peasant society is the basis of Mao's claim to a place in the Marxist hagiology. In reinterpreting Marxism in the light of conditions in China, the Party leaders introduced an option of flexibility which they have sometimes exercised with considerable freedom without openly departing from Marxist premises. The degree of conformity had to be sufficient to convince the Party functionaries down in the ranks, if not the people as a whole, that official policies remained faithful to the spirit and essence of Marxist theory, and that compliance was therefore right and proper, or at least unavoidable. While it was not necessary that the Party leaders have as simplistic a trust in ideology as the lower echelon cadres, the leaders could not afford to abandon altogether their belief in the theoretical rational which legitimized their authority, justified whatever exercise of power was necessary to impose their will, and confirmed their confidence that the tide of history was running in their favor. Thus, the Party leaders were neither the slaves nor the masters of ideology in any absolute

sense.

Unfortunately, the mandate of Marxism on the subject of population was not every explicit except in the negative. Marx denounced Malthus in scathing terms. The explanation of overpopulation in Malthusian theory was contrived, according to Marx, to justify the use by capitalist societies of induced unemployment as a means of exploiting the workers. However, in socialist society, which placed the means of production in the hands of the workers, such manipulation would not occur, and hence there would be no unemployment and no surplus population. Marx held that overpopulation was never "absolute" (resulting from demographic or economic necessity) bụt only "relative" (derivative of the pattern of social and economic organization). Hence each type of society had its own peculiar "law of population." The particulars of the socialist law of population were never elaborated. Marxists believed that state ownership would inspire the workers to such hitherto unknown levels of productivity and inventiveness that economic adversity, including population problems, would soon be banished forever. If ever a socialist society should face such problems, Engels said, it could more easily solve them than could any other kind of society. Lenin added, however, that the fact that the masses had no use for Malthusianism did not in any way prevent a socialist society from repealing laws against abortion and contraception. The confidence of these declarations was warming but their vagueness and equivocation made it difficult to ascertain on what logical basis the confidence rested.

The Initial Posture: Unqualified optimism

The Chinese Communist leaders interpreted the Marxist precepts to mean that China's abundant population was an asset to economic development, which could be accomplished without the need for large capital investment. Full mobilization of China's human resources, they expected, would speedily raise the country to the status of a first-class power. China's perennial population problems were the heritage of indigenous Chinese "feudalism" and foreign capitalist exploitation. Under the leadership of the CCP, the politically awakened masses would soon change all these things.

The optimistic stance of the Party leaders was set forth in a release by the New China News Agency (NCNA) on September 16, 1949, which was later included in the collected works of Mao:

It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly refuted by Marxists long ago, but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China after their revolutions..

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly groundless.1

The concluding reference to "pessimistic views" is revealing, for there would have been little need to attack such views unless they had a significant following in influential circles. Presumably not all of the Party leaders believed China's food and population problems would be easily solved. Nevertheless, the optimists were evidently in command of the power structure and therefore of the mass media, which carried only one side of the argument throughout the early years. A gradual erosion of the optimistic attitude seems to have taken place from about the middle of 1953 until, by the spring of 1957, the thinking in the Central Committee regarding food and population had become markedly Malthusian. This change seems to have been related to the Party's reassessment of the situation in agriculture.

Agricultural Difficulties and Rising Doubts

For all their optimism, the Party leaders were aware that the success of their revolution was contingent upon raising the productivity of agriculture so that China could be free of the perennial threat of famine. The first step toward higher agricultural productivity was "land reform." In 1950, the Party's director of rural work, Teng Tzu-hui, explained the priority attached to "land reform" as follows:

It is also necessary to mobilize fully the masses during agrarian reform and to overthrow the enemy thoroughly, as well as to build up a real revolutionary dictatorship of the peasant. Without attaining these conditions, it will be impossible to think of raising the productive zeal of the peasants and their productivity while remnant feudal influences still exist and the demands of the peasants are not yet met.

On the other hand, if feudal influences are thoroughly overthrown, their land and property confiscated, and the economic demands of the broad masses of peasants met, then the production zeal and productivity of the peasants will be greatly raised, and the productivity of the rural areas will be greatly developed. This can ́also be definitely asserted.2

The increases in agricultural production widely reported in 1951 and 1952 were attributed forthwith to "land reform." One report, claiming staggering crop increases in 1952, boasted that "boundless future production increase" was assured, that Malthusian theories had been

"The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," Sept. 16, 1949; in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. IV, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961, pp. 453-454.

2 Teng Tzu-hui, "The Political Significance of Agrarian Reform," Ch'iang-chiang jih-pao, Hankow, Dec. 27, 1950; translated in CB, No. 212, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 6.

proven false, and that the world need not suffer from hunger even if its population trebled.3 The persistence of local famines in China during 1951 did not unduly alarm the leadership because of their confidence that such problems would soon be eliminated forever. However, there were also many reports of maladministration of the "land reform" movement that had an adverse effect on agriculture and for which the local cadres were held responsible. The catalog of their malfeasances included complacency, bureaucratism, blind optimism, "commandism," overestimation of past achievements, impatience for quick results, alienation from the masses, failure to cope with spring famine, failure to calm the anxieties of the peasants so that production could be maintained, and neglect of production.* The common program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) passed on September 29, 1949, had stated that "in all areas where the agrarian reform has been carried out, the right of ownership over the land obtained by the peasants shall be protected." This promise was often repeated during the next several years, despite the fact that some formerly landless peasants who had been given land confiscated from landlords were said to be showing signs of spontaneous capitalism, a failing the Party believed inevitable with landowners. Actually, as a Party Central Committee statement drafted in December 1951 and finally published in March 1953 revealed, the Party had promised to respect land ownership mainly to win the support of the middle peasants. It had no intention of letting private ownership continue indefinitely. In order to overcome economic difficulties caused by the scattered nature of individual peasant activities, the Party directive said,

5

We must promote "organization," and, on the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefits, develop the active nature of mutual aid and cooperation among the peasants.6

The promotion of "organization" was a reference to Mao's often repeated phrase that the peasants must "get themselves organized for production," meaning that they must be cooperativized. The effort to move them in this direction began almost immediately after land reform with a drive to enlist them in mutual aid teams and in the first agricultural producer cooperatives. In this way, the December 1951 directive concluded, "it will be possible for us to realize our final objective in the rural areas the leadership of the entire body of peasants on the road to socialism and communism." By September 1952, about 40 percent of all peasant households were in mutual aid organizations and some 4,000 cooperatives had been set up.

But the peasants were reluctant to accept organization when they discovered that it meant a loss of control over the conditions of work, and the rural cadres were obliged to resort to coercive tactics. By the end of 1952, these tactics had begun to have a noticeably adverse effect

3 Fan P'u-chai, "Ts'ung t'u-ti kai-ke hou nung-ts'un sheng-ch'an-li te fa-chan ch'ih Ma-erh-su-ssu-p'ai te huang-miu te jen-k'ou-lun" ("Critique of the Erroneous Population Theory of the Malthusian School from the Standpoint of the Development of Rural Productive Forces After Land Reform"), KMJP, Sept. 28, 1952.

See the selection of articles on "land reform" in South China in CB, No. 184, June 12, 1952.

5 "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," Sept. 29, 1949; translated in CB, No. 9, Sept. 21, 1950, p. 7.

6"CCP Central Committee Decision on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agriculture,” (Issued on Dec. 15, 1951), JMJP, Mar. 26, 1953; translated in CB, No. 240, Apr. 30, 1953, p. 3.

7 Ibid., p. 12.

on production, and the cadres were again warned against the excesses of haste, "adventurism," "commandism," and compulsion. Whereupon, early in 1953, the cadres proceeded to dissolve a number of the newly formed cooperatives to restore peasant incentives, only to be ordered later in the year to resume the march of cooperativization.

8

The rural cadres and the Party leaders were under considerable pressure because of agricultural difficulties in 1953 and 1954. Both years witnessed widespread local crop failures and famines, which were particularly severe in 1954, a year of major floods in the monsoon areas of southeast Asia. Although official grain figures continued to increase during both years, the rate of increase was below the rate of population growth, and the actual situation may have been worse than the figures indicated because of the upward bias in official grain figures caused by expansion of the crop reporting system. In 1953, an effort had been made to institute a more effective method of government purchase and redistribution of surplus grain in order to alleviate local food shortages, but the new arrangements seem to have aroused peasant suspicions and further damaged production incentives. In the fall of 1954, public sales of government grain reserves began to rise sharply in both rural and urban areas as the fear of impending food shortages spread among the population. These developments heightened the concern of Party leaders and cadres alike.

Changing Attitudes Toward Population Problems

During the earlier part of this period, the few references to population that appeared in the press reflected Mao's 1949 position. In January 1951, an article in a geographical journal reiterated the theme that a large population means abundant manpower, which is the most precious form of capital and China's guarantee of a prosperous future.9 A People's Daily editorial in August 1952 discussing the 3,000,000 unemployed in China insisted that the need for manpower was paramount as the nation began large-scale construction:

Large as our country is, it is only evident that the greater our manpower, the better, when we undertake the new democratic construction and march toward socialism. Only the capitalistic system finds it impossible to solve the unemployment problem. The fantastic so-called theory of "over-population" of theirs has long become completely bankrupt.10

In September an NCNA dispatch claimed that, thanks to the "release of immense productive forces in agriculture" through "land reform,' China had become self-sufficient in food and fibers for the first time in 200 years." In October a noted academician intimated that the creativity of the emancipated masses had already manifested itself in miracles and that more would soon follow,12 and another writer recalled that Mao had written years earlier that the "millions of masses who wholeheartedly support the revolution" were "like a wall of steel

Nothing was said in the press about this development while it was taking place, but in October 1955, Mao cautioned the cadres against repeating "the mistake of 1953 of the large-scale dissolution of cooperatives." See Mao Tse-tung, "On the Cooperativization of Agriculture," NCNA, Peking, Oct. 16, 1955; translated in CB, No. 364, Oct. 19, 1955, p. 5.

Li Hsü-tan, "Ti-ta wu-po jen-chung te hsin Chung-kuo" ("A New China with Vast Territory, Rich Resources, and a Large Population"), Ti-li chih-shih (Geographic Knowledge), vol. 2, No. 1, January 1951, p. 8. 10 "To Effect Full Employment in a Planned and Systematic Manner," NCNA, Peking, Aug. 2, 1952; translated in SCMP, No. 388, Aug. 3-5, 1952, p. 58.

11 "Li Shu-cheng Sums Up Rapid Progress in Agriculture in New China," NCNA, Peking, Sept. 22, 1952; translated in SCMP, No. 422, Sept. 24, 1952, p. 18.

12 Feng Yu-lan, "My Understanding about the New Society in the Past Three Years," JMJP, Oct. 8, 1952; translated in SCMP, No. 435, Oct. 18, 1952. p. 19.

which no force can break." 13 In May 1953, a writer of a magazine article ridiculed the idea that overpopulation was the cause of China's poverty and insisted that a rapid increase in the country's human resources was a favorable condition for economic development.14

However, by the spring of 1953 the mood had already begun to change as food shortages persisted. A People's Daily editorial warned of increasing demands for grain which would be difficult to meet "in our country with such a large population where mechanization of agriculture has not been carried out." The editorial forecast "many years of effort" during which "the food problem is likely to appear as still an urgent problem."15 In midsummer, Teng Tzu-hui, taking account of food shortages and famines in various regions, observed candidly that the 1952 grain crop was inadequate to provide for the annual increase in population and that a "colossal reform task" lay ahead if the regime was to serve the needs of the 470 million peasants and "gradually turn our agriculture from the backward economy of the small peasant into socialized mechanized agriculture." 16

Tentative Steps Toward Birth Control

The summer of 1953 seems to have been a turning point within official circles in regard to birth control. The public position had been that birth control was "reactionary," "antihumanitarian," an outgrowth of capitalism," and a "way of killing off the Chinese people without shedding blood." 18 As late as April 1953, the Maritime Customs Office in Canton instituted a ban on the import of contraceptives, not exempting those prescribed by doctors.19 However, in August 1953, the State Council instructed the Ministry of Public Health to help the masses exercise birth control,20 (though the public was not informed of this decision until March 1957) and in July 1954 the ministry "drew up measures" relating to birth control that were submitted to the Government Administration Council for approval." These actions seem to have had no visible results.

The lack of public disclosure reflects ambivalence in official circles, which is further apparent in the treatment of population figures and rates of increase. If a large population was, as Mao had said, a "good thing," a larger population should have been welcomed as an even better thing. Yet when the authorities began to receive evidence from the "land reform" population investigations that the rural population was much larger than pre-Communist population data suggested, there was no great eagerness to publicize the new figures. The official 13 Chou Ping-lin, "People's Democratic Government Provides Opportunity for Manifesting the Great Creative Capacity of the Chinese People," JMJP, Oct. 9, 1952; translated in SCMP, No. 438, Oct. 23, 1952, 14 Yen Chien-yü, "Ts'ung yu-kuan jen-k'ou te chi-ko wen-t'i t'an tao hsin Chung-kuo ti-i-tz'u jen-k'ou tiac-ch'a te chung-ta i-i" ("A Discussion of the Great Significance of the First Population Census of New China Starting from the Discussion of Several Problems Concerning Population"), Hsin chien-she (New Construction), No. 5, May 3, 1953, pp. 34-40.

p. 21.

15 Grain Production Increase Is the Primary Task on the Production Front," NCNA, Peking, Apr. 11 1953; translated in SCMP, No. 551, Apr. 15, 1953, p. 14.

18 Teng Tzu-hui, "Rural Work: Its Basic Mission and Policy," JMJP, July 23, 1953; translated in CB, No. 255, Aug. 10, 1953, pp. 3 and 13.

17 E. Stuart Kirby, China's Population Problem," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol XXIV, No. 17, Hong Kong, Apr. 24, 1958, p. 613.

18 Sun Ching-chih, "Su-ch'ing ti-li-hsüeh chung te ch'ung mei ssu-hsiang” (“Eliminate Worship-America Ideology in the Field of Geography"), JMJP, Apr. 25, 1952.

19 "Import Ban of Contraceptives," Ta-kung pao, Hong Kong, Apr. 7, 1953, (telephone report from Canton); translated in SCMP, No. 545, Apr. 5-7, 1953, p. 8.

20 Exercise Appropriate Birth Control" (editorial), JMJP, Mar. 5, 1957; translated in SCMP, No. 1487, Mar. 12, 1957, p. 6.

21 Shao Li-tzu, "Concerning the Problem of Dissemination of Knowledge about Contraception," KMJP, Dec. 19, 1954; translated in SCMP, No. 976, Jan. 28, 1955, p. 26.