I do say that of the 9 cases approved by the President 7 were of minor commercial significance.

This record, I repeat, might have been expected, had not three Presidents in succession, in talking to the Nation, repeatedly given assurances that no domestic industry would be placed in jeopardy by the trade agreements program.

Evidently that was for public consumption and to avoid the spread of dissatisfaction to the general public from the industries that have been turned away.

The Congress has on its part on three occasions amended the escape clause to make certain that its intent was clear.

Yet no difference could subsequently be detected in the final outcome of the cases brought under the amended law.

The inevitable conclusion is that so long as this absolute power to override the Tariff Commission is allowed to reside in the President precisely so long will the future experience with the escape clause remain the same as in the past.

That is why the executive power should be curbed in the very delegation of authority itself. This should be done in such a manner that Congress will be able to determine how its delegation of power under the escape clause is to be carried out.

As it is, this is impossible because the President cannot be restrained since he acknowledges no guidelines established by Congress and feels free to do as he wishes with a power that belongs to the Congress and not to him.

Mr. Chairman, there are several alternate ways by which the law could be amended to assure the final authority of Congress in the premises. However, the method proposed in H. R. 12591 is not one of them.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, a word about the State Department and executive policy in this whole field. There is an almost pitiful faith placed in the trade agreements program to pull us out of our international difficulties.

This faith borders on desperation and numbers among its adherents the various women's organizations that believe that trade leads to peace of the world although even now trade is to be used as a weapon of economic warfare against Russia.

The actual value of the trade agreements program to the State Department, however, lies principally in the enhancement of the executive power. It gives the Department more ammunition and a feeling of a broader range of power in negotiations.

It is more than doubtful, however, that the power borrowed from Congress and toward which the Department now adopts an attitude of outright ownership, has really helped our foreign relations.

To a considerable extent the present Russian economic challenge is an outgrowth of the foreign economic policy of this country. Our posture of world economic and political leadership, resting all too heavily upon the principle of buying our way through, has given Russia the means of driving us from pillar to post; also, it has placed a powerful weapon in the hands of countries that seek to play us off against Russia.

So long as our diplomacy continues to proceed on the policy of buying our way through rather than standing on principle, so long will

the State Department continue to ask for additional chips from the people and so long will the need for more chips continue unassuaged. The trade agreements program with its call for further tariff reductions is but a measure of the weakness of our diplomacy.

What is now proposed in H. R. 12591 is more of the same rather than a redirection of a bootless and bottomless policy.

We give our support to the amendment to H. R. 12591 introduced into the Senate on June 24 by Senator Strom Thurmond and strongly urge this committee to adopt it. This would restore some of the balance now lacking in the trade agreements program.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my written statement

I have a few documents that I would like to insert in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection they will be inserted in the record.

Thank you very much, Mr. Strackbein.

Will you briefly explain the Thurmond amendment?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. The Thurmond amendment provides, No. 1, for a 2-year extension, and, No. 2, for Tariff Commission recommendations to be sent to the Congress as well as to the President.

Should the President disagree with the Tariff Commission recommendation and seek to reject it, he would so propose to Congress.

If neither House acted or if a Congress did not take action within 60 days, the Tariff Commission's recommendation would go into effect.

In other words, the burden would be placed upon the President to obtain the approval of Congress to his proposal of rejection.

The difference between that and the present bill, the H. R. 12591, is that the burden in the latter is placed on an industry that has succeeded in gaining a favorable recommendation from the Tariff Commission.

Under the present bill, the bill before this committee, a Presidential veto or rejection of a Tariff Commission recommendation would stand unless overridden by the two-third vote majority of both Houses of Congress. There is a very considerable difference between these two proposals.

In the Thurmond bill recognition is given to the fact that the original power of regulating foreign commerce and the constitutional responsibility of laying and collecting taxes and duties resides in Congress.

The President's right is only secondary. It is a delegated power and, therefore, the bill recognizes that Congress should have the last word, and that it should be the burden of the President to gain the support of Congress rather than the other way around.

To set up an administrative recommendation on the same basis as a law of Congress requiring a two-thirds vote to override the President does not seem to be justified.

A recommendation of the Tariff Commission is not an act of Congress. It is one step in an administrative process, one step in an administrative process, may I repeat, carried out under law that has already been passed and already been signed by the President.

Therefore to put a recommendation of the Tariff Commission and its rejection by the President on the same basis as the overriding of a veto of a law passed by Congress, does not seem to be justified and the Thurmond amendment makes that distinction.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Along with that, the Thurmond amendment would, instead of granting the President 25 percent reduction powers in the tariff, cut that down to 10 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Have you concluded?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Are there any questions?
Senator KERR. Yes.

I want to ask questions.

Is it your concept that the Tariff Commission is an agency of the Congress?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Yes, sir.

Senator KERR. Created by the Congress to carry out a function in connection with the responsibility of the Congress under the Constitution relating to the regulation of trade and commerce?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Correct.

Senator KERR. Then does it not seem like more than delegation of an authority, and rather the abandonment of an authority and repudiation of a responsibility to say that the Executive can nullify or refuse to recognize or consider the recommendation of this agency set up by the Congress unless the Congress then, at a later time, supports its own creature by a two-thirds vote of both Houses?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Yes, Mr. Kerr, I would go along with that, and say that it was in fact, or that the action taken by Congress in granting this power, did in fact result in abandonment by the Congress. Whether it was so intended in the first place or not, it has come to that result.

Senator KERR. I asked you if it was not only a delegation of authority but an abandoning of the responsibility and power placed upon the Congress by the Constitution.

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Yes, I would agree with that except that I do not want to say that Congress intended such abandonment when it delegated this power.

The fact has come about and so I do not suppose it makes much difference whether this was intended by Congress or not.

Senator KERR. I agree with you that they did not intend to. I am only addressing myself in my question to the actual net result of the action.

Mr. STRACKBEIN. I agree with you a hundred percent.

Senator KERR. Do you know who is going to be the next President of the United States?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. No; I have not the remotest idea. I don't even know who the nominees will be.

Senator KERR. Does it not seem like an amazing and, in fact, astounding situation for Congress for a period of 312 years to thus abandon its authority and its responsibility to an identity which not a single Member of the Congress has the remotest idea of who it might be?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. It seems preposterous to me, Mr. Kerr, that such a thing should be proposed, should be seriously proposed."

Senator KERR. And for a period of 32 years to give to a personage whose identity is not known, whose attitudes could not be known, practically complete authority to disregard the overall recommendations made by a creature of the Congress itself?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. I frankly don't believe that the proposal is constitutional; I don't think it carries out the spirit or the letter of the Constitution, and yet it is one of those things that is like the old story where you are told that they cannot put you in jail when in fact you talking through the bars to the person who is in jail.

In other words, this apparently cannot come about but it has come about.

Senator KERR. And is proposed by this bill?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. And it is proposed to bless this with the support and the vote of Congress. To me it is almost inconceivable that Congress should seriously propose taking such a step.

Senator, this is the same as saying to the people back home, to the interests that are clearly at stake, in the matter of increasing imports that for 5 years they will not have a chance to come before Congress and have a bill introduced and heard by the Ways and Means Committee to change the system.

It was always my impression that we had elections in this country for the very purpose of testing the changing sentiment of the country. Now what good would it do to test this change of sentiment in the country if it cannot be expressed in the Halls of Congress?

Senator KERR. In other words, this Congress, if it passed this bill, would be saying, in effect, that an authority vested in the Congress by the Constitution would be denied exercise by the next two Congresses? Mr. STRACKBEIN. Correct.

Senator KERR. But would rest firmly and finally in the hands of the Chief Executive, the identity or attitudes of whom are both unknown at this time by the Congress so delegating that authority? Mr. STRACKBEIN. That is correct.

There is another angle to this, Senator, and that is the position of the State Department.

It is the function of the State Department to carry on our foreign relations. That is their business. They look outwardly from the United States. They try to maintain friendly relations with other countries, and I say that is their function. They are supposed to do that, and they are in their field when they operate in that fashion. Now when this sort of authority is given into their hands to make trade agreements, to use trade as a pawn in diplomacy, I believe that it is entirely human that they should become extremely impatient of anybody, including the Congress of the United States, looking over their shoulder and restraining them.

They feel that they can do this job so much better.

Senator KERR. Would not they have some reason to have that attitude if this Congress gave them that unlimited authority for 32 years beyond the end of this present Executive's term?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. They would feel that they had been confirmed in what they have done and what they have been doing. There is no question about it.

Senator KERR. I want to thank you for your statement. It is one of the best I have heard on this question.

27629-58-pt. 2--2

Are there other questions?

Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.

Senator DOUGLAS. I wondered if I might ask Mr. Strackbein a question or two.

Mr. Strackbein, how frequently do you think that Congress should review tariff policy?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. I think that should depend entirely upon the demand of the interested parties as to how often they thought the law should be reviewed.

In other words, if the law were satisfactory, I see no reason why it should be reviewed in more than once in 10 or 20 years. It all depends; I don't think you should put a time period on it.

Senator DOUGLAS. Well, the period in this bill is only 5 years. In 5 years we would have a chance to review the tariff policy. Senator KERR. Would the Senator speak a little louder?

Senator DOUGLAS. Yes; I say under the present bill there would be another review in 5 years.

You suggested 10 or 20 years?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. No, Mr. Douglas, I have not suggested 10 or 20. Senator DOUGLAS. I thought you did.

Mr. STRACKBEIN. I said there should be no time period specified. Senator DOUGLAS. Well, do you think it should be reviewed every year?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. I say it should be reviewed when the necessity for it becomes clear.

Senator DOUGLAS. And who is to be the judge?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Without any relation to any particular time period.

Senator DOUGLAS. Who is the judge of the necessity?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. The people most affected.

Senator DOUGLAS. Who are they?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. The people of the United States.

Senator DOUGLAS. Yes; and how do they make their desires known? Mr. STRACKBEIN. Presumably by communication with their elected representatives.

Senator DOUGLAS. So that when any considerable group of people want to have the tariff revised then Congress, beginning with the Ways and Means Committee of the House, would hold hearings?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Yes, sir; if there were sufficient substance in these requests for revision.

Senator DOUGLAS. Isn't it true that at any one time there are groups dissatisfied with any law?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Undoubtedly.

Senator DOUGLAS. And isn't it probable that if your demands were laid down at every session, that possibly every session and every year there would be demands for revisions of the tariff and rather strong demands?

Mr. STRACKBEIN. Now, Senator, if you will go back into the tariff history of the United States, you will find that there was not a demand for legislation on the tariff every year or two. The 1913 tariff, the Underwood tariff remained in effect until the emergency tariff act, right after World War