its modifications, but also of the non ego. In other words, he taught the doctrine of natural realism or dualism, in opposition to that of cosmothetic idealism, the doctrine of those who hold the existence of an external world-a world, however, unknown in itself, and therefore asserted only as an hypothesis. He held this consciousness of the external world, however, to be only of the primary qualities of matter, the secondary being known through a mediate representation. Mr. Mill differs from him, in thinking that all our knowledge of the non ego is a matter of inference alone, and that our knowledge is only representative and largely derived from our sensations, and when he abandons his usual method of cross-examining Hamilton and turns to the statement of his own philosophy in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters, he becomes deeply interesting and instructive. But while he gives a simpler and less dogmatic view of the units of human knowledge than Sir William Hamilton, what he says is only the complete statement of views which are maintained in the sixth book of his Logic. He reduces, like Comte, all our knowledge to phenomena. The external world of matter is defined as the permanent possibility of sensation; the consciousness is resolved into "sucursions of feeling." But Mr. Mill has himself assisted us to see the inadequacy of his psychological theory to cover the whole ground. He says:

"Besides present feelings, and possibilities of present feeling, there is another class of phenomena to be included in an enumeration of the elements making up our conception of mind. The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life, consists not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and expectations. Now, what are these? In themselves they are present feelings, states of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished from sensations. They all, moreover, resemble some given sensations and feelings, of which we have previously had experience. But they are attended with the peculiarity, that each of them involves a belief in more than its own present existence. A sensation involves only this; but a remembrance of sensation, even if not referred to any particular date, involves the suggestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a copy or representation, actually existed in the past; and an expectation involves the belief, more or less positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which it

directly refers, will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved in these two states of consciousness be adequately expressed, without saying, that the belief they include is that I myself formerly had, or that I myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered or expected. The fact believed is, that the sensations did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or thread of consciousness, of which the remembrance or expectation of those sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something dif ferent from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself.

"The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability, at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observed, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts. . . . . . I think, by far the wisest thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place."1

This is granting all we demand. It concedes the truth of the Hamiltonian philosophy on this point, and this once granted, we have a datum of consciousness, a self-active intelligence, (not a machine,) a power of self which distinguishes between self and not-self, and by necessary inference, the fact of the existence of matter. Now add Mr. Mill's psychological results to this postulate of intelligence, and you have the means of arriving at the sum of human knowledge. It should be remarked that here he touches the ground, which, in controversy with Mr. Mansel, he laid down as the basis of our true philosophical knowledge of God. It shows that there is a mental unknown, call it datum of consciousness or inexplicable fact, to which every philosopher, whatever may be his theory of the powers of mind, must refer for the residuum of human intelligence: so that Mr. Mill and Sir W. Hamilton actually approach each other and shake hands, by however diverse methods. Mr. Mill may be more accurate in his logical processes than his antagonist, and his own theory is the simpler one and so less easily becomes inconsistent, yet he has failed to prove his points at the

'Examination, Vol. I, pp. 260, 261, 262.
8

VOL. VI.-NO. XXXI.

very step where conclusive proof was indispensable. We do not care to follow him through this most interesting and valuable part of his book, because we entirely agree that the chief part of our knowledge is gained through observation and experience, and are ready to call him master in all the logical methods of induction. We even grant that the law of inseparable association can be made to account for many of the beliefs which have often been held necessary, and are convinced that all the discoveries which are to be made in speculative philosophy are hereafter to be gained through the method which he inculcates. We put our trust in the positive method of reducing the phenomena of mind to the accurate classifications of science, as much as Mr. Mill.

The next point in this discussion is his attempt to refute Sir W. Hamilton's theory of Causation. Hamilton states that, in addition to cause and effect, there is a first Cause which accounts for substances themselves, that this is creative energy, and that this power resides in the Divine mind. Mr. Mill faults this

conception of cause because it is a reflex of "the power of our Self over our volitions." It is based on the analogy of human experience. He himself is a strict causationist, but he sees in cause only invariable antecedence. This coincides with the

doctrine of philosophical necessity as stated in his Logic, "that, given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred." But while he detects the flaws in Hamilton's scheme, we fail to be satisfied that we have no other notion of cause than the relation between antecedent and consequent. The design-argument we do not now insist upon; but our own observation and experience of cause and effect, whether the product of inseparable association or an original belief, irresistibly leads us away to a beginning and a Beginner, and the mind refuses to be satisfied with anything short of this. Expressed in set terms, Hamilton's theory of causation may be contradictory, but something like it has been the deeply rooted conviction of all races of men; and it seems to us to be a part of that image of God in man, which convinces us that the in

1 System of Logic, p. 522.

tuitions of man are not unlike in kind to the thought of God. If this conviction is not a postulate of consciousness, it has been acquired through Revelation, and this does not at all impair its truth.

In connection with the theory of causation is the Freedom of the Will, which as a philosophical dogma Mr. Mill attempts to refute. In this we do not think he is successful. He thinks that we are not conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest motive, and therefore that the balancing of motives is not a power of consciousness. In reply, we say, that even if we do yield to the stronger motive, we are conscious of the power of choice; and this is all that the freedom of the will need mean.. The idea of balancing and then acting wilfully, which Mr. Mill supposes necessary, is not at all so. Having refuted, as he thinks, this view of the case, he turns to the argument from moral responsibility. "Responsibility," he says, "means punishment." Then he attempts to show that the idea of punishment, including that of justice, is not given in consciousness, but derived from the teaching of others. Punishment, he holds, is amply justified on grounds of utility, and moral responsibility ceases to be anything more than the answer to a human tribunal. In such a light, the freedom of the will shrivels to a figment, or is lost in the invariable uniformity of law. This in brief is his refutation of Hamilton. Does it answer its purpose? His interpretation of moral responsibility is not broad enough. If the judgment of right and wrong be latent till called forth by experience, does it not point to a moral intelligence resident in man, which is not in antagonism to an intelligent Creator? In one view, Mr. Mill's statement of the opposition of freedom or liberty in man to the invariable laws by which we are governed, seems true; but in another, and even on his own showing, in his attempt to reduce, in the System of Logic, the laws of human character to scientific method, his own admission of the play of unregulated forces in man gives the postulate of freedom which we demand. Neither philosopher makes a satisfactory argument. Hamilton's is too mystical. Mill's is too narrow in its induction.

Thus far we have dealt only with Mr. Mill as a speculative philosopher, and we are deeply conscious that such a brief criti

cism of the main topics, omitting entirely the discussions on Logic, is unsatisfactory; yet these salient points are really the only vital things in the work. The discussion of Hamilton's views is often one-sided and partial, not probably intentionally, but from the logical thoroughness of Mr. Mill's mind, which incapacitates him often to see on both sides of a straight line. His Examination he calls an attempt "to anticipate, so far as is yet possible, the judgment of posterity upon Sir W. Hamilton's labors" but while he may not maintain the same rank as a philosopher which he held before this attack, we do not regard Mr. Mill's logical inductions as entitled to full belief. It is an apparent, not a real victory. We say this, with a prejudice for neither side, and conscious that the truth lies between the two extremes here indicated.

1

His treatment of moral questions is confined chiefly to a tract on Utilitarianism in the Dissertations and Discussions, and to the Essays upon Dr. Whewell's Moral Philosophy, Prof. Sedgwick's Discourse, Bentham, and Coleridge. It is also set forth in the System of Logic; but all that is necessary to our purpose is contained in the tract. This was written latest and embraces all that he has said elsewhere. Mr. Mill is a most consistent and earnest advocate of the utilitarian theory. "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." He makes right and wrong questions of observation and experience." He denies that there are innate principles, or a moral sense, which teach us right or wrong directly. The experience of mankind, from the evidence of pleasure and pain, lead us to desire what is pleasant, to avoid what is painful. Thus the science of morals is strictly human and capable of progressive development. A higher civilization gives a higher and juster code, since it brings larger observation and experience. It is true that the happiness principle is always an invariable term, but opinions change as to what the highest happiness is, and in Mr. Mill's opinion should change continually for the better. According to the theory of utility, therefore, there is no invariable standard.

1 Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. III., p. 308.