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devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

SECTION 19 OF TITLE 3 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE ENTITLED "VACANCY IN OFFICES OF BOTH PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT; OFFICERS ELIGIBLE TO ACT"

(a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.

(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this subsection.

(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section, a Speaker is to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.

(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, except that—

(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the Vice President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice President qualifies; and

(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded on whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such individuals. (d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Postmaster General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor.

(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service.

(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as President.

(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them.

(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the case of the President (June 25, 1948, ch. 644, sec. 1, 62 Stat. 672).

Senator LANGER. We will consider them all at one time, will we, Mr. Chairman?

Senator KEFAUVER. We will consider these all at one time, and anymore that may be introduced during the time we are having our hearings.

The very able counsel of our subcommittee is Mr. Wayne Smithey, who is a specialist in constitutional problems.

I had a very short statement which I will direct to be printed in the record at this point.

Before we proceed to hear testimony this afternoon, I think it would be well for me, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, to make a few remarks.

Any amendment to the Constitution is a matter of serious import. It is particularly so when, as here, we are dealing with the Office of the Presidency of the United States, which is probably the most important office in the free world. Serious though it may be, this is not the first instance in which the Congress and the people of the United States have had occasion to focus their attention on possible ambiguities in the clause of the Constitution relating to the succession to the Presidency during periods when the President is disabled.

During the Garfield and Wilson administrations, the Nation was confronted with vivid illustrations of the impasse which may result when a President of the United States is incapacitated. Despite their experience, the legislators of those eras did not succeed in fashioning a solution to the problem. Today, however, the President of the United States, having been himself subjected to illnesses of a serious nature during his term of office, has urged that the Congress submit a proposed constitutional amendment to State legislatures for ratification. We have, in addition, in answer to my inquiry, as chairman of this subcommittee, received suggestions from two former Presidents, Herbert Hoover and Harry S. Truman whose communications I will submit for inclusion in the record at the close of my remarks. With these expressions before us, we may now proceed in a nonpartisan manner to seek to overcome a formidable obstacle, namely, the decision as to what individual or group is best qualified to determine when the President is disabled and when he has recovered sufficiently to undertake the powers and duties of his office.

The subcommittee is scheduled to hold hearings today and later on this issue. It is likely when we have completed today's hearing that it will be necessary to hold additional hearings. We want the best advice which it is possible to obtain. We seek, and indeed we have already sought, to secure the thoughts of some of the most knowledgeable and able men in the United States. If this subcommittee, and ultimately the Congress, may come to an agreement concerning a desirable alternative to the existing constitutional provisions, we will have served to assure the undisturbed operation of our highest office not only for ourselves but for all the peoples of the world who look to this Nation for leadership in the preservation of democratic institutions.

(The statements referred to above are as follows:)

THE KEY LARGO ANGLERS CLUB,
Homestead, Fla., January 20, 1958.

Hon. ESTES KEFAUVER,

Chairman, Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have received your kind note requesting my views on the proposed bills you send me.

I assume that the question is solely the method of determining the "inability" of the President "to discharge the powers and duties of his office," and contained in it also the method of determining the "removal of disability.”

All questions of succession seem covered by article II, section 1, paragraph 5 of the Constitution, and therefore legislation on this subject seems to me unnecessary.

1. There seems to be some question as to whether remedy can be found by statutory law or must be through constitutional amendment. The Congress will need decide whether the above-mentioned section in the Constitution would be sufficient authority for a statutory solution.

2. It seems to me that the method of determining "inability" or "recovery" requires consideration of the spirit of the separation of powers in the Government and certain traditional practices which have become fixed in our national life during the past 150 years.

3. The President and the Vice President are elected as the chosen leaders of a political party with declared mandates, principles, solutions of issues. and promises to the people.

4. The Congress, in one or both Houses, is often controlled by an opposition political party, and thus by those who are, in practice, mostly opposed to the mandates or promises upon which the President and Vice President are elected by the people.

5. All of which leads me to the generalization that a President's inability to serve or his possible restoration to office should be determined by the leading officials in the executive branch, as they are of the party having the responsibilities determined by the election.

6. I believe that a simple amendment to the Constitution (or possibly statutory law) could provide for a commission made up from the executive branch to make the determinations required. I do not suggest that the individual persons be named but that the departments or agencies be enumerated, whose chief official or head should be a member of such a commission. The number could well be limited to not less than 7 and not more than 15 such heads of departments or agencies. There could be a further provision that they should seek the advice of a panel of experienced physicians or surgeons.

I cannot conceive of any circumstance when such a defined body of leaders from the executive branch would act in these circumstances otherwise than in the national interest.

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DEAR ESTES: In reply to your letter of the 10th, I am sending you a copy of an article of mine, written for the North American Newspaper Alliance, which covers the subject of a President's inability to carry on his duties.

These are my views, and if you want to make use of the article, you are at liberty to do so.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

HARRY TRUMAN.

(Copyright by Harry S. Truman, 1957)

There has been an understandable reluctance to deal with the delicate and sensitive problem of what we are to do when any President becomes incapacitated and is unable to perform his duties.

Our Founding Fathers did not provide for such an eventuality. During the 168 years of our history under the Constitution, there have been only two occasions when the question arose of a President's ability to serve. I refer to James A. Garfield and Woodrow Wilson. We have been fortunate, indeed, that we have not had to face such a crisis more often.

But the job of the President is getting to be an almost unendurable mental and physical burden, and we ought not to go on trusting to luck to see us through. We may find that we have waited too long to provide a way of meeting the situation in the event a President becomes incapacitated. There have been suggestions to deal with the matter through legislation. Others have proposed amending the Constitution.

However we deal with it eventually, this is too vital a matter to be acted on hastily without the widest discussion and study. I have felt that there is always great danger in writing too much into the Constitution. We must have cerain

flexibility to meet changing conditions. We have already experienced the consequences of hastily amending the Constitution without adequate public discussion, as in the cases of the 18th and the 22d amendments.

In response to the many letters I have received on the subject from all parts of the country, and the world, I am taking the liberty of suggesting a way to meet this problem.

I would like to make it perfectly clear that it is not my intention to cast reflections on anyone, or to raise any doubts about the health or condition of the President. Along with all of our citizens, I wish him good health and a long life.

But there is a growing concern about our needs to provide against the danger of a lapse in the functioning of the Presidency and the crises that might ensue. The power of the President of the United States and his influence on the world today have grown so great this his well-being is of paramount interest to people everywhere. It is no longer a matter to be decided by political leaders and constitutional authority.

Even a minor indisposition of the President will set into motion unexpected and often unreasoning fears, such as we have recently witnessed.

The framers of our Constitution drafted a brilliant and inspired document in which they anticipated and provided for nearly all of the basic developments of our democracy. But who could fully foresee the role of the American Presidency in the kind of a world in which we now live-a role which also requires the President to be available in person at any hour to make decisions which he alone can make and which cannot be put off?

As Vice President, I found myself acutely conscious of this problem in a personal way when I met President Roosevelt upon his return from Yalta. Up to that time I regarded the circumstances of an incapacitated President as an academic problem in history, such as was posed by Presidents Garfield and Wilson.

After the first shock of seeing President Roosevelt, I tried to dismiss from my mind the ominous thoughts of a possible breakdown, counting on his ability to bounce back from the strains and stress of office. After Yalta, President Roosevelt continued to carry on with sustained energy and alertness—until suddenly called by death.

From the day I succeeded to the Presidency, I have been thinking about the needs of an act of legislation to provide machinery to meet the emergency of a President's disability.

Shortly after taking office, I considered setting up a commission to study the problem and make recommendations. But in the midst of war and during the period of postwar reconstruction we were preoccupied with more immediate and urgent matters.

I therefore chose instead to recommend to the Congress a change by statute of succession to the Presidency from the Cabinet to the Congress in the event the Nation was without a Vice President. Up to that time the Secretary of State was next in order of succession. I did not think that a Cabinet officerwho is not elected by the people-should succeed to the Presidency, which is an elective office. The Speaker of the House, who is, in fact, the top-ranking elected public official after the President and the Vice President, is now under the new law next in succession.

This, however, does not meet the problem when a President is unable to perform the duties of his office.

I suggest, therefore, that the following proposal may provide us with a workable solution:

1. When a President is stricken with an illness, raising the question of his ability to carry out the duties of his office, there should come into being a Committee of Seven composed of representatives of the three branches of the Government. This Committee should consist of the Vice President, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. This Committee would select a board of leading medical authorities drawn from top medical schools of the Nation. This medical board, thus chosen, would then make the necessary examinations presenting their findings to the Committee of Seven. Should the findings of the medical board indicate that the President is unable to perform his duties, and that he is, in fact, truly incapacitated and not merely stricken with a transitory illness, then the Committee of Seven would so inform the Congress. Congress then would have the right to act, and by a two-thirds vote of the full membership declare the Vice President as President.

The Vice President, designated as President, would thereupon serve out the full term of his predecessor. Should the stricken President, thus relieved, experience during this term a complete recovery, he would not be entitled to repossess the office.

Should the Congress be in adjournment or recess when a President is incapacitated, the Vice President, the Speaker, and Chief Justice should call a meeting of the Committee of Seven. This Committee, after receiving the medical findings, would have authority to call Congress into special session for the purpose of declaring the Vice President as President.

2. When a Vice President succeeds to the Presidency and leaves the office of the Vice President vacant, the last electoral college should be called into session by the new President for the purpose of selecting and declaring a new Vice President. I would recommend that in every instance where a Vice President succeeds to an unexpired term of a President the electoral college be convened to choose a new Vice President.

By this procedure I think we would be able to ensure the proper continuance of the functioning of the Presidency and, at the same time, protect the Nation's paramount interests through the full exercise of the checks and balances of our free democratic institutions.

I suggest procedure along these broad general lines could be enacted into law by statute. If necessary, these provisions could be framed into a constitutional amendment.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Langer, do you wish to make any comment on the subject at the present time?

Senator LANGER. I do not, except to say I think we ought to go into the matter very completely and clearly. It is a matter of great importance and I think we ought to take all the time necessary to do a good job.

Senator KEFAUVER. I know the Senator's feelings about it, and I know his contribution to the thinking on this subject will be most valuable.

Senator Dirksen, do you wish to make any comments or observations?

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Chairman, I think my comments would be rather in the nature of questions, and my first question is this: Is it your judgment that if this matter were to be handled by statute rather than constitutional amendment, this particular subcommittee should proceed with the statutory application or statutory remedy for this condition, on the theory that we might very likely decide that we could handle it by statute rather than by amendment? That is a jurisdictional question.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes.

Senator DIRKSEN. And I do not know whether or not this subcommittee would have authority to go ahead with it.

Senator KEFAUVER. Of course, on the question of whether the problem can be handled by legislation or whether it will require a constitutional amendment, that is one of the subjects that we will have to have hearings on and thrash out. It is a serious subject.

I have spoken to Senator Eastland with reference to this very problem, and I feel that he wants this subcommittee to have hearings and make recommendations or reports either in the field of a joint resolution for a constitutional amendment or legislation, in other words, to handle the whole subject.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now my second question is this: In view of the statement made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that it was their desire, after conferring on the matter, that the Court not be considered in this as an agency or as individuals that should share

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