the amount of those claims?' Mr. Goodwyn: 'We never checked them.' Mr. Dearing (counsel for the railroad company): 'My idea is that the Commission can easily check them, and you and I can check them if we come to the position that they are entitled to the reparation.' Mr. McChord: 'You deny it all?' Mr. Dearing: 'Yes.' Mr. McChord: 'I will put all these claims in as exhibits. Some of these have not been made up by the complainants, and we will want to fill them in later.' Mr. Dearing: 'That will be all right.' Mr. McChord: 'Shall I put them in now?' Mr. Siler: 'Yes, or at any time."" In short, the record shows that the only question made respecting the reparation claims was the general contention that the rates charged by the company were in fact not unreasonable or extortionate; and that it was in effect conceded that the particular amounts claimed were proper to be awarded as reparation, if the rates charged were determined to be unreasonable and extortionate.

We have already seen that there was evidence to support the Commission's affirmative finding upon the latter point. And this leaves no basis, as we think, for appellant's present attack upon § 829 as repugnant to the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the proceeding before the Commission there were pleadings sufficiently formal, and appellant was perImitted to raise such issues and introduce such evidence as it desired. There is nothing to show that it suffered for lack of compulsory process against witnesses. As to its right to adduce evidence before the court in the action to enforce payment of the award, its complaint in this regard seems to us at least premature. There is nothing to show that it has or could have any defence to the payment of the reparation that it has not already either interposed or waived in the proceeding before the Commission, or to show that it has any evidence to be adduced before the court that it would be prevented from introducing by the VOL. CCXXXV-39

effect of the restriction contained in § 829. This court does not sit to pass upon moot questions; and, as has been often pointed out, it is incumbent upon one who seeks an adjudication that a state statute is repugnant to the Federal Constitution to show that he is within the class with respect to whom it is unconstitutional, and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 161; Southern Railway v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 534; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 550; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 544.

The order of the District Court should be, and it is Affirmed.

HENDRICK v. STATE OF MARYLAND.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,

STATE OF MARYLAND.

No. 77. Argued November 11, 12, 1914.-Decided January 5, 1915.

Only those whose rights are directly affected can properly question the constitutionality of a state statute and invoke the jurisdiction of this court in respect thereto.

Where a state statute provides as a prerequisite to the use of the highways of a State without cost by residents of other States compliance with the highway laws of their respective States, one who does not show such compliance cannot set up a claim for discrimination in this particular.

Quare, and not now decided, whether the Motor Vehicle Law of Maryland so discriminates against residents of the District of Columbia as to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws in that respect. This court will assume, in the absence of a definite and authoritative ruling of the courts of a State to the contrary, that

235 U.S.

Counsel for Plaintiff in Error.

when a statute shall be construed by the highest court, discrimination against the residents of a particular State or Territory will be denied.

The movement of motor vehicles over highways being attended by constant and serious dangers to the public and also being abnormally destructive to the highways is a proper subject of police regulation by the State.

In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a State may prescribe uniform regulations necessary for safety and order in respect to operation of motor vehicles on its highways including those moving in interstate commerce.

A reasonable graduated license fee on motor vehicles when imposed on those engaged in interstate commerce does not constitute a direct and material burden on such commerce and render the act imposing such fee void under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. A State may require registration of motor vehicles; and a reasonable license fee is not unconstitutional as denial of equal protection of the laws because graduated according to the horse power of the engine. Such a classification is reasonable.

The reasonableness of the State's action is always subject to inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress.

A State which, at its own expense, furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce may exact compensation therefor; and if the charges are reasonable and uniform they constitute no burden on interstate commerce. The action of the State in such respect must be treated as correct unless the contrary is made to appear.

A state motor vehicle law imposing reasonable license fees on motors, including those of non-residents, does not interfere with rights of citizens of the United States to pass through the State. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, distinguished.

THE facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law of Maryland and their application to citizens of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Jackson H. Ralston and Mr. Osborne I. Yellott, with whom Mr. Clement L. Bouve and Mr. William E. Richardson were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

235 U. S.

The act is an illegal attempt to regulate interstate com

merce.

Passing into or through States of the Union in automobiles is an act of interstate commerce.

The matter of interstate transportation of passengers is one capable of uniform regulation and legislation, and is thus exclusively within the domain of Congress and wholly apart from regulation or interference on the part of the States.

Where, in subjects requiring uniformity of legislation, such as interstate transportation of passengers, the state law comes into direct conflict with the commerce clause, it is illegal, although a bona fide attempt to exercise the police power of the State.

The exaction of license and registration fees as conditional to the privilege of the use of the roads of the State of Maryland is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce directly, and imposes a burden on such commerce.

The Maryland law is unconstitutional, as violative of the rights of citizens of the United States to pass into and through Maryland.

The Motor Vehicle Law discriminates unconstitutionally against the residents of the District of Columbia.

The Motor Vehicle Law is further unconstitutional, in that it is not a bona fide exercise of the police power of the State, but an unlawful attempt to collect revenue for the State.

The law is unconstitutional in that the registration fees provided for and graded according to differing scales of payment have no relation to the necessary expense of identification or control of motor vehicles, and constitutes arbitrary, unequal, unfair, and class legislation, and does not insure to the citizens of the United States equal protection of the laws.

The tax imposed is not laid as compensation for the use of the roads.

235 U. S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

In support of these contentions see Adams Express Co. v. The Auditor, 166 U. S. 976; Bowman v. C. & N. W. R. R., 125 U. S. 465; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Covington Bridge v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Fargo v. Stevens, 121 U. S. 230; Fed. Cas., No. 18260; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Mayor, 141 U. S. 679; Hendrick v. Maryland, 115 Maryland, 552; Int. Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Leisy v. Hardin, 100 U. S. 135; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; License Cases, 5 How. 504, 592; Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 75; Pickard v. Pullman Co., 117 U. S. 34; Pullman Co. v. Twombly, 29 Fed: Rep. 667; Railroad Co. v. Hasen, 95 U. S. 465; Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U. S. 489; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 394; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; United States v. Col. & N. W. R. R., 157 Fed. Rep. 325; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 295; Williams v. Fears, 50 L. R. A. 685; Cooley on Const. Lim., 5th ed., p. 501; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., p. 99; 8 Cyc., p. 1042; Miller on Const. Law, p. 260; Public General Laws of Maryland, 1910, ch. 207, §§ 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 140a, 1400, 140p, 140r.

Mr. Enos S. Stockbridge and Mr. Edgar Allan Poe, Attorney General of the State of Maryland, for defendant in error:

The act of 1910 is a valid exercise of police power by the State of Maryland.

There are not any new or unusual principles involved in this case, but simply the application of doctrines long recognized, and at this late date thoroughly crystallized. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, this court has rec