페이지 이미지
PDF
ePub

ACCOUNT.

INDEX.

See EXECUTORS AND TRUSTEES.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
See INFANT.

ACQUIESCENCE.
See TIMBER.

ACTION.
See LIEN.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.
See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 2.

ADVERTISEMENT.
See DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES.

AFFIDAVIT.

If a judicial opinion or decision,
oral or written, is not pronounced
or delivered in open court, it can-
not, until the parties are notified
of it, be said to be pronounced or
delivered within the meaning of
sec. 57 of the County Courts Act,
R.S.O. 1897, ch. 55, requiring
appeals from the county court to
be set down for the first sitting of
a Divisional Court commencing
on or after the expiration of one
month from the judgment, order,
or decision complained of.

Dictum of ARMOUR, C.J., in
Fawkes v. Swayzie (1899), 31
O.R. 256, approved. Allan v.
Place, 148.

2. Division Court Appeal
Time-"Date of the Decision Com-
plained of"-Judgment-Notifica-
tion of, to Parties.]-Upon appeal
by the plaintiffs from the judg-
ment of a division court, it was
objected that the provisions of
sec. 158 of the Division Courts
Act had not been complied with,
the judgment being dated the 5th

See COSTS, 1-CRIMINAL LAW, 6. August and the papers filed and

ALLUVION.
See WATER AND WATERCOURS-

ES, 1.

AMENDMENT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 7-INFANT
-TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

APPEAL.

the appeal set down on the 22nd
August. Section 158 requires the
certified copy of the proceedings
in the division court to be filed
in the High Court "within two
weeks after the date of the de-
cision complained of." It ap-
peared that judgment was re-
served at the hearing, and that
the written reasons for judgment
were dated the 5th August, but
that notice thereof was not re-
ceived by the plaintiffs' solicitor
till the 12th August:-

1. County Court Appeal-Time Held, approving the dictum of
-R.S.O. 1897, ch. 55, sec. 57.] ARMOUR, C.J., in Fawkes

V.

Swayzie (1899), 31 O.R. 256, that
the appeal was in time, for judg-
ment could not be said to be
pronounced until the parties were
notified of it. Maxon v. Irwin,
81.

ASSAULT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3.

ASSESSMENT AND TAXES.

1. Business Assessment-Club-

3. Supreme Court of Canada-
Extending Time for Appealing-4 Edw. VII. ch. 23, sec. 10 (e) (O.)]
Leave to Appeal-Necessity for--The object of sec. 10 of the As-
Powers of Court of Appeal.]-Time sessment Act, 4 Edw. VII. ch. 23
for allowing appeal to the Supreme (O.), is to reach the income de-
Court of Canada extended by the rived by the land-holder from the
Court of Appeal, and the security various occupations mentioned in
approved of and allowed, under the section, carried on by him
sec. 71 of the Supreme Court Act, upon the land, and perhaps in-
R.S.C. 1906, ch. 139, although this directly the stock-in-trade and
might have been done by a single personal property belonging to
Judge of the Court of Appeal,
since the failure to apply within
the proper time, under sec. 69,
arose from the impression that
leave to appeal was necessary,
and no Court was sitting during A social club, having no capital
that time to which the application stock, and consequently no divi-
for leave could have been made. dends, profits, or earnings to be
Also leave to appeal granted, if
necessary, valeat quantum, under
sec. 48 (e) of the Supreme Court
Act. Hamilton Steamboat Co. v.
Mackay, 184.

the business, and the word "busi-
ness" in that section means some-
thing which occupies time and at-
tention and labour, and is followed
for profit.

divided among its members, al-
though it furnishes meals and
liquors to them and their guests,
is not a club within the meaning
of sub-sec. (e) of the section, and
is not liable to a business assess-

See HABEAS CORPUS, 1-PAR-ment.
LIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1, 2, 3—
COMPANY, 2.

APPRAISEMENT.
See INSURANCE, 2.

ARBITRATION AND
AWARD.

See INSURANCE, 1, 2.

ARREST.

See COSTS, 1.

Judgment of MABEE, J., 12
O.L.R. 275, reversed. Rideau
Club v. City of Ottawa, 118.

2. Business Assessment-Land
Occupied "Mainly for the Purpose
of their Business 4 Edw. VII.
ch. 23, sec. 10 (0.)—Amount of
Assessment Court of Revision.]—
The plaintiffs, an express com-
pany, agreed with a navigation
company, who carried passengers,
mails, and all kinds of freight, and
had wharf accommodation in the
defendant municipality, that the
agent of the navigation company
should act as agent of the plain-
tiffs during the season of naviga-

tion. The plaintiffs paid part of
the salary of the agent and his
clerk, and used the wharf premis-
es, which were assessed to the
navigation company:-

Held, that the land was not
used by the express company
"mainly for the purpose of their
business," and that they were not
liable to a business assessment
under the provision of 4 Edw. VII.
ch. 23, sec. 10 (0.)

Lands by City-Delegation of Pow-
ers to Official-Personal Service of
Notice on Owner-Validating Act,
3 Edw. VII. ch. 86, sec. 8 (0.)—
Effect of.]-On a sale of the plain-
tiff's land for taxes for the years
1892-1896, the fullest description
given in the assessment rolls, ex-
cept that in some of the years the
depth was given, was that for the
year 1893, namely, "Carlaw av-
enue, east, south end, commenc-
Held, also, that the question ing 120 feet from Queen, vacant
whether the amount of the assess- land, owner John Russell" (the
ment was excessive could not be plaintiff), "1242, 8 57-100 acres,"
raised in this action, but was for not stating on which side of Queen
the court of revision. Dominion street it was: as a matter of fact
Express Co. v. Town of Niagara, it was 135 feet from that street,
78.

and it was not vacant. Before
the date to which the sale had
3. Income Tax-Mining Com- been adjourned for want of bid-
pany "Income Derived from the ders, or by reason of the bids being
Mine"-Assessment Act, 4 Edw. below the amount in arrear, the
VII. ch. 23, sec. 36, sub-sec. 3 (0.)] board of control made a report to
-The Assessment Act, 4 Edw. the council, which, after referring
VII. ch. 23, sec. 36, sub-sec. 3 (O.), to the powers conferred on the
provides: "In estimating the municipality to purchase lands
value of mineral lands, such lands in such cases, recommended that
and the buildings thereon shall be the assessment commissioner be
valued and estimated at the value authorized to purchase and ac-
of other lands in the neighbour- quire for the city such lands as
hood for agricultural purposes, might be deemed advisable. This
but the income derived from any was adopted by the council, the
mine or mineral work shall be plaintiff, who was an alderman,
subject to taxation in the same being present, and voting in
manner as other incomes under favour of it. Notice of such ad-
this Act:"-
journed sale and of the intention
of the city to purchase was duly
advertised in the daily newspapers
and in the Ontario Gazette, but
no written notice was served per-
sonally on the plaintiff, although
he knew of the lands being taxed,
and of their being offered for sale,
and had paid part of the taxes for
the three first years:-

Held, that the net receipts for
the year's work of a mine, left
after deducting working expenses,
etc., is "the income" derived
from the mine within the meaning
of the above section, at any rate
where, as in this case, dividends
have been declared based upon
the net receipts as ascertained.
In re Coniagas Mines Co. and
Town of Cobalt, 386.

Held, MEREDITH, J.A., dissent-.
ing, that the description was in-

4. Sale of Land for Taxes-In- sufficient; and that personal ser-
valid Assessment

-

Purchase of vice on the plaintiff of the notice

of intention to purchase was es-
sential.

Waters-Liability to Assessment—
Real Property-Easement-Assess-
Per GARROW and MEREDITH, ment Act-Exemptions-Interest of
JJ.A.: It was not essential, under Crown-Bridge Forming Part of
secs. 183 and 184 of the Assess- Toll Road-Public Road or Way.]
ment Act, R.S.O. 1897, ch. 224,
-A toll bridge across the waters
that the council should consider of the Bay of Quinté, and its ap-
and determine as to each specific proaches, erected by a company
lot to be purchased, but it could incorporated by 50 & 51 Vict. ch.
delegate such power to the assess- 97 (D.), and acquired by the
ment commissioner as one of its plaintiffs, who were incorporated
officials.
by 62 & 63 Vict. ch. 95 (D.), was
held to be liable to assessment, as
regards the part situate in the
township of Ameliasburg, as real
property, within the meaning of
the Ontario Assessment Act, 4
Edw. VII. ch. 23.

Section 8 of 3 Edw. VII. ch. 86
(O.), after, in general terms, valid-
ating and confirming all sales,
proceeded to specify a number of
irregularities, amongst others ir
regularities in the assessment, but
not specifying an invalid assess- The effect of the two Dominion
ment, and as to the failure to statutes referred to is to confer a
comply with the provisions of perpetual right in the nature of an
secs. 183-4, and concluded: "And easement to construct and main-
notwithstanding any other failure tain the bridge across the navig-
or omission by the city or any able waters of the Bay of Quinté;
official of the city to comply with
any requirement of the said Acts,
and notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in either of the said
Acts contained," namely, the
Assessment Act in the R.S.O. and
Consolidated Assessment Act,
1892:-

the words "real property," in
sec. 2 (7) of the Assessment Act,
by virtue of sec. 2 (8) of the
Municipal Act, 1903, include an
easement; and the bridge comes
within none of the exemptions
mentioned in the Assessment Act.
The interest of the Crown in any
Held, MEREDITH, J.A., dissent- property is exempt, but that
ing, that the defects were not leaves the interest of any person
cured by the said Act; that the else not holding for the Crown,
ejusdem generis doctrine applied; or in trust for the Crown, liable
and that the Act was only applic- under the general words of the
able to the specific cases referred statute; and the plaintiffs were
to, and cases of a like character. not agents or trustees for the
Crown. Section 37 of the Act ap-
The sale was, therefore, held
bad, and the deed to the city set plies only to a bridge forming part
aside, and the plaintiff held en- bridge; nor is this bridge a public
of a toll road, and not to this
titled to redeem the lands on pay-road or way, within the meaning
ment of the amount of the taxes of sec. 5 (5) of the Assessment Act.
in arrear and interest.

Judgment of MACMAHON, J., at
the trial affirmed. Russell v. City
of Toronto, 484.

Niagara Falls Suspension
Bridge Co. v. Gardner (1869), 29
U.C.R. 94, In re Queenston Heights
Bridge Assessment (1901), 1 O.L.
5. Toll Bridge over Navigable R. 114, and International Bridge

Co. v. Village of Bridgeburg (1906), | a part of the purchase money;
12 O.L.R. 314, followed.
and, the cheque being dishon-
Judgment of BOYD, C., affirmed. oured, the plaintiff was held en-
Belleville and Prince Edward titled to recover the amount
Bridge Co. v. Township of Amelias-
burg, 174.

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES.

See COSTS, 2.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT

OF CREDITORS.

See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 1.

ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE.
See MORTGAGE.

ASYLUM.

See LUNATIC.

BENEFIT CERTIFICATE.
See INSURANCE, 3.

BETTING.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND

PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. Cheque Consideration
Part Payment under Unenforceable
Contract-Statute of Frauds.]-A
definite oral bargain (good except
for the Statute of Frauds) for the
sale by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant of an ascertainable and
definite parcel of land is a suffi-
cient consideration for a cheque
drawn by the defendant upon a
bank in favour of the plaintiff for

thereof from the defendant, the
latter not being in possession, and
the plaintiff not having made or
tendered a conveyance, but being
able and willing to perform his
contract.

Judgment of the 4th division
court in the county of Waterloo
reversed. Kinzie v. Harper, 582.

2. Promissory Note-Erasure of
Word "Renewal"-Material Al-
teration-Holder in Due Course-
"Tenor"-R.S.C. 1906, ch. 119,
sec. 145.]-By the proviso to sec.
145 of the Bills of Exchange Act,
R.S.C. 1906, ch. 119, "where a
bill has been materially altered,
but the alteration is not apparent,
and the bill is in the hands of a
holder in due course, such holder
may avail himself of the bill, as if
it had not been altered, and may
enforce payment according to its
original tenor."

The defendant gave N. a prom-
issory note intended as a renewal
of and to retire a former note for
the same amount which N. had
discounted at a bank. When the
defendant made the note, the
word "renewal" was, 'at his in-
stance, written near the lower
N. erased the
left-hand corner.
word "renewal," the erasure not
being apparent without the use of
a magnifying glass, and discounted
the note with the plaintiffs, with-
out taking up the original note,
which the defendant had to pay.
In an action on the renewal note:→

Held, that the alteration not
being apparent, and the plaintiffs
having taken a note complete and
regular on its face, in good faith
and for value without actual
notice, they were "holders in due

« 이전계속 »