failed to give such credit to the Illinois statute as it was required to give under Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and the Act of Congress passed to carry it into effect (§ 905, Rev. Stat.). Upon an examination of the record, we are unable to perceive that the Kentucky court failed to accord to the Illinois statute the credit to which it was entitled under the Federal system. The court recognized the existence of the statute and its validity, as pleaded by defendant and as admitted by plaintiff's demurrer. It also recognized the relevancy of the statute to the question in controversy, and either admitted or assumed that it had the effect of limiting the powers of defendant with respect to issuing policies of insurance, so far as the terms of the statute extended. Thereupon it became necessary for the court in the due performance of its judicial function to interpret the meaning of the enactment, in order to determine whether it evidenced the purpose of the law-making body to limit the powers of the corporations with respect to business conducted beyond the confines of the State of its origin. So doing, the court held as follows (147 Kentucky, 490, 491): "Upon an inspection of the whole act we are satisfied that the section above quoted was not intended by the Legislature of Illinois to have an extra territorial effect. It was only intended to regulate the business done in Illinois. The act is a general one governing this character of business and evidently refers to business done in Illinois. When in a charter of an incorporated company restrictions are imposed as to the kind of business it may do, such limitations upon the power of the company ordinarily follow it wherever it goes, that is, when such a company comes into another State, it has only the powers which its charter confers. But that is not this case. The act in question is a general law regulating insurance companies and was evidently designed as a 235 U. S. Opinion of the Court. regulation of the business in the State of Illinois. It has no application to the business done in Kentucky." It does not appear that the court's attention was called to any decision by the courts of Illinois placing a different construction, or indeed any construction, upon the section in question. If such decision existed, it was incumbent upon defendant to prove it as matter of fact. We are referred to no authoritative judicial construction of the statute in the State of its origin, nor have we searched for any, for what is matter of fact in the state court is matter of fact in this court upon review; and this applies where foreign law is in question in the state court as well as to any other issue of fact. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 6; Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, 622. It is earnestly argued that the court erred in its construction of the Illinois statute. We do not pass upon this question, deeming it to be outside of the limits of our jurisdiction; for it is settled that where in a state court the validity of an act of the legislature of another State is not in question, and the controversy turns merely upon its interpretation or construction, no question arises under the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal Constitution. Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360; Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 222, 227; Banholzer v. New York Life Insurance Co., 178 U. S. 402, 406; Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U. S. 458, 464; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 51; Texas & N. O. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408, 416. Judgment affirmed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE Concurs in the result. 235 U.S. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. WIGGER, ALIAS MOOSE JOHN. ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA, FOURTH DIVISION. No. 349. Argued October 23, 1914.-Decided November 30, 1914. The act of the legislature of Alaska of April 26, 1913, so amending § 43 of Title II of the Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure enacted by Congress March 3, 1899, that several charges against any person for similar offenses can properly be joined in one indictment, was within the power delegated by Congress to the legislature of Alaska by the act of August 24, 1912. The clause in § 3 of the act of August 24, 1912, providing that all laws theretofore passed by Congress establishing executive and judicial departments in Alaska should continue until amended or repealed by Congress, related to laws establishing such departments and not merely regulating procedure, and the form of indictment was open to amendment by the territorial legislature. THE facts, which involve the validity and construction of an act of the territorial legislature of Alaska amending § 43 of Title II of the Alaska Code of Civil Procedure so as to permit one indictment for several offenses of the same class, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren for the United States. There was no appearance or brief filed for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court. The grand jury returned an indictment against defendant in error containing three counts, charging him with as many different violations of the criminal laws in force 235 U.S. Opinion of the Court. in Alaska. He demurred upon the ground (among others) that more than one crime was charged. The demurrer was sustained by the District Court upon this ground, and the case comes here under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. The other grounds of the demurrer need not be further noticed. By § 43 of Title II of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1899 (Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure, c. 429, 30 Stat. 1253, 1290; Comp. Laws of Alaska, § 2152), it was declared that "the indictment must charge but one crime, and in one form only; except that where the crime may be committed by use of different means the indictment may allege the means in the alternative." And by § 90 of the same Code (30 Stat. 1294; Comp. Laws of Alaska, § 2199), the defendant was entitled to demur where more than one crime was charged. But by an act of the legislature of Alaska, approved April 26, 1913 (Sess. Laws, p. 65), it was enacted that § 43 of Title II of the act just mentioned should be amended to read (like § 1024, Rev. Stat.) as follows: "When there are several charges against any person for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts or transactions of the same class of crimes or offenses, which may be properly joined, instead of having several indictments the whole may be joined in one indictment in separate counts; and if two or more indictments are found in such cases, the court may order them to be consolidated." The sole question presented for decision is whether this act of the territorial legislature was efficacious to amend the act of Congress. In Summers v. United States, 231 U. S. 92, 105, the validity of the territorial act was assumed; but no question had been raised about it. Local powers of legislation were first conferred upon Alaska by act of Congress of August 24, 1912, c. 387, 37 Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S. Stat. 512, of which the most pertinent clauses are set forth in the margin. The scope of the authority of the 1 1 An Act to create a legislative assembly in the Territory of Alaska, to confer legislative power thereon, and for other purposes. * * * * * SEC. 3. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF UNITED STATES EXTENDED.That the Constitution of the United States, and all the laws thereof which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in the United States; that all the laws of the United States heretofore passed establishing the executive and judicial departments in Alaska shall continue in full force and effect until amended or repealed by Act of Congress; that except as herein provided all laws now in force in Alaska shall continue in full force and effect until altered, amended, or repealed by Congress or by the legislature: Provided, That the authority herein granted to the - legislature to alter, amend, modify, and repeal laws in force in Alaska shall not extend to the customs, internal-revenue, postal, or other general laws of the United States or to the game, fish, and fur-seal laws and laws relating to fur-bearing animals of the United States applicable to Alaska, or to the laws of the United States providing fc. taxes on business and trade, or to the act entitled "An Act to provide for the construction and maintenance of roads, the establishment and maintenance of schools, and the care and support of insane persons in the District of Alaska, and for other purposes," approved January twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and five, and the several Acts amendatory thereof: Provided further, That this provision shall not operate to prevent the legislature from imposing other and additional taxes or licenses. And the legislature shall pass no law depriving the judges and officers of the district court of Alaska of any authority, jurisdiction, or function exercised by like judges or officers of district courts of the United States. SEC. 4. THE LEGISLATURE.-That the legislative power and authority of said Territory shall be vested in a legislature, which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives. * * SEC. 9. LEGISLATIVE POWER-LIMITATIONS.-The legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil; [Here follow numerous express limitations none of which has reference to the present subject.] |