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offered for sale were the lands in question. It was not essential that each lot to be purchased by the city should be specially designated. The direction to the assessment commissioner was to purchase such lands as he might deem advisable in the city's interests. The city can only act through its officials, and the assessment commissioner was the official who was seized of the whole matter. The respondent also was a member of the corporation, and was present at the meeting of the council when the resolution was passed, and voted for it and thereby assented to it. The taking of the deed by the city was a ratification of the act of their official. The case must be treated as if there had been no bid made. Notice to the respondent personally was not necessary. The advertisement in the city newspapers and the Ontario Gazette was sufficient. Further, the object of the notice is to give information of the city's intention, and the respondent had such information, for he knew all about it. The validating Act, 3 Edw. VII. ch. 86, sec. 8 (O.), as amended by 6 Edw. VII. ch. 99, secs. 7, 8 (O.), validated the sale to the city. The general words used in the Act validated all sales "purporting to be for taxes in arrear." The specifying of certain cases of irregularity had not the effect of limiting the effect of the general words. They are given merely abundante cautela, while the effect of the words following, namely, "and notwithstanding any other failure or omission," etc., show that no limitation was to be placed on the general words. The ejusdem generis doctrine does not apply: Hardcastle on Statutes, 3rd ed., p. 191; Anderson v. Anderson, [1895] 1 Q.B. 749. The case of O'Brien v. Cogswell, 17 S.C.R. 420, relied on before the trial Judge, is clearly distinguishable. The Act in question there did not contain the word "purporting," the effect of which is that where there has been a sale as a matter of fact, though by reason of some defect in the proceedings the sale is invalid, it is validated.

Hamilton Cassels, K.C., and R. S. Cassels, for the respondent. It is undoubted that in the case of lands sold for taxes all the requisites of the statute must be strictly complied with. A proper description is one of the prerequisites; there was no proper description here. The description is so ambiguous that it is impossible to locate the land. The appellants admitted it was insufficient by giving a proper description in the deed deed to them:

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Wildman v. Tate, 32 O.R. 274, affirmed on appeal, 2 O.L.R.
Knaggs v. Ledyard (1866), 12 Gr. 320; Booth V.
Girdwood (1871), 32 U.C.R. 23; Nelles
v. White (1881),

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29 Gr. 338; Burgess v. Bank of Montreal (1878), 3 A.R. 66. No
valid purchase of the land was made by the city. There must be
an abortive sale and an adjournment. There was no valid ad-
journment here, for the city had advertised its intention to
purchase before the adjournment was made, and, further, there
was a fictitious bid, which would, in itself, invalidate the sale.
The council must decide as to each specific lot to be purchased.
They cannot direct a purchase of lands en bloc, and they cannot
delegate their power to an official. The statute expressly requires
them to make the decision: Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
4th ed., sec. 96. Written notice also must be served on the owner
personally. It is quite clear from the Act that personal service
was intended. There was no personal service; the published notice
also is too indefinite: Kennan v. Turner (1903), 5 O.L.R. 560;
Chrysler v. Township of Sarnia (1888), 15 O.R. 180; Regina v.
Reed (1886), 11 O.R. 242; Fleming v. City of Toronto (1892),
19 A. R. 318 Am. & Eng. Encycl., 2nd ed., vol. 21, p. 533;
Blackwell on Tax Titles, 5th ed., sec. 398; Regina v. Justices of
Meath, [1897] 2 Ir.R. 21; Love v. Webster (1895), 26 O.R. 433;
Maxwell on Statutes, 4th ed., 449. The validating Act does not
assist the appellants. They only apply to matters of procedure
prior to the sale. The general words of the Act are also
controlled by the specific grounds of irregularity mentioned.
The concluding words clearly come within the doctrine of
ejusdem generis; O'Brien v. Cogswell, 17 S.C.R. 420; Whelan
v. Ryan (1891), 20 S.C.R. 65; Booth V. Girdwood, 32
U.C.R. 23; Carter v. Hunter, 9 O.W.R. 58. There is clearly
and the making

the right to redeem. The time for redemption
of the deed to the city never elapsed: Ruttan v. Burk
(1904), 7 O.L.R. 56; Nelles v. White, 29 Gr. 338. The respondent
is in no way estopped from attacking the validity of the sale by
being present and voting at the council meeting, nor from his
right to redeem: Peck v. Town of Galt (1881), 46 U.C.R. 211;
Blackwell on Tax Sales, 5th ed., secs. 890-1; Claxton v. Shibley
(1885), 9 O.R. 451. The appellants have not been misled nor
have they in any way changed their position by anything done by

the respondent; they are, however, estopped from denying the respondent's right to redeem, for their practice has been to allow redemption so long as the lands remained in their hands. Then as to the cross appeal, the respondent should have been allowed his costs of the action.

December 23. Moss, C.J.O.:-Action impeaching a purchase assumed to be made by the defendants of certain lands the property of the plaintiff, at a sale for arrears of taxes thereon held on the 24th of April, 1901, and a deed of conveyance purporting to be made in pursuance of the sale and purchase, and bearing date the 1st of October, 1902.

The claim is that the lands were not duly and properly assessed so as to render them liable to be sold for arrears of taxes, and that in any event the defendants were not entitled to become the purchasers thereof, by reason whereof the assumed sale to and purchase by them were invalid and void.

The defendants, besides asserting that the sale was lawful and regular in all respects, claimed the benefit of certain Acts of the Legislature which they contended validated the sale and purchase in all respects.

The learned trial Judge set aside the sale and purchase on the grounds (1) that the lands were insufficiently described in the assessment proceedings and in the proceedings leading to the sale, (2) that the defendants had not taken the proceedings necessary to qualify them to become the purchasers, and (3) that the case did not come within the validating Acts.

The plaintiff submitted to pay all the arrears of taxes which had been imposed and also such sum as would have been imposed if the lands had been in the ownership of a private person, from the date of the sale, with interest, and the learned Judge directed that upon payment by the plaintiff of the amount to be found due and payable on the foot of an account to be taken, the defendants should convey the lands to him. To this the plaintiff makes no objection. The relief was awarded without costs to either party.

The defendants having appealed, the plaintiff by way of crossappeal asks that he be allowed his costs of the action.

As to the objection based on the ground of want of proper description, it is difficult to see how in face of the decisions extending over a

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long series of years the learned trial Judge could have come to any other conclusion. A more vague and indefinite description can hardly be suggested. It has no point of commencement, and no landmarks to guide the searcher along the metes and bounds enclosing the 8 57/100 acres of which the parcel is said to be composed. With all the information supplied by the assessment roll or the advertisements of sale how could he identify the parcel?

The fullest description was that contained in the assessment roll for 1893, viz.: "Carlaw avenue, east south end, commencing 120 feet from Queen, vacant land; owner, John Russell; 1,242; 8 57/100 acres." There is nothing to shew whether it was on the north or south side of Queen street, and as a matter of fact it was 135 feet from the north side, and it was not vacant. But even as much as is there stated was not continued in subsequent years, and in 1895 it is described as commencing at Queen street. Looking at the items of information purported to be furnished and comparing them with the actual facts, it is not possible to say that an assessor properly doing his duty could not easily have given a more accurate and intelligible description of the parcel of land in question.

But assuming that the description given was sufficient, or that the errors in it have been cured by the validating legislation so that the right to make sale cannot be further questioned, there remains the serious objection to the right of the defendants to become the purchasers at the time and under the circumstances existing when they assumed to become such purchasers.

Their power and right to purchase were governed at the date of the purchase by sec. 184 of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1897, ch. 224. Sub-section 1 directs the treasurer of the municipality to sell so much of the land as is sufficient to discharge the taxes and all lawful charges.

Sub-section 2 provides that if the treasurer fails at such sale to sell any land for the full amount of the arrears of taxes due, he is at such sale to adjourn it until a day then to be publicly named by him, etc.; of which adjourned sale he is to give notice by public advertisement as directed, and on the day named for the adjourned sale he is to sell such lands, "unless otherwise directed by the local municipality in which they are situate," for any sum he can realize, and shall accept such sum as full payment of the taxes, provided that if the owner comes to redeem he must pay the full amount of taxes due.

Sub-section 3 enacts that if the council of the municipality in which is situate any lot to which sub-sec. 2 refers desire to become the purchasers thereof for the amount of the arrears of taxes thereon, it shall be lawful for such municipality to purchase the same if the price offered at such adjourned sale is less than the amount of such arrears, and if the council of the local municipality before the day of such adjourned sale has given notice in writing of intention so to do. It is obvious that the right to purchase "any lot" instead of permitting it to be sold for any sum the treasurer can realize can only be exercised provided certain things are done and happen, and among these is the pre-requisite that the council before the day of the adjourned sale has given notice in writing of intention to purchase the lot.

The question is, to whom and in what manner is the notice to be given? Prima facie it would seem that the notice should be given to the owner of the lot. He is the person to be most materially affected by, and therefore the person most chiefly interested in, the proceeding. Others may be interested in knowing that the municipality may become the purchasers in the event of the price offered by outside parties not reaching the amount of the arrears, but their interest less important than that of the owner whose property is about to be dealt with. That the intention was that the owner was the person to be specially notified appears from the express direction that the notice is to be in writing as contra-distinguished from the method of notifying the public of any proceeding with reference to an intended sale. That seems in every instance to be directed to be given by public advertisement, and there must have been some reason for directing a different method in this instance.

If the intention had been that the notice should be by public advertisement, it would have been very easy to have so expressed it as had been done in other parts of the same section, instead of adopting an expression which as applied to an advertisement in a public newspaper is more than ambiguous.

On the other hand, the signification ordinarily attached to notice in writing is that it is a notice served personally on or sent by post to the party for whom it is intended. That these means of giving notice in writing were present to the mind of the Legislature is shewn by reference to sec. 134 of R.S.O. 1897, ch. 224 (now sec. 99 of the Assessment Act, 4 Edw. VII. ch. 23), and other sections. And the

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