burner without the sample; and the sale of the territory aforesaid was a fraud and myth, as was the agreement to send the sample burner, as there is no such territory In Madison county, Neb., as that mentioned in the written contract or agreement made by Thos. E. Hall with these defendants, purporting to give them the right to sell or manufacture the burner aforesaid, in the territory aforesaid; and these defendants did not know but what the said contract or agreement was good at the time it was made. These defendants do not know whether the person who took the note was Thos. E. Hall, or who he was, or whether there is such a person living, or such a firm in existence as Hall & Co.; but, whoever the person was, he represented himself to be Thos. E. Hall, and, by his false and fraudulent representation aforesaid, induced these defendants to give the note aforesaid, the said payee in said note not giving them, nor has any person ever given them a deed for any territory, or the right and power or authority to manufacture and sell said burner in any territory, when, in fact and in truth, the defendants supposed, and were led to believe by the representations of the said Thos. E. Hall, at the time of the giving of the note sued upon, that they were getting a deed, or the right and authority to sell or manufacture the said hydro-carbon burner in the precincts of Union Creek, Warnerville, and Battle Creek, in said county. And the consideration for said note has entirely failed, for the said Thos. E. Hall gave these defendants paper purporting to be a deed or contract or authority to sell or manufacture said hydro-carbon burner attachment in the townships of Warnerville, Madison, and Battle Creek, in Madison county, Neb., that not being the territory they purchased, or supposed they purchased. (3) At the time the plaintiff purchased the note in suit, these defendants were reputed to be, and were, and now are, solvent and able to pay the said note, and the same could be collected from them by law; and it was worth in the market more than $140. (4) The plaintiff did not purchase said note in the usual course of his trade or business as a banker, or as an investment, but purchased it at a greatly reduced price, at a large discount, for the purpose of speculation, and without having the same transferred and indorsed directly to him, or the payment thereof guarantied. (5) The plaintiff is a banker at Madison, Madison county, Neb., and it is his custom, and the custom of all the banksin said town of Madison, to buy † notes at a discount; and it is the usual custom of said banker, and was so at the time of the purchase of the note sued upon by the plaintiff, to require the pavee or person from whom they purchased notes to transfer the same to them direct, and indorse and guaranty the payment thereof. That the usual discount of notes in and at the banks in Madison in November, 1887, was not to exceed twenty to thirty per cent., by the year, of notes purchased in the usual course of trade. That plaintiff purchased the note in suit of the person with whom the defendants dealt, and to whom they gave it, about the same day it was given, and the payee indorsed it in blank. That plaintiff purchased it for a much less sum than $140, and for about the sum of $100, well knowing, at the time he purchased it, that these defendants were solvent, and able to pay the same. (6) That the note sued upon, together with other notes to the same payee, were offered for sale at a large discount, at the different banks in Madison, on or about the day plaintiff purchased the note in suit, and were refused by some of the bankers; and, at or about the time plaintiff purchased the notesued upon, the same payee offered to sell to plaintiff another note of these defendants, of the same date, for the same amount and rate of interest, due June 1, 1888, but said plaintiff refused to purchase it at any price, assigning as his reason for such a refusal that he wished to wait and see if the note sued upon was all right,the consideration for both the note sued upon and the note offered plaintiff, and which he refused to buy, being the same.' The plaintiff's reply denied each and every affirmative allegation in the defendants' answer contained, except those of the third paragraph, which are admitted. A jury having been impaneled for the trial of the cause, and the court having held that the burden of proof was upon the defendants, the defendants offered a witness, whereupon the plaintiff objected to the introduction of any testimony on the part of the defendants, alleging as the grounds of such objection that the answer admits the execution and purchase of the note, and its genuineness, and that the facts pleaded in the answer do not constitute any defense to the action; that it is not alleged in the answer that the plaintiff took the note in suit with any knowledge or notice of the alleged fraud between the antecedent parties, nor that he acted under such circumstances as show bad faith or lack of honesty on his part, which objection was sustained. Whereupon, on motion of the plaintiff, the court, over the objection of the defendant, charged and directed the jury to bring in a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of the note sued on. Whereupon the jury returned their verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $167.65. Defendants' motion for a new trial having been overruled, a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The cause is brought to this court on error. I have searched the Code, as well as the reports, in vain for authority to justify the trial court in the practice pursued in this case. The answer of the defendants was probably open to demurrer, and possibly to a motion to make it more definite and certain. But the plaintiff replied to it, and went to trial. In such case, there was no proper case presented to the court for its decision that the facts stated in the answer constituted no defense to the action. But had the point been raised by demurrer to the answer, would the court be justified in holding, as a question of law, that the note did not originate in illegality or fraud, and thus relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving the good faith of its purchase by him? It is alleged in the answer that the sole and only consideration the declarations and acts of the vendor, made shortly after the alleged transfer, and before the rights of innocent parties intervened, may be shown as circumstances in corroboration. 2. Evidence examined, and held to sustain the grounds of attachment set forth in the affidavit therefor. 3. A creditor may take adequate security from a failing debtor without being chargeable with seeking to hinder and delay other creditors; but where a debtor heavily indebted makes a mortgage upon all his property to one creditor, the sedebt, and the effect will be to prevent other credcurity being greatly in excess of the amount of the itors from collecting their claims out of the residue, an attachment on the ground of fraudulent disposition of the property on the facts stated in the opinion will lie against the debtor. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error to district court, Red Willow County; COCHRAN, Judge. R. M. Snavely and E. M. Bartlett, for plaintiffs in error. G. M. Lambertson, Rittenhouse & Starr, and H. W. Keyes, for defendants in error. MAXWELL, J. On the 24th of September, 1887, the defendants executed and delivered to the First National Bank of Indianola and L. J. Holland a chattel mortgage upon "all our general stock of merchandise, consisting of dry goods, groceries, boots and shoes, hats & caps, crockery, clothing,. notions, jewelry, safe, and show-cases, fixtures, and all our other goods and mer for the note sued on was the sale to the defendants of the territory of the precincts of Union Creek, Battle Creek, and Warnerville, in Madison county, Neb., or the right to sell a hydro-carbon burner attachment to or for a stove, said by the payee of the note sued on to be patented, and manufactured by Hall & Co., of Kansas City, Mo.; and the said note purported to be for royalties, or in payment for royalties, upon the burners sold by these defendants. And the said Thomas E. Hall, the payee of said note, and the person who took the same from the defendants, and who represented himself to the defendants to be the agent and attorney of Hall & Co., agreed that, within 30 days from the time of the execution and delivery of said note, Hall & Co. would ship to the address of these defendants at Madison, Neb., a sample burner, with which they could canvass, and from which defendants might be able to manufacture said burners; and, with said express agreement and undertaking by the defendants with said Thomas E. Hall, they signed and delivered the note sued on, and would not have so signed and delivered it had they not been induced to do so through and by the representations aforesaid, and that all of the representations made as aforesaid by the said Thomas E. Hall, the payee of said note, were false and untrue in every particular, etc. These facts, although, obvi-chandise contained in the brick building, ously, difficult to prove, are, if true, susceptible of proof, and, if proved, would establish fraud on the part of the payee in obtaining the execution and delivery of the note. While it must be admitted that the failure of Hall & Co. to ship the sample burner was but a breach of contract, it is equally true that the representations that said invention had been patented by Hall & Co., made for the purpose and under the circumstances alleged, was, if untrue, a fraud which would vitiate the note in the hands of the payee. The same may be said of the representation that said Thomas E. Hall was the agent or attorney of said patentees, and authorized to sell, in their names, rights to manufacture, use, and sell such machines; and, upon proof that either or both of these representations were made as alleged, and were false, the burden would be cast upon the plaintiff to prove that he gave value for the note before maturity, without notice, etc. See Conley v. Winsor, 41 Mich. 253, 2 N. W. Rep. 31, and Fitch v. Jones, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 134. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. The other judges con cur. (29 Neb. 76) SMITH et al. v. BOYER et al. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. March 11, 1890.) FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-EVIDENCE-DECLA RATIONS-ATTACHMENT. 1. While the general rule is that the declarations of a party made after he has parted with his interest in the subject-matter of the litigation cannot be received to disparage the right or title of one who acquired the same in good faith before such declarations were made, yet this rule does not apply to transfers of property made for the purpose of defrauding creditors. In such case, the fraudulent character of the transfer being proved, store-houses, and basement, situate on lot 6, block 33, in the town of Indianola, Nebraska. Also our books and book-accounts held and owing to us, the said firm of Boyer & Davidson, on account of our business in said store above named, "-to secure the payment of $5,336.46, of which sum $2,000 is alleged to have been due the bank, and the remainder to Holland. The exact value of the property mortgaged does not appear, but there is testimony that the goods were of the value of about $12,000, while the amount due on the accounts is not shown. On the 26th day of September, 1887, the plaintiffs commenced an action by attachment against the de-. fendants; the grounds therefor, as stated in the affidavit for an attachment, being "that the defendants have sold, assigned, and disposed of their property with the fraudulent intent to cheat and defraud their creditors, and hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts, and are about to sell, assign, and dispose of their property with the fraudulent intent to cheat and defraud their creditors, and hinder and delay them in the collection of their debts, and that they are about to convert their property into money for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of their creditors, and are about to sell, assign, and dispose of a part of their property with intent to defraud their creditors, and have sold, assigned, and disposed of a part of their property with the intent to defraud their creditors." Upon this affidavit being filed, and a like affidavit for garnishment, and an order of the court obtained, part of the debt not then being due, a writ of attachment was issued and delivered to the sheriff at 8 o'clock P. M. of said day, and returned, "not being able to come at the property of Boyer and Da vidson, or James J. Boyer or Charles B. Davidson, members of said firm, claimed to be in the possession of L. J. Holland, J. W. Dolan, the First Nat'l Bank," etc. Notice was served upon the persons garnished, naming them, and requiring them to appear and answer, etc. The defendants filed a motion, supported by affidarits, to dissolve the attachment upon substantially two grounds, viz., irregularity in procuring the same, and because the grounds upon which the attachment was granted were untrue. Affidavits in opposition to and in support of the attachment were thereupon filed, and on the final hearing the attachment was discharged, and the garnishees released. The dissolution of the attachment is now assigned for er ror. It seems to be conceded by the attorneys for the plaintiff that the claim of the national bank is bona fide, and probably that of Holland. The chattel mortgage seems to have been procured through the instrumentality of the latter. A debtor in failing circumstances may pay one or more of his creditors, provided he deliver him no more than sufficient to pay the debt. In Elwood v. May, 24 Neb. 375, 38 N. W. Rep. 793, it is said: "A creditor may obtain from a failing debtor payment in full of his claim, and he will not be chargeable, upon that ground alone, of seeking to defraud other creditors. Neither will the fact that the claim is paid in goods of no greater value than the amount of the claim of itself establish the fraudulent character of the transaction. So far as the testimony discloses, the defendants in error were paid in goods of value not exceeding the amount of their claims against Cramer." To the same effect, Rothell v. Grimes, 22 Neb. 526, 33 N. W. Rep. 392; Leffel v. Schermerhorn, 13 Neb. 342, 14 N. W. Rep. 418; Shelly v. Heater, 17 Neb. 505, 23 N. W. Rep. 521. The case of Grimes v. Farrington, 19 Neb. 49, 26 N. W. Rep. 618, is not in conflict with these decisions, the exact value of the goods mortgaged not being shown. The highest estimate in that case was about $14,000, while the debts secured exceeded $9,000. It did not appear that the property would sell for more than the amount of the debts. While a bona fide creditor has a right to secure his claim, yet he has no right to tie up all the property of his debtor, where all of such property greatly exceeds in value the amount of the debt secured; in other words, while he may take adequate security for his own claim, he cannot hinder and delay, if not defraud, other creditors in the collection of their claims by placing the debtor's property beyond their reach. If he do so, he violates the law prohibiting fraudulent conveyances. The fact that the is a creditor does not give him a license to tle up property of the debtor not necessary for his own security, and prevent its application to the payment of other debts owing by the debtor; and, if the debtor assign him all his property to secure a grossly inadequate debt, other creditors have good cause to complain that he transfer is fraudulent as to them. In the case at bar the defendants had conveyed all their property to the mortgagees. | Such property is shown to have been greatly in excess of adequate security for the debts, and prima facie this was sufficient to justify an attachment upon the grounds specified in the affidavit therefor. Fraud can rarely be proved by direct evidence, and in most cases necessarily must be shown by facts and circumstances; and among those which may be proved against himself are the declarations and acts of the debtor while claiming an interest in the property which he asserts he has conveyed. Thus in Campbell v. Holland, 22 Neb. 596, 35 N. W. Rep. 871, the court, by COBB, C. J., quoting from Carney v. Carney, 7 Baxt. 284, says: "As a general rule, the declarations of a party made after he has parted with his interest in the subjectmatter of litigation cannot be received to disparage the title or right of a party acquired in good faith previous to the time of making such declarations. But this very just and reasonable principle must be taken as inapplicable to cases of fraudulent sales of property. If, for example, a conveyance is made absolute on its face, and the vendor continues to retain possession of the property as before, this being prima facie evidence of fraud, a creditor impeaching such conveyance on the ground of fraud may be admitted to prove the declarations of the vendor, thus retaining the possession in relation to the ownership, or the character of his possession of the property." A number of statements made by Boyer, and acts done by him, shortly after the attachment was levied, and while he still claimed an interest in the property, that tend to support the charge that the transfer was made to defeat certain of his creditors, are shown by the record, while the sheriff in an affidavit states "that on the 19th day of October, 1887, I had subpœnas put into my hands by J. H. Berge, of Indianola, a notary public, in the above-entitled cases, and also in behalf of Nave & McCord in their claim against Boyer & Davidson, to subpoena said James J. Boyer in all of said cases, and Chas. B. Davidson and Matilda Davidson and others in said above-entitled cases, to appear before said notary public, and give their depositions in said cases, respectively, on the 21st and 22d days of October, 1887, as shown by my returns on said subpoenas, and that said subpoenas were received on the 19th of October, 1887. That about the time said subpoenas were received, said James J. Boyer was here in town, but I made diligent search for him, and could not find him any where. His wife had already gone away. I went to his house on the 19th and on the 20th and on the 21st of October, 1887, and knocked at the door, and it was locked. After some talking of some persons in the house, and after some little time, L. J. Holland came to the door, and, on being asked where Boyer was, said he was not there, and did not know where he was, and that L. J. Holland was the only one to be seen in the house, although affiant did not search the house. I searched diligently in the country and in this town for said James J. Boyer, but could not find him. I learned that he had been seen riding his trotting horse across into Kan That for respondent. sas since I received said subpoenas. I have | J. R. Webster, for petitioner. A. Y. Wright, good reasons to believe that the said James J. Boyer knew that said subpoenas were in my hands before he left, and that he secreted himself, and hid away from me, and absconded into the state of Kansas, to avoid the service of said subpoenas, and to avoid giving his testimony in the above-entitled and above-mentioned cases. That said Matilda Davidson left on the train on the very same day that said subpoenas were placed in my hands to take her depositions, and as I am informed went to Denver. The said James J. Boyer said to me, about the time I was serving the execution on said oats heretofore mentioned, that I would not get his horse, referring to the trotting horse which I had had orders to serve execution against; that I thought I was pretty sharp, but I would not get the horse. He knew where it was, but I would not get it, and he would not tell me where it was. I was told that some one was seen driving that horse that evening, out west of town. Went out to Steve Lyons' place, but, not finding the horse there, came back. Met said James J Boyer in the road about a mile out of town, and he skulked off in the weeds to keep me from knowing who he was. searched diligently for the horse, but could not find him. I verily believe, and have good reasons to believe, that he was hiding away, secreting, and concealing said horse to prevent me from serving the execution against it, and to prevent his creditors from appropriating it to the payment of their demands, and that he has removed said animal out of this state with intent to keep me from serving said execution at that time in my hands." These statements are not denied by Boyer. In the affidavits of the defendants for the dissolution of the attachment they swear to the honesty of their intentions. This statement would have had much greater weight if they had come into court, and made a full and detailed statement of their business, and the assets still in their hands, if any. Had they done so, perhaps it would have been unnecessary to swear to a mere conclusion, and the latter is entitled to but little weight. The evidence fully sustains the grounds for the attachment, and the court erred in discharging it. The judgment of the district court is reversed, the attachment reinstated, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. The other judges concur. (29 Neb. 135) In re ROBINSON. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. March 11, 1890.) ARREST WITHOUT EXTRADITION-HABEAS CORPUS. When a person is arrested in a sister state, and without being extradited is forcibly brought into the jurisdiction of this state to answer to a criminal offense, and is committed to jail to await trial on such charge, held, that such person is unlawfully deprived of his liberty, and is entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. (Syllabus by the Court.) Habeas corpus. NORVAL, J. A petition was filed in this court on the 6th day of February, 1890, on behalf of Bertie Robinson for a writ of habeas corpus. It appears from the pețition and evidence that a complaint in writing was made before the county judge of Furnas county, on September 10, 1889, charging the petitioner with stealing a horse, the property of one Ira B. Huff, and that on the 24th day of the same month one E. M. Matson filed a complaint before a justice of the peace of Sherman county, Kan., charging the petitioner with stealing, in said Furnas county, the aforesaid horse. The said justice issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner, who was afterwards arrested and taken before said justice of the peace. On motion of the county attorney the prosecution was dismissed. Robinson was, by order of the justice, delivered to the custody of Matson, a constable of Red Willow county, Neb., who forcibly, and against the will and consent of Robinson, and without any warrant, requisition, or other legal process, conveyed said Robinson out of the state of Kansas into the state of Nebraska, where he delivered said Robinson up to the sheriff of Furnas county for prosecution for said crime. The petitioner was taken before the county judge of said Furnas county, who held the petitioner to the district court of the county to answer said charge, and, in default of bail, the petitioner was committed to the jail of the county, where he has ever since been deprived of his liberty by the respondent, as sheriff of said county. On the 9th day of December, 1889, an information was filed in said district court, charging Robinson with the crime of horse-stealing. On the following day, on being arraigned in said court, he pleaded not guilty to the charge, and on the same day he prayed said district court to discharge him from custody, because he was arrested in the state of Kansas, and was brought forcibly, and without any requisition, into this state, and delivered to the sheriff of said county to answer said accusation. The motion was overruled, and an exception was entered. On the 11th day of December Robinson was tried for said crime in said district court, and, the jury failing to agree upon a verdict, it was discharged, and Robinson was remanded to the custody of the respondent, to await further trial. But a single question is presented for our consideration, and that is whether or not, under the foregoing facts, the district court of Furnas county had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner in the criminal case pending therein against him. We think the answer should be in the negative. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction cannot be acquired in a civil case when the summons is served upon a defendant who was brought into the jurisdiction of the court by force, fraud, or deceit, for the purpose of obtaining service of summons upon him. Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35; Williams v. Reed, 29 N. J. Law, McClure & Anderson, W. K. Brown, and | 385; Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa, 260; Van Horn v. Manufacturing Co., 37 Kan. 523, 15 Pac. Rep. 562; Townsend v. Smith, 3 N. W. Rep. 439; Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374; Compton v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130. The same rule obtains in criminal prosecutions. Nearly the entire current of authority in this country is to the effect that, when a fugitive from justice has been extradited from one state to another, he cannot be prosecuted in the state to which he has been surrendered on an offense other than the one for which he was extradited, before he has had an opportunity to return to the state from whence he was brought. In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, 11 N. W. Rep. 280; State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273; Ex parte Hibbs, 26 Fed. Rep. 421; U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; State v. Hall, 19 Pac. Rep. 918; Waterman v. State, 18 N. E. Rep. 63. In principle there is no difference between the case at bar and where a person is held for an offense other than the one he was extradited for. In either case it is an abuse of judicial process, which the law does not allow. Ample provisions are made for the arrest and return of a person accused of crime, who has fled to a sister state, by extradition warrants is sued by the executives of the states. There is no excuse for a citizen or officer arresting, without authority of law, a fugitive, and taking him forcibly, and against his will, into the jurisdiction of the state for the purpose of prosecution. We cannot sanction the method adopted to bring the petitioner into the jurisdiction of this state. He did not come into the state voluntarily, but because he could not avoid it. The district court, therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner, and his detention is unlawful. State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. Rep. 177; State v. Hall, 40 Kan. 338, 19 Pac. Rep. 918; In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, 11 N. W. Rep. 280. While many authorities hold to the contrary doctrine, we prefer to adopt the rule that seems to be based upon reason, and which recognizes honesty and fair dealing. The prisoner will be discharged. Judgment accordingly. The other judges concur. (29 Neb. 83) VAMPLEW et al. v. CHAMBERS. (Supreme Court of Nebraska. March 11, 1890.) WILLS-POWER OF SALE-BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. | Mrs. Saunders, while occupying the premises as a homestead, borrowed $2,500 of one C., and secured the same by a mortgage on the homestead. The sold, and purchased by the mortgagee, and a deed mortgage was afterwards foreclosed, the property made to the purchaser. In an action by the heirs to have the mortgage and deed declared null and void, held, that the purchaser had acquired a good and sufficient title. 2. Where a conveyance is made in pursuance of an apparent authority in a will, a stranger finding the chain of title on the record full and complete in the last grantee, and having no notice, actual or constructive, of secret infirmities therein, will be protected if he purchase or loan money on the strength of such title. 8. Held, that the proof failed to show such notice as could affect the mortgagee or impair his security. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, Douglas county; WAKELEY, Judge. Estabrook, Irvine & Clapp, for appellants. George E. Pritchett, for appellee. MAXWELL, J. This is an action to have a certain mortgage on real estate, and the foreclosure thereof, and the master's deed issued in pursuance thereof, declared null and void, and the plaintiffs decreed to be the owners of the property. On the trial of the cause the court below found the issues in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the action. The plaintiffs appeal. The plaintiffs, who were minors when the mortgage was executed, are heirs of one Charles Vamplew, deceased, and claim the property in question as heirs of their father. It appears from the record that on or about the 16th day of September, 1866, Charles Vamplew, the father of the plaintiffs, being possessed of the property in controversy, and having made the will hereafter referred to, died. This will was duly admitted to probate, and contained these provisions: "I do give and bequeath unto my dear wife, Marian Vamplew, all my real and personal property whatsoever, and whatsoever that I am possessed of, or have claim to, at the time of my decease, to her own use, benefit, and individual control absolutely, during the term of her natural life; with full power and authority to sell the same, or any part thereof, if in her judgment considered best and expedient for the benefit and advantage of my dear wife and her and my children me surviving, and for their maintenance, education, and the teaching of them, and each Of them, any trade, business, or profession; and after the decease of my dear wife my will and desire is that any property, real or personal, then remaining, in the possession or under the control of my dear wife, shall be equally divided amongst my three surviving children, or the heirs of their bodies or any of their bodies, if any of my children me surviving die before my dear wife, leaving issue lawfully begotten; but in case such of my children as die before the decease of my dear wife, Marian Vamplew, shall leave no issue them surviving, then the share or shares which they or each or any of them would have been entitled to, shall be equally di 1. A will, duly admitted to probate after the death of the testator, contained a provision that "I do give and bequeath to my dear wife, Marian Vamplew, all my real and personal property whatBoever, and whatsoever that I am possessed of, or have a claim to own, at the time of my decease, to her use and control and individual control absolutely during the time of her natural life, with full power and authority to sell the same, or any part thereof, if in her judgment considered best and expedient for the benefit and advantage of my dear wife and her and my children surviving me." There was also a provision that in case she married again her authority should cease and determine, and the remaining estate be equally divided among his children. About two years after the probating of the will the widow conveyed the real estate in dispute to one Neale, a brother-in-law, for an ex-vided amongst the survivors, or their lepressed consideration of $2,500. A few weeks afterwards she was married to one Saunders. Soon after the marriage Neale conveyed to Mrs. Saunders for an expressed consideration of $500. In 1871 gal issue them surviving, as aforesaid. But in case of the marriage of my dear wife aforesaid, my will and desire is that |