-Not only the narrative of general Lee, but the history of our Revolutionary struggle at all times, and in every part of the Union, furnishes the most direct and awful lessons of experience on all these points: And yet how incomprehensibly,how lamentably,-have they not failed to produce their natural, one would have thought necessary, effect, with the present administration of this country, in the conduct of the unhallowed war, which they have undertaken. The transactions on our frontiers for the few months, past, argue a degree of improvidence, and of rashness, that looks like a sudden and wrathful visitation of Divine Providence, rather than the consequence of native imbecility of mind, united to the most blind and intemperate passion.

The Appendix to this work, contains some well written, and highly entertaining biographical notices. Among the number, those of major general baron de Kalb, and general Morgan, deserve to be particularly mentioned. There is another name, prominent, too, in almost every page of the work, to which our attention was particularly attracted; that of colonel John Eager Howard. The career of this officer in the South has, we think, a character, even of more usefulness, and brilliancy, than that of any one of his associates in arms. He may be said to have decided, in one instance, the cause of independence. He is to be found in almost every action of any importance, pressing into the thickest of the fight with his intrepid corps, and rendering the most important service both by his courage and judgment. There is now no individual of the surviving revolutionary officers, to whom the United States owe such heavy obligations. This gentleman is, however, one of those, who are now stigmatized as tories;who, would not, if they were so disposed, be permitted, to serve their country once more, in that elevation of military. rank, to which their experience and capacity entitle them. In the same class is the author of these Memoirs. We do not wish, in tenderness to the American name, to revive the recollection of the horrid catastrophe at Baltimore, in which he was so conspicuous a victim; but we cannot refrain from the reflection, how far he must have been from expecting, when he fought by the side of Greene, that he would ever be proscribed as a tory, or ever bear the mark of wounds inflicted by an infuriate mob, in the land which he then served, with such entire and generous devotion. To call up a blush into the cheek, of every American not absolutely callous to the national disgrace, he has but to produce these Memoirs. They will, we trust, soon be, on every account, in the hands of all his countrymen.

231

Observations on the Report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which prefaced the Decrees concerning the New Organization of the National Guard, published in the Moniteur of the 16th of March 1812.

[WE have recently obtained from abroad, a small pamphlet, with the foregoing title, ascribed upon good authority, to the pen of Mr. Gentz, who is so deservedly classed, among the first political writers of his time. As it treats of matters, in which the American people have an immediate interest, and is written with considerable ability, we shall present them with a translation, (the original being in French) of the sections of it, to which we attach most importance. The Despot of France has so often appealed to the treaty of Utrecht, as the basis of his pretensions in favour of maritime rights, that it has become of some consequence for the world, to ascertain the true character, and force of this celebrated treaty. Mr. Gentz has, in the following pages, investigated and determined the question, in a manner fitted to convince every understanding, and to deprive the French government, of all colour of defence, for the imposition it has attempted in this instance. The French Ministerial Report, to which the author refers, throughout his pamphlet, and which must be familiar to most of our readers, will be found in the appendix to our present number.]

THIS Report, which may be considered, as the introductory Manifesto of the terrible war, now about to be commenced, is but an exposition of the pretended encroachments of England on neutral rights, in maritime hostilities, and of the measures successively adopted by France to avenge and protect those rights. The author of the Report begins by asserting, "that the rights of maritime neutrality, were solemnly "regulated, by the treaty of Utrecht become the common law "of nations," and " that this law has been re-enacted verbatim "in all subsequent treaties." He thence proceeds to a recital of the "arbitrary and tyrannical edicts," by which England has violated the principles of the treaty of Utrecht, and of the acts of reprisal with which France had combated those edicts; and the general result is the urgent necessity, of employing all the disposable forces of France, to exclude neutrals from certain ports at the extremity of the continent, into which they might introduce a few bales of English merchandize.

The French government must imagine, that its cotemporaries reduced to a state of the most pitiable stupidity, have lost, together with the desire, or the power of resistance, even the remembrance of all that has happened in their own time;

even the last vestige of the history and ancient public law of Europe; or at least, the faculty of reading, comparing, and reflecting. Otherwise, it would not hold out to them as diplomatic oracles, fables so clumsily put together, that the most credulous reader, must regard, in the light of an insult, the attempt to impose them on his belief.

A satisfactory refutation of each part, or rather of every phrase, of this Report, would not be a difficult task. I shall restrict myself, however, at present, to a succinct examination of the questions of right. My object will be accomplished, if I succeed in proving,

1st. That the treaty of Utrecht, at the very period of its signature, was not,-could not be, and was never pretended to be," the common law of nations with respect to maritime rights."

2dly. That this treaty, far from acquiring afterwards, an extension, or force other than that which it originally possessed, had not the most remote connexion, with any of the subsequent events, and political relations.

3dly. That, in the strife in which France and England have, since the year 1806, been engaged, to lay the com merce of all countries of the world under reciprocal interdiction, France must be considered as the real agressor.

4thly. That the principles asserted in the Manifesto of the 16th March, to justify the new war, with which the continent is about to be desolated, are the same,-carried indeed to an unprecedented height of atrocity,--which have distinguished the march of the French government, in every stage of the present contest,

I. For the establishment of a common law of nations, regulating the limits between belligerent, and neutral rights in maritime war, it would seem indispensable, that all independent powers, duly represented in a general congress, should have consulted together, on the principles to be followed in this department of public law, and have produced a code recognized and sanctioned by all the parties interested.

I need not dwell here, on the inadmissibility, and the absurdity even, of a supposition to this effect. It is sufficient, for us to know that no such enterprise has ever been achieved, nor even attempted, and particularly, that the treaty of Utrecht, such as it is, bears no mark of resemblance whatever, to a code of public law, or a common rule of nations.

What is generally styled the treaty of Utrecht, is, as all the world knows, merely a collection of separate treaties, con

cluded between the different powers, that had taken part, in the war of the Spanish succession. Among these treaties, there are to be found three, relating to commerce and navigation: one between France and England; another between England and Spain; the third between France and Holland.

In the treaty between France and England, it is stipulated that, if it should happen to either of these powers, to remain neutral in a maritime war, the flag of such power should cover the merchandize of the enemy of the other; and, in addition, that, by contraband articles subject to confiscation, in every description of vessel, should be understood, only those, which were immediately applicable to the purposes of war. These two points settled, at all times, in a particular and distinct manner, in each particular treaty of navigation, between the nations of the world, formed, at the end of the seventeenth, and the commencement of the eighteenth century, nearly the whole question of neutral rights in maritime war. By the earlier treaties of 1655, and 1677, France and England had, with respect to these points, made the same reciprocal concessions, as those contained in the treaty of Utrecht, and these concessions were renewed and enforced, even in favour of the power supposed to remain neutral, in the famous commercial treaty of 1786.

When attention is given to the relative situation of these two powers, it will no longer be a matter of surprise, that, in all the treaties between them affecting navigation, the greatest latitude of right should be allowed, to the one of them, that might remain neutral during a maritime war of the other. The reason is plain: the supposed event was so improbable, that all that was mutually promised, amounted as it were, to no more than a diplomatic compliment. After the decline of Spain, and subsequently of Holland,-France and England were the two preponderating powers at sea. It was evident, that, directly or indirectly, every maritime war, of whatever importance or duration, must either begin or finish, by being a war between England and France. Such in fact, is the history of all the wars, which have occurred, since the close of the seventeenth century. Nothing was risked, by indulging in the supposition of a maritime war, in which one or the other would be neutral, because the case was difficult even to be imagined. The more they were confirmed in their position of rivals, the more did that rivalry verge towards a state of habitual hostility, and the less did it cost them, to be liberal in stipulations of the kind under review.

But the final arrangements with respect to neutral rights, VOL. IV.

2 G

made by treaty between England and France, did not bind either of the contracting parties, in its relations with other powers: no general principle resulted from them; each party retained the right of making on this head, with any other state, such arrangements as might seem the most easy, or useful.

The treaty of navigation and commerce between England and Spain, forming a sequel to that of peace and amity, which these powers had signed at Utrecht, was but the ratification of a treaty of 1667, which was inserted verbatim in that of 1713. In this treaty, favourable enough, indeed, in other respects for the party, that might eventually wear the character of a neutral, there is no mention made of the maxim, that "free ships make free goods;"-an important fact, demonstrating in the first place, how slender was the connexion, between these separate treaties, and in the second, how far the doctrine just mentioned, was, from being considered, as a law generally established, or of universal jurisdiction. For, if such had been the light in which it was viewed, the silence of a formal treaty, on a point of so great importance, would be wholly inexplicable.

The treaty of commerce between France and Holland, signed at Utrecht, having had no reference to England, I need not give it any attention.

As for the other powers of Europe,-as for those even that took part in the negotiations of Utrecht, or were included in the several treaties, such as Portugal, Prussia, Sweden, Savoy, Tuscany, Genoa, Venice, &c. not a word was uttered determining their maritime rights, or the limits of their future neutrality, neither upon any general principle, nor in relation to any one of the powers, who had co-operated in the general pacification.

To know precisely what idea the French government must itself have entertained, of the character of these stipulations, concerning neutral rights, and of the degree of propriety with which they could have been asserted, as general principles, we have but to glance at the laws, which then constituted the maritime code of France herself.

No country has exerted more severity, in her legislation against the freedom of neutrals in maritime war, than France. The ordonnances of Francis I. (1536 and 1543),-of Henry II. (1554),-of Charles IX. (1569),—of Henry III. (1584), &c., had all enacted without any reservation, "that ene"my's goods should subject to confiscation, not only all mer"chandize laden with them, but even the ship itself to whom