people, the army was an unpleasant and unprofitable national incubus, the life of the soldier was deemed as but the last resort of the shiftless, the drone or the outcast.

And yet, notwithstanding the popular objections to a standing army, Congress managed to have under its control, even from the very adoption of the Constitution, at least the shadow of such an army.

The War Department of the United States was organized on the seventh of August, 1789, with General Knox as the first Secretary of War. He found a standing force of six hundred and seventy-two available men as the "bulwark of the new nation—a weak enough bulwark for so undefended a land! From the date of the organization of the Department to the War of 1812 the Secretaries of War were, respectively: Henry Knox, Timothy Pickering, James McHenry, Samuel Dexter, Roger Griswold, Henry Dearborn and William Eustis. Of these, all except Dexter were veterans of the Revolution, but the incoherencies, the frail finances and, above all, the national animosity to a standing army gave our first Secretaries little in the way of material and much in the way of worry.

As Indian wars and international disputes warranted an increasing force the troops of the United States grew from the paltry seven hundred of 1789 to somewhat more respectable proportions. In 1792 this force was increased to 5120 men, in 1794 it fell to 3629; it rose to 5144 in 1804, dropped to 3278 in 1807, and, in 1810, footed up 7154. Between these years, too, its generals-in-chief were of an equally shifting character. Washington was succeeded by Knox in 1783, Knox by Harmar in 1788, Harmar by St. Clair in 1791, St. Clair by Wayne in ayne by Wilkinson in 1796, Wilkinson by Washington d Washington again by Wilkinson in 1800.

Washington's term as Lieutenant-General began on the third of July, 1798, just twenty-two years to a day after his assuming command of the Revolutionary troops on the commons of Cambridge. It was his last service to the American people and was the result of the popular war-wave that swept the land when, in 1798, the insults of France, steeped in the fanatical fury of a righteous revolution unrighteously upheld, almost drove the former allies into war.

Throughout the States the black cockade was the symbol of patriotism; the old fervor of the fighting days returned and the doggerel of the time, sung and whistled in every town, gave the key note of determination:

"Americans then fly to arms,

And learn the way to use 'em;
If each man fight to 'fend his rights
The French can't long abuse 'em."

The war fever grew. Line-of-battle ships sprang from hastily-laid stocks. Along the Atlantic coast forts were traced out, built or strengthened. Volunteers rushed to the militia recruiting offices and, as the citizen soldiers of America pledged themselves anew to the defense of the land they loved, they shouted huzza! and yet again huzza! to the most popular of all the toasts and sentiments of the day: "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute!"

But neither defense nor tribute became necessary. Napoleon the Shrewd as well as the Great, recognized the unwisdom of making another foe in the "nation of debaters" across the western sea. France recalled her hasty words and stopped her hostile ways. The allies of old became friends once more and the army of the United States was reduced to a peace foot

ing. The militia regiments dwindled away; muster days lost their dramatic expectancies and not until 1812, when the old antagonist, Britain, sought to force brutality into battle and contempt into conflict was there need or call for the active services of the American Soldier.

And as the century died there died with it the great soldier who had by his wisdom, his strategy and his indomitable will led the way along which the thirteen colonies marched into freedom. In 1799 Washington died- the leading historic figure of the eighteenth century, the soldier who first in war was also the statesman first in peace and has ever since been the ideal patriot, first in the hearts of his countrymen.

the scene of contest. Here French and Indians, here English and French, here Americans and Englishmen had warred for the possession of the western water-ways into Lakes Michigan and Superior. Finally delivered up by the British in 1795 it was, in this month of July, 1812, held by a little garrison of fifty-seven American soldiers under command of Lieutenant Hanks.

Remote from civilization, surrounded only by the waters and forests of the vast Northwest, this slender band of defenders heard but little from the world without and still less from their official superiors-the dilatory War Department at Washington. Forty miles to the northeast, upon St. Joseph's Island in the

Sault St. Marie, stood the nearest English post, garrisoned by a small detachment of British regulars under command of Captain Roberts.

On the morning of the seventeenth of July, 1812, Lieutenant Hanks, looking out from his quarters, was surprised to see no signs of life in the little fur-trading settlement that had sprung up below the American post. Sending out to ascertain the cause he was astounded to learn that, during the preceding night, a force of more than a thousand men — British, Canadians and Indians had been led from the British fort above against the American post. But still more astounded was he when he learned that war had actually been declared between Great Britain and the United States, and that a British officer waited below, flag in hand, as a messenger from Captain Roberts, demanding the surrender of Fort Mackinaw.

Resistance was impossible. Dazed, overawed and entirely unprepared for defense Lieutenant Hanks had no alternative but to surrender. With a negligence that was as stupid as it was unpardonable the War Department at Washington delayed sending to the posts on the Western frontier any notification of the declaration of war. The British authorities had been quick to act. And thus it came to pass that an important military post among the great lakes fell without a blow to the alert and better-informed soldiers of England.

This disaster at Mackinaw was but an index to the conduct of what is known in the history of America as the War of 1812. Negligence, delay, "a miserly economy" and an utter lack of trained troops impeded the American operations from the very outset. Forts were surrendered, important posts abandoned,

ost and plans of invasion disastrously brought to naught

er lack of competent leaders and the timid and