list of Members who have continuously served on the joint committee.

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Under all the circumstances and as a result of the years of experience and developing of information which has come to the joint committee, the committee concluded last year that the time

had come when a comprehensive revision of the basic Atomic Energy Act should be undertaken. Accordingly hearings were held throughout the latter part of last year and for over 3 months of this year. For many weeks past the committee has taken the results of these hearings and its accumulated information, and has worked long and diligently in attempting to perfect S. 3690 and H. R. 9757, the bill which is before us today.

The basic aim of S. 3690 endeavors to bring the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 into harmony with the realities of 1954. It endeavors to keep our legislative controls over atomic energy in step with the changing problems our Nation faces in this field—problems not only in the realm of science and technology but in the realm of economics and international political relations as well. It protects our vital military secrets but it proposes to open the opportunities for peacetime uses to our own people as well as to others.

The members of the joint committee have not been alone in believing that a revision of the organic law is now desirable. On February 17, President Eisenhower submitted to the

Con

gress a series of recommendations for amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. His message said that the changes proposed by the executive branch had the "purpose of strengthening the defense and economy of the United States and of the free world." Toward this end, the President sought to accomplish the following:

First, widened cooperation with our allies in certain atomic energy matters;

Second, improved procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic energy information; and

Third, encouragement of broadened participation in the development of peacetime uses of atomic energy in the United States.

The bill now before the Senate will achieve these three objectives set forth in the President's message. In addition, the bill is designed to effect an overall modernization of the organic

law, changing it wherever the members of the joint committee-who have been in daily touch with our atomic program since 1947-have concluded that revisions would advantage our Nation.

In response to the first recommendation in the President's message-increased cooperation with our allies in certain atomic matters-the bill permits such cooperation in both the peacetime and military fields, under carefully stipulated safeguards. On the peacetime side, it authorizes the negotiation of bilateral agreements for cooperation. Under such agreements, the Commission may transfer and exchange restricted data dealing with nonmilitary uses of atomic energy with other nations. The Commission may likewise transfer atomic materials in quantities needed for peacetime uses to another nation which is party to such an agreement for cooperation.

Furthermore, this legislation authorizes the President to enter into international arrangements with a group of nations toward the end of atomic cooperation in the peacetime field, and subsequently to cooperate with such a group of nations pursuant to agreements for cooperation. In this manner, the bill would permit our Government to join in a peacetime international atomic pool plan, such as the President described in his United Nations speech last December 8.

In the area of military applications, the legislation permits the Department of Defense to give another nation, or a regional defense organization to which we are a party, sharply circumscribed restricted data concerning the tactical employment of atomic weapons. The legislation would thereby permit more realistic defense planning among the NATO forces. This bill does not authorize any exchange of information which would reveal important data on the design or fabrication of the nuclear part of atomic weapons, nor does it permit the disclosure of detailed engineering information on other sensitive parts of our weapons.

I believe it is accurate to say that no portion of S. 3690 has received-and rightly so-closer committee attention than those sections dealing with international cooperation. Experience teaches that whenever some particular safeguard against the disclosure of classified information to another nation proves unnecessary, it can always be relaxed. Contrariwise, the act of surrendering exclusive control of some item of information is final, and we cannot call back these data, even if we would subsequently wish to. As a result the joint committee has been cautious in the extreme in its approach to this portion of the bill, and it has recommended carefully delineated changes only in those instances where the need and desirability for increased international cooperation have appeared clear and demonstrable.

In response to the second recommendation of the President-improved procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic information-S. 3690 incorporates a series of revisions which, I believe, will increase the total effectiveness of our program for safeguarding sensitive atomic data.

Presently, all personnel of the Atomic Energy Commission or its contractors who have access to restricted data are given the same background check as to their character, associations, and loyalty—whether such employees have access to large quantities of extremely sensitive information, or whether they require access to only a small quantity of relatively insensitive data. S. 3690 would permit the Atomic Energy Commission to relate the scope of background investigations to the amount and sensitivity of the data which an employee would receive while on the job-thus allowing our investigative agencies to concentrate their efforts on the areas where extremely painstaking checks are most vital. Presently also, much restricted data relates to the military utilization of atomic weapons. Notwithstanding this, the Atomic Energy Commission is

responsible for the control of all restricted data. S. 3690 gives the Department of Defense a larger share of responsibility in both safeguarding and declassifying data which relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons.

It is my conviction that the information-control procedures recommended in S. 3690 do not represent an actual weakening of our security system. I believe, in fact, that the very opposite is true. By revising these procedures in the light of 8 years of experience, S. 3690 should afford our Nation more effective guaranties against the disclosure of sensitive data than it now possesses.

In response to the third recommendation of the President-encouraging broadened participation in the domestic development of peacetime atomic energy-the pending bill authorizes private persons to possess and use special nuclear materials, and to own and operate atomic reactors capable of producing or utilizing such materials. Title to such materials, however, would be retained by the United States Government.

Overall, the Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors have already done a good job in pressing toward economical atomic power. Indeed, it is only because of their impressive achievements that we can now look forward to such power in the relatively near future. But as the Atomic Energy Commission has itself maintained, research and development carried on purely under governmental auspices will no longer suffice to enable us to achieve practical peacetime power at the earliest possible date. Optimum progress now requires that governmental research and development, using the public's money, be supplemented by private research and development, using private money. S. 3690 would encourage such increased private participation in the atomic power field.

Realizing that relatively few com

panies may participate in this effort during the next few years, the joint committee has exhaustively explored the question of how to guard against the dangers of restrictive patent practices. The majority of the committee has recommended that, in the case of all such patents which are applied for during the next 5 years, the holders of patents or inventions primarily related to peacetime uses of atomic energy be required to license such patents to others in return for just compensation.

In making its recommendations on the subject of peacetime power development, the joint committee has been keenly aware of its responsibility to write legislation which will benefit all the American people, and which will not permit one group of Americans to benefit unduly at the expense of the rest of our national community. I sincerely believe that the proposed legislation will accomplish that purpose.

Taken in its entirety, S. 3690 is a complicated and highly technical bill. It is complex because the problems we face in atomic energy are complex. Notwithstanding that fact, the basic philosophy which motivated the joint

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committee in its consideration of the proposed legislation is straightforward and easy to describe. Our guiding principle has been this: Which type of legislation will best promote the security and the well-being of our Republic? We do not expect every Member of the Senate to agree with every single provision of the pending bill. During the course of our deliberations on the bill, I believe that every member of the joint committee at one time yielded on some specific point or another. Yet none of us has compromised on fundamentals, and I think the fact that the committee has come into substantial accord on the essentials of the proposed legislation speaks well for it.

S. 3690 does not pretend to represent